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 Abstract 
The concept of autonomy underlies many other issues in moral and 
political philosophy. This dissertation states that contemporary debates within 
Shi’i thought view autonomy as individualistic, and that this individualism 
brings it into conflict with tradition. It then argues that autonomy is not 
equivalent to individualism, and argues for an understanding of autonomy that 
is socially and historically embed- ded and discursive. This makes it possible 
to rethink the relationship between autonomy and tradition. This rethinking is 
done through a method of reflective equilibrium, where various ideas from 
various fields are brought into a coherent whole. There are two phases to this 
rethinking. The first is in clarifying the concept of autonomy and the second is 
bringing this concept of autonomy and Shi’i tradition into equilibrium.  
The dissertation begins by stating that Shi’i thought has already made 
room for autonomy, but that the concept of autonomy that is dominant is 
individualistic. An understanding of autonomy as socially and historically 
embedded is defended. The second phase is to reconcile this embedded 
notion of autonomy with Shi’i tradition. It is argued that autonomy is important 
for both the internalisation of tradition and the formation of tradition. Empirical 
evidence is provided through positive psychology that shows that the most 
effective means of internalising a belief is through contexts that support 
autonomy. This understanding of internal- isation is brought into equilibrium 
with the Shi’i concept of forbidding wrong. It is argued that one of the 
conditions of forbidding wrong is the condition of efficacy. Approaches to 
forbidding wrong that support autonomy meet this condition, while those that 
deny autonomy generally do not. Finally, it is argued that autonomy should be 
considered within the process of ijtihād because it has an epistemic gain. 
Autonomous individuals gain a certain level of expertise through their life 
experiences that are necessary to be incorporated in the ijtiḥād.  
  
 
 
Abstract!..........................................................................................................!3!
Acknowledgements!........................................................................................!8!
Introduction!...................................................................................................!9!
Discursive Selves!..................................................................................................................................!11!
The Shi’i Tradition!.................................................................................................................................!12!
Categorisation: Islamists, Traditionalists, and Reformists!...............................................!17!
Contemporary scholars!......................................................................................................................!23!
Western Philosophy!.............................................................................................................................!27!
Structure of the Dissertation!............................................................................................................!30!
Method!.........................................................................................................!32!
Coherentism vs Foundationalism!..................................................................................................!32!
Reflective Equilibrium!..........................................................................................................................!33!
The Pragmatic Turn!..............................................................................................................................!34!
The Precedence of Empiricism!......................................................................................................!36!
An Instrumentalist Defense!..............................................................................................................!38!
The Structure of the Study!................................................................................................................!41!
The Definition of Autonomy and Its Foundations in Shi’i Thought!....!42!
A Prototype Approach to Defining Autonomy!.........................................................................!43!
Prototyping!...............................................................................................................................................!44!
Schemata!..................................................................................................................................................!45!
Defining Autonomy!...............................................................................................................................!46!
A Schema of Autonomy: Relevant Attributes!.......................................................................!48!
Autonomy and Social Embeddedness!.....................................................................................!49!
How Shi’ism has made room for autonomy!.............................................................................!53!
Autonomy as a Comprehensive Doctrine!...............................................................................!53!
Fiṭra and the Good Innate Nature!...............................................................................................!56!
Free-will!......................................................................................................................................................!57!
The Intelligibility of Good and Evil!...............................................................................................!58!
The Scope of Taqlīd!............................................................................................................................!60!
Pushing the Boundaries of Autonomy!........................................................................................!65!
Shabestari and Reformist Conceptions of Autonomy!..........................!66!
Biography!...................................................................................................................................................!67!
Reformism and the Authoritarian State!......................................................................................!69!
Epistemic Egalitarianism as a Social Movement!...............................................................!71!
Shabestari’s Hermeneutcis!..............................................................................................................!73!
Modernity and Choice!.........................................................................................................................!76!
Establishing Religious Experience!...............................................................................................!79!
Experience as an attractive encounter with God!...............................................................!81!
From the Abyss to Faith!.....................................................................................................................!83!
Gadamer vs Shabestari!.....................................................................................................................!85!
Rethinking Choice and Embeddedness!....................................................................................!87!
A Social Self!................................................................................................!89!
Rawls and Justification!.......................................................................................................................!91!
Autonomy as Content!........................................................................................................................!92!
Autonomy as Process!........................................................................................................................!93!
The Implications of Autonomy!........................................................................................................!95!
A Comprehensive Kantian Autonomy!......................................................................................!96!
Political Conception of the Person!.............................................................................................!96!
Two Concepts of Autonomy and Islam!....................................................................................!98!
MacIntyre’s Critique of Liberalism!...............................................................................................!101!
The Myth of Enlightened Rationalism!....................................................................................!103!
How Tradition Affects Rationality!.............................................................................................!106!
MacIntyre and Rawls!.......................................................................................................................!108!
Liberalism and the Socially Embedded Self!......................................................................!109!
Kymlicka’s Model of the Self!.......................................................................................................!111!
The Public Sphere as a Standard of Civilisation!.................................................................!122!
Conclusion!...............................................................................................................................................!128!
The Paternalism of ’Amr bi al-Ma`rūf!.....................................................!129!
Importance of Forbidding Wrong!.................................................................................................!131!
The Condition of Efficacy!................................................................................................................!134!
Freedom and Personality!................................................................................................................!139!
Incorporating Autonomy in Forbidding Wrong!......................................................................!142!
Self-Determination Theory!......................................................................!142!
SDT and Philosophical Anthropology!.......................................................................................!143!
History and Foundations!..................................................................................................................!145!
SDT assumptions and Foundations!..........................................................................................!148!
The Findings of SDT!..........................................................................................................................!150!
Internalization and Extrinsic Motivation!...................................................................................!152!
The Negative Effects of External Motivation on Intrinsic Motivation!....................!153!
Types of Internalization!..................................................................................................................!155!
The What of Motivational Goals!................................................................................................!163!
Internalization and Faith!................................................................................................................!163!
Autonomy vs Independence and Structure!............................................................................!164!
Independence!......................................................................................................................................!165!
Autonomy and Independence!....................................................................................................!165!
SDT and Cross Cultural Context!..............................................................................................!166!
Asian Communitarianism!..............................................................................................................!168!
SDT Results on Different Cultures!..........................................................................................!169!
Structure!...................................................................................................................................................!173!
Criticisms of Autonomy From Other Sciences!.....................................................................!174!
The Implications for Forbidding Wrong and the Limits of SDT!....................................!176!
Discursive Tradition!.................................................................................!179!
What is tradition?!.................................................................................................................................!181!
Tradition as discourse!.....................................................................................................................!182!
Tradition and autonomy!.................................................................................................................!185!
Truth and Daily Life!............................................................................................................................!187!
A Pragmatic Ijtihād!...................................................................................!188!
Terminology!............................................................................................................................................!189!
Fallibalism!................................................................................................................................................!194!
Ijtihād and Valid Inquiry!....................................................................................................................!196!
Ethical Cultivation and Shared Moral Responsibility!........................................................!198!
Conclusion!...............................................................................................................................................!202!
The Pragmatic Truth and Epistemic Democracy!.................................!203!
Pragmatism and Epistemic Democracy!...................................................................................!204!
The Background to Pragmatism!..................................................................................................!205!
Descartes’ Epistemology!..............................................................................................................!206!
Pierce’s Response!............................................................................................................................!207!
Anti-Skepticism and Anti-Foundationalism!.........................................................................!208!
Fallibilism!................................................................................................................................................!210!
Correspondence!.................................................................................................................................!211!
Pragmatic Truth!..................................................................................................................................!212!
Cheryl Misak!..........................................................................................................................................!213!
Intellectual History of Misak!.........................................................................................................!214!
Objectivity and the Community of Inquirers!.......................................................................!217!
Autonomy and the Empirical Evidence for Epistemic Gain!...........................................!220!
People are Primitive and Infantile!............................................................................................!222!
Empirical Evidence in Support!...................................................................................................!225!
Unaccredited and Interactional Expertise!...............................................................................!228!
History of Expertise!..........................................................................................................................!229!
Two New Types of Expertise!......................................................................................................!230!
Planning Without Local Expertise!............................................................................................!234!
Two Types of Experience and Ijtihād!.....................................................................................!237!
Autonomy, Unaccredited Expertise and Ijtihād!...................................!238!
The Current Role of Expertise in Uṣūl al-Fiqh!......................................................................!240!
The Probative Force of Ahl al-Khibrah!..................................................................................!240!
Expertise and Taqlīd!........................................................................................................................!242!
Unaccredited Expertise in Shi’i Fiqh!..........................................................................................!244!
State Incorporation of Fiqh!.............................................................................................................!247!
Labour Law!............................................................................................................................................!249!
Family Law!............................................................................................................................................!251!
Modarrasi and the Incorporation of Unaccredited Expertise!........................................!255!
Theory But Not Practice!...................................................................................................................!256!
Conclusion!................................................................................................!257!
Limits of the Research!......................................................................................................................!263!
Further Research!......................................................................................!265!
Bibliography!..............................................................................................!270!
  
Acknowledgements 
Through out the process of writing this dissertation I have benefited 
immensely from the help of my advisor, the staff and students at Exeter, and 
my wife and family.  
I would like to express my utmost gratitude to my advisor Professor 
Sajjad Rizvi. It was through my discussions with Professor Rizvi that that led 
me to this research question, and he supported me when I decided to take a 
new approach to dissertation. He has been more than helpful throughout the 
entire the process of this thesis. I could not have imagined having a better 
advisor and mentor for my Ph.D. study.  
I would also like to thank Professor Robert Gleave, Dr. Marc Valeri and 
the research staff at the University of Exeter for their insight into many issues 
regarding Arab and Islamic studies. I would also like to thank Hassan 
Beloushi, for his stimulating comments during our weekly discussions, and for 
all the fun we had during over the years.  
Lastly, I would like to thank my wife Ensieh Matinpoor. The dissertation 
would not have been possible if it wasn’t for her support and assistance. I 
would also like to thank my father, my in-laws, my brother and sister for 
supporting me throughout writing this thesis and my life in general.  
  
 Introduction 
In 1783 a Berlin journal asked, “What is enlightenment?” In response to 
this question Kant gave his famous reply: “Enlightenment is the human 
being’s emergence from his self-incurred minority. Minority is inability to make 
use of one’s own understanding without direction from another.”1 In short, the 
Enlightenment had given birth to autonomy; the capacity for one to rationally 
choose one’s own projects and goals. Autonomy has ever since been a 
cornerstone for both moral and political philosophy. It has been central to 
Kant’s moral project as well as Rawls’ theory of justice. 
This autonomy has also been viewed as coming into conflict with 
tradition. On the surface, it would seem that autonomy requires independence 
while tradition demands obedience. Autonomy is at times expressed in an 
existentialist manner, where the individual has lost all forms of authority, lives 
in a world devoid of meaning, and it is only through personal choice that any 
meaning can be salvaged. This is the understanding of the self that is 
presented by the Iranian reformist thinker Mohammad Mojtahid Shabestari, 
whose views we will return to in a later chapter. On the other hand, tradition is 
thought of as an uncompromising rigid set of rules that all must obey. This is 
manifest through the concept of taqlīd, emulation, where the layperson is 
required to follow the religious expert. Robert Gleave summarizes the problem 
as such: “The influence of liberal notions of individual will and freedom of 
thought would seem to run counter to the ijtihad-taqlid theory.”2 
This dilemma also exists within Shi’i thought itself. There are concepts 
within the tradition that support both sides. Shi’ism supports many of the 
attributes essential for autonomy, such as free will, rationality, and good 
disposition. On the other hand, there are concepts within the tradition that can 
                                                        
1Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, Kant, Immanuel, 1724-
1804. Works. English. 1992 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 17.  
2Robert Gleave, “Conceptions of Authority in Iraqi Shi’ism Baqir Al-Hakim, Ha’iri and 
Sistani on Ijtihad, Taqlid and Marja’iyya,” Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 2 (March 1, 
2007): 66. 
be used to deny autonomy such as the commandment to forbid wrong and the 
notion of taqlīd. 
However, the key to understanding the relationship between autonomy 
and tradition is understanding the discursive nature of both autonomy and 
tradition. To steal a term from the pragmatist philosopher Robert Brandom we 
are “makers and takers of reasons.”3 The way that we come to understand 
tradition is the same way we come to understand our own identities, it is 
through a process of deliberation with others. The key to understanding the 
discursive nature of our selves, is through understanding how we are socially 
and historically embedded. I will use these terms interchangeably in this 
dissertation. 
The main argument of this dissertation is that autonomy and tradition fit 
together when we understand autonomy is necessary for both the 
internalization and formation of tradition. I first argue that the individualistic 
understanding of autonomy that dominates reformist thought is not defensible. 
I argue instead for a socio-historical understanding of autonomy, one that is 
grounded in the empirical psychological research of Self Determination 
Theory. It is through this research that I argue that the autonomy supportive 
contexts are necessary for the internalization of tradition, and that it meets the 
requirement of efficacy put forward in the concept of `amr bi al-ma`rūf. I then 
argue that autonomy is important for the formation of tradition. The Shi’i Uṣūlī 
conception of truth as an end of inquiry commits Shi’i uṣūlism to incorporate 
the views and opinions of people who are not experts in jurisprudence 
because it provides an epistemic gain. The inclusion of non-experts helps to 
discover the truth. 
Different understandings of autonomy, have been, put forward by moral 
and political philosophers. Many of the early conceptions of autonomy have 
been criticised for being too individualistic, or atomistic. These individualistic 
interpretations of autonomy do not properly take into consideration how we 
are intricately bound to the social and historical contexts which form us. There 
has thus been a socio-historical turn within the understanding of autonomy, 
                                                        
3Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive 
Commitment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 6.  
where liberal moral and political philosophers are now trying to incorporate 
these critiques into their various philosophies. 
The discourse within Shi’i thought, however, is still dominated by this 
individualistic understanding of autonomy. The conception of autonomy that is 
put forward by reformist thinkers such as Mohammad Mojtahid Shabestari, 
consider the individual to be in an infinite plane where they must choose 
various goals and projects. On the other hand they deny the epistemic 
authority of religious experts, and state that through religious experience 
individuals can develop their own understanding of religion. They do not take 
serious this embedded concept of autonomy. I highlight Shabestari because 
while he presents an individualistic understanding of the self, the very 
hermeneutical tradition that he borrows from is amongst the greatest critics of 
this individualism. Hans Georg Gadamer is in the forefront of philosophers 
that critique the Enlightenment for its prejudice against prejudice, authority 
and tradition. 
These atomistic conceptions of autonomy have been critiqued by 
conservative Shi‘i thinkers. Yet, the conservative understanding of the 
relationship between the expert (mujtahid) and the layperson (muqallid) 
ignores the discursive nature of autonomy and tradition. It is through the give 
and take of reasons that individuals come to internalize faith, and it is through 
this discourse that tradition is formed. I therefore argue that a socio-historical 
understanding of autonomy requires that we reexamine the relationship 
between autonomy, authority, and tradition. 
Discursive Selves 
The concept of discursive selves that I use within my arguments is built 
upon the foundations laid by previous philosophers and psychologists. There 
are three concepts that are fundamental to how I understand the discursive 
self, and each concept will be clarified in coming chapters. 
The first is that we are socially and historically embedded. Our 
identities, and our rational reasoning, are embedded within a social and 
historical tradition. We understand who we are through this tradition, and 
through dialogue with others. We are formed through social forces but are 
also active respondents that challenge and deny various aspects of our 
identities and beliefs within society. 
Secondly, we internalise beliefs and values through our autonomy. We 
are active agents in the formation of our identities. To internalise a belief 
requires us to fit this new belief among the others that we currently hold. This 
internalisation in turn motivates us towards our goals and proper actions. 
The third concept is that experience brings about expertise. Our daily 
experience as students, wives, or workers, brings about a level of knowledge 
that attainable mainly through our various experiences. These experiences 
help us to develop a level of expertise that enable us to critique the various 
social forces around us. Thus, we are not ignorant participants, but 
knowledgeable participants with a great deal of unaccredited expertise. 
The concept of the social-historical self will be built upon the discussion 
of an overlapping consensus of feminist, communitarian, and liberal 
philosophers. Although each use the concept of emebbedness for their own 
ends, they broadly agree on the fact that we are embedded. The concept of 
autonomy and internalisation is based on the psychological work of Self 
Determination Theory (SDT). SDT is a theory of motivation, but it built upon 
philosophical theories of the self and has developed a theory about how we 
internalise beliefs and why this internalisation motivates us. The third concept 
of expertise is built upon theories within the philosophy of science, especially 
those put forward by Harry Collins and Robert Evans. 
The Shi’i Tradition 
I should clarify foremost what I mean by Shi’i tradition. First of all, I 
understand tradition as being discursive as described by Talal Asad. Asad 
puts forward his understanding of tradition in his seminal essay “The Idea of 
an Anthropology of Religion.” He defines tradition as thus:  
A tradition consists essentially of discourses that seek to instruct practitioners regarding 
the correct form and purpose of a given practice that, precisely because it is established, 
has a history… An Islamic discursive tradition is simply a tradition of Muslim discourse that 
addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a particular 
Islamic practice in the present.4 
Tradition can therefore be thought of as the framework that guides the 
beliefs and actions of individuals. It’s composed of the comprehensive 
doctrines and moral principles that have been established through discourse, 
debate, and deliberation. As I will show below, I label those who wish to 
conserve this said tradition as traditionalists, those who wish to reform the 
tradition to allow for more liberal interpretation as reformists, and those who 
wish to reform tradition so that it meets the requirements of governing a 
modern Islamic state as Islamists. 
What I mean by the Shi’i tradition is the ithnā‘asharī (Twelver) uṣūlī 
Shi’i tradition. Ithnā‘asharī is a sect within Islam that believes that there were 
12 divinely guided Imams after the Prophet Muhammad. It is a comprehensive 
doctrine that holds certain theological beliefs, the main tenants which can be 
found in the uṣūl al-dīn, the principles of faith; tawhīd (the unity of God), divine 
justice, prophethood, Imamate, and the day of resurrection.5 Moreover, there 
are also theological stances on issues related to philosophical anthropology, 
and it is these issues that are relevant to this research. This includes views on 
fiṭrah (good innate nature), free will, and ḥusn wa qubh al-‘aqlī (the 
intelligibility of good and evil). Later on, it will be shown how Shi’i philosophical 
anthropology can support the modern concept of autonomy and these three 
concepts will be explored in further detail. In doing so I will reference the 
works of the early Shi’i theologians who were influential in defining Shi’i 
theology. This includes influential scholars such as Muḥammad ibn 
Muḥammad ibn al-Nu‘man  al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022), ‘Alī ibn Ḥusayn 
                                                        
4Ibid., 14.  
5 Shaykh Ṣadūq Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī ibn Bābawayh, Al-Itqādāt, ed. ‘Alī Mīr-Sharīfī and 
‘Aṣām ‘Abd al-Sayyid, (Qum: al-Mu’tamar al-‘Alimī li al-Alfīyyah al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, 
1992); Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥillī, Miqdād ibn ‘Abdallāh Suyūrī Ḥillī, and Abī al-Fatḥ ibn 
Makhdūm al-Ḥusaynī, al-Bāb al-Ḥādī al-‘Ashr li al-‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī ma‘a Sharḥayhī, ed. 
Mahdī Muḥaqiq (Mashhad: Mu’asasah Chāp va Intishārāt Āstān-i Quds-i Raḍavī, 1991; 
Martin J. McDermott, The Theology of Al-Shaikh Al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022) (Beyrouth: Dar el-
Machreq éditeurs, 1978);  
al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044), and Jamāl ad-Dīn Hasan ibn Yusuf al-
‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī (d. 771/1369).6 
Mu‘tazilite theologians influenced many of these early thinkers.7 The 
Mu‘tazala are rationalist theologians that originated in the early to mid-eighth 
century.8 They debated various themes in theology such as divine justice, free 
will, and the commandment to do right and forbid wrong. Their opinions will be 
discussed only when it helps to clarify an early Shi’i position. One thinker that 
will be referenced in particular is qādī ‘Abd al-Jabbār al-Hamadānī (d. 
415/1024). ‘Abd al-Jabbār was one of the last great Mu‘tazilite thinkers and 
has written summaries about Mu‘tazilite theology.9 
Uṣūlī refers to a school within Shi’i thought. There have been various 
debates within Twelver Shi’ism, but the current dominant framework is 
uṣūlism. The term Uṣūlī applies to an approach towards legal theory within 
Shi’i jurisprudence that supports the application of rational principles. This is 
in contrast to the Akhbārīs who protested against the incursion of rationalism. 
The dispute between these two groups came to a head by the works of 
Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarābadī (d. 1036/1627) especially his book al-Fawā‘id 
al-Madaniyya. The Akhbārīs gained prominence during the 17th and 18th 
century. Uṣūlism made a return in the early 19th century and this revival is 
generally attributed to Muḥammad Bāqir al-Bihbihānī (d. 1206/1791). Al-
                                                        
6 For an overview of the influence of these scholars see Mohammed Ali Amir-Moezzi, 
“Early Shīʿī Theology”, in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine 
Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199696703.001.0001/oxfor
dhb-9780199696703-e-30; Hasan Ansari and Sabine Schmidtke, “The Shīʿī Reception of 
Muʿtazilism (II): Twelver Shīʿīs”, in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine 
Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199696703.001.0001/oxfor
dhb-9780199696703-e-34; see Hossein Modarressi, “Rationalism and Traditionalism in 
Shî’î Jurisprudence: A Preliminary Survey”, Studia Islamica, no. 59 (1984): 141–58 
7 Ansari and Schmidkte, “The Shīʿī Reception of Muʿtazilism (II). Martin J. McDermott, 
The Theology of Al-Shaikh Al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022) (Beyrouth: Dar el-Machreq éditeurs, 
1978), 1-8. 
8 Racha el-Omari, ‘The Muʿtazilite Movement (I): The Origins of the Muʿtazila’, in The 
Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, ed. Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199696703.001.0001/oxfor
dhb-9780199696703-e-34 
9 ‘Abd al-Jabbār al-Hamadānī, Al-Uṣūl Al-Khamsah, ed. Fayṣal Badīr ‘Awn (al-Shuwaikh: 
Kuwait: Kuwait University - The Authorship, Translation and Publicaton Committee, 
1998). Richard C. Martin, Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu’tazilism from Medieval 
School to Modern Symbol (Oxford: Oneworld, 1997), 33-35. 
Bihbihānī revived the authority of rational arguments in legal reasoning, and 
uṣūlism has been the dominant legal theory ever since.10  
One of the main disputes between the Akhbārīs and the Uṣūlīs was in 
regards to the use of ijtihād. Ijtihād is the effort of a qualified jurist to reach a 
sound judgment on issues related to Islamic law.11 ‘Abdallāh b. al-Ṣāliḥ al-
Samāhijī (d. 1135/1723), a prominent late Safavid Akhbārī scholar, has 
provided a concise summary of the Akhbārī/Uṣūlī debate. The first item that 
he describes in the conflict is that the Uṣūlis (here labelled as mujtahidīn) 
believe that the use of ijtihād is obligatory, while the Akhbārīs prohibited its 
use. 12 The Uṣūlīs considered four sources for proof (ḥujiyyah): the Qur’an, 
the sunnah of the Prophet and the Imams, ijmā‘ (consensus) and ‘aql 
(rationality). This is while the Akhbārīs only recognized two sources: the 
Qur’an; and the sunnah.13 In his analysis of al-Samāhijī’s work, Andrew 
Newman states that al-Samāhijī’s text confirms the fact the Uṣūlīs “argued for 
the necessity of recourse to subjective disciplines and rationalist principles - 
especially including ijtihād - in the analysis and application of the revelation.”14 
Gleave, in support of this distinction, writes that ijtihād was “perhaps the 
defining issue upon which a scholar was classified as an Akhbārī or Uṣūlī by 
later tradition.”15 
There were social implications on this approach to legal theory and the 
concept of ijtihād led to the establishment of a clerical hierarchy, specifically 
                                                        
10 For a history of this conflict see Andrew J. Newman, ‘The Nature of the Akhbārī/Uṣūlī 
Dispute in Late Ṣafawid Iran, Part 2: The Conflict Reassessed’, Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London 55, no. 2 (1992): 250–61.  Juan Cole, 
‘Shi’i Clerics in Iraq and Iran, 1722-1780: The Akhbari-Usuli Conflict Reconsidered’, 
Iranian Studies 18, no. 1 (1985): 3–34; Robert Gleave, Inevitable Doubt: Two Theories of 
Shī`ī Jurisprudence (Leiden; Brill, 2000), 2-13. Robert Gleave, Scripturalist Islam: The 
History and Doctrines of the Akhbārī Shīī School (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 1-60. 
11 The concept of ijtihād will be revisited in a later chapter. For the definition of ijtihād in 
Shi’i legal theory see Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥillī, Mabādī’ al-Uṣūl Ila ‘Ilm al-Uṣūl (Beirut: Dār al-
Aḍwā’, 1986), 240; ‘Alī Mishkinī, Iṣtilāḥāt Al-Uṣūl wa Mu‘aṭam Abḥāthuha (Qum: Daftar-i 
Nashr al-Hādī, 1993), 18; Hossein Modarressi, “Rationalism and Traditionalism in Shî’î 
Jurisprudence: A Preliminary Survey”, Studia Islamica, no. 59 (1984): 149-150. 
12 Andrew J. Newman, ‘The Nature of the Akhbārī/Uṣūlī Dispute in Late Ṣafawid Iran. Part 
1: “Abdallāh Al-Samāhijī”s "Munyat Al-Mumārisīn’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London 55, no. 1 (1992): 24. 
13 Ibid., 24-25. 
14 Andrew J. Newman, “The Nature of the Akhbārī/Uṣūlī Dispute in Late Ṣafawid Iran, 
Part 2: The Conflict Reassessed”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London 55, no. 2 (1992): 250–61. 
15 Gleave, Inevitable Doubt, 133. 
through the concept of marja‘ al-taqlīd. The concept of marja’iyya refers to the 
importance of senior clerics as “guides, paradigms of practice and spiritual 
mentors.”16 A marja‘ is “a senior religious and juristic authority with a 
following.”17 The concept of mara‘iyya is built upon the twin concepts of ijtihād 
and a‘lamiyya (the most learned). Given that the concept of ijtihād implies 
expertise, for it is the inquiry of a trained jurist, the only recourse that 
laypersons have to valid legal opinions is to rely on the expertise of a qualified 
jurist, the mujtahīd.18 This in short is the concept of taqlīd, or emulation, and a 
layperson that follows the opinions of a mujtahid are called muqallid.19 Given 
that issue of taqlīd is related to the issue of ijtihād, it is also considered as 
being one of the main differences in the Akhbarī/Uṣūlī debate.20  
Added to the principle of ijtihād is the concept of a‘lamiyya, the most 
learned. Laypersons are required to not only follow a mujtahid, but are also 
required to follow the mujtahid that they considered to be the most learned.21 
This is the position occupied by the marja‘ al-taqlīd, for he is considered to be 
the most learned of the mujtahids. The first scholars who were bestowed the 
title of marja‘ al-taqlīd were the 19th century scholars Muḥammad-Ḥasan al-
Najafī and Murtaḍā al-Anṣārī (d. 1281/1864).22 
Staying within the Uṣūlī framework as set out by al-Bihbihānī, Shaykh 
Murtaḍā al-Asnarī made even further advancements within Uṣūlī thought. He 
is generally credited for expanding the general principles of law (al-uṣūl al-
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‘amaliyya), and for restructuring laws related to transactions. His works have 
overshadowed earlier Uṣulī works and his two books al-Makāsīb, on 
transactions, and al-Rasā‘il, on the principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh), 
are part of the main staples of the hawzah (Islamic seminary) curriculum.23 
Categorisation: Islamists, Traditionalists, and 
Reformists 
Although this dissertation is situated within the Shi’i tradition it is also in 
reaction to specific trends within contemporary Shi’i thought. It is a critique of 
a critique of ideas that became dominant in Iran after the establishment of the 
Islamic Republic. Before I can place my own work amongst the different 
intellectual strands within contemporary Shi’i thought it is necessary to 
describe how I have categorized these different strands. My categorization is 
quite straightforward in which I divide Shi’i thinkers into broadly three camps: 
traditionalists, reformists, and Islamists. The main criterion for this 
categorization is the way that various scholars approach ijtihād. I take my lead 
from Mehran Kamrava, for he also categorises the different intellectual trends 
according to their approach to ijtihād, while others have categorised these 
groups according to their approach to politics.24 Although I find slight fault with 
Kamrava’s categorization, specifically the way he defines his “conservative” 
category, Kamrava has brilliantly laid out the essence of the difference 
amongst the various categories, and his categorisation still holds today. 
Mehran Kamrava, in his book Iran’s Intellectual Revolution, divides 
Iranian intellectuals into three categories: conservative, reformist, and secular-
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modernist.25 Kamrava provides short definitive descriptions of the three 
categorizes. He relies upon the general English definitions of the words, as 
well as the elaborate descriptions he gives of the different discourses. He 
summarizes that the conservative discourse is grounded in the traditional 
ijtihād and that it “eschews theoretical and doctrinal innovativeness unless 
doing so is made absolutely necessary by evolving political circumstances”26 
He defines the cornerstone of reformism as their approach to ijtihād and the 
fact that they “complement their ijtihad and their broader understanding of 
religion with other, additional sciences, including especially hermeneutics.”27 
Secular-modernists, as the name suggests, believe that “modernity and 
secularism are intertwined and naturally complementary, one being 
impossible without the other.” 28  For this category religion has no role in the 
public domain. Given that the thinkers in this last category generally put aside 
religion, they are of not of interest to the research at hand. 
I generally agree with Kamrava’s understanding of reformist and 
conservative, but I believe that the “conservative” category is too broad. It 
would be better to divide conservatives into two separate branches: 
traditionalist and Islamist. This therefore gives us the tripartite categorisation 
stated earlier.  Traditionalists match closer to Kamrava’s conservative 
category. They are scholars that limit reform within Islamic law to what has 
been made available within traditional scholarship. Islamists, on the other 
hand, do allow for a greater degree of reform in Islamic law, but towards a 
different social and political orientation than the reformists.  The reformists 
push religious reform towards liberal ends while the Islamists are more 
socially conservative and put the interests of the Islamic state above the 
interests of individuals.  
By dividing Kamrava’s “conservative” category it enables us to 
differentiate traditional scholars such Ayatollahs Sistani, and Wahid 
Khorasani, from Islamist scholars such Ayatollahs Khomeini, Khamenai, and 
Mesbah Yazdi. Kamrava’s categorization compromises the conflicting 
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approaches of the Islamist and the traditionalist camps. As stated above, 
Kamrava describes the conservative discourse as eschewing “theoretical and 
doctrinal innovativeness”. Later on, and after a lengthy analysis of the 
conservative discourse, Kamrava concludes that: 
As we have seen so far, both the language and, more importantly, the logic of the 
conservative religious discourse is firmly grounded in traditional interpretations of Islam 
and Shi’ism.29 
This runs counter to what would be considered a traditionalist 
approach. Under my categorisation, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989), 
the founder and first Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, is a prototypical 
Islamist figure. The reason being that at many junctures Khomeini put aside 
traditionalist approaches to Islamic law for what expedience required in 
governing an Islamic state. This will be made clearer in a later chapter that 
discuss labour and marriage laws as well as the establishment of the 
Expediency Council after the founding of the Islamic State. Ervand 
Abrahamian makes a similar argument in his book Khomeinism and argues 
that Ayatollah Khomeini was not a traditionalist, but rather a populist leader. 
He writes: 
if fundamentalism suggests the strict implementation of the laws and institutions found in 
the basic religious texts, then Khomeini again was no fundamentalist.30 
Arguably, Ayatollah Khomeini himself would agree with Abrahamian. 
Muḥammad Hassan Qadirī, a student of Khomeini and a member of the 
Guardian Council, wrote a letter to Khomeini that reflected critiques levied 
against Khomeini’s rulings on the permissibility of chess and the commercial 
transaction of musical instruments from a traditionalist perspective. In 
response, Khomeini wrote that: 
The way that you have understood traditional literature necessitates that modern 
civilization be destroyed, and people move to the mountains and desserts and become 
nomads.31 
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This is hardly the type of response one would expect from a 
traditionalist. The application of traditional Islamic jurisprudence to the modern 
state required that Khomeini had to make difficult discussions when it came to 
Islamic law. To add to the difficulty many of these discussions were time 
sensitive, meaning that government could only wait so long for an appropriate 
answer. One of the prime examples of the discrepancy between traditionalist 
Islamic law and the state is the issue of labour law. This will be discussed in a 
later chapter. 
It would suffice to say that the concept of wilāyat al-faqīh, was a 
modern concept introduced to Islamic law by Khomeini such that it would give 
greater manoeuvrability to the faqīh in order to legislate rulings that would 
have been difficult to pass through a traditionalist method.32 There is clearly a 
difference in the approaches of the two categories. 
Another scholar that does fit into this categorisation is Morteza 
Motahhari (d. 1979).  Motahhari was the student of Ayatollah Khomeini and is 
heralded as being one the most influential intellectuals associated with the 
Islamic revolution of Iran.33  Motaharri focused on demonstrating that Islam is 
a complete and coherent way of life with practical implications for the modern 
age. Moreover, Motaharri advocated for the reform of Islamic law to meet the 
requirements of the modern age, and there is evidence that he supported an 
understanding of wilāyat al-faqih as put forward by Khomeini.34   
Prototypical scholars within the traditionalist camp would be Ayatollahs 
Ali Sistani, Wahid Khorasani, and Safi Golpaygani. All three scholars are 
considered to be a part of the marja’iyya, and all have studied under other 
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high-ranking scholars. Sistani is the student and successor to Ayatollah Abu 
al-Qasim al-Khoei (d. 1992) who was himself a prominent marja‘.35  Although 
Sistani is based in Iraq he has gained a large global following.36 Ayatollah 
Hossein Wahid Khorasani is a leading marja‘ in Qum. During my studies in 
the hawzah in Iran, Khorasani was constantly held to be one of the most 
knowledgeable scholars in Qum, and his classes on upper level fiqh and uṣūl 
would be highly praised, and very crowded. Ayatollah Lotfi Safi Golpaygani is 
another marja‘ in Qum. Safi Golpaygani used to be the head of the Guardian 
Council and his traditionalist approach to ;Islamic legal theory was at times at 
odds with Ayatollah Khomeini. This had to due specifically with the use of 
ḍarurah and maṣlaḥa.37 
All three scholars have a traditional approach towards Islamic legal 
theory. None of these scholars puts forth an approach that goes beyond the 
confines of legal theory as traditionally discussed within Shi’i uṣulī thought.  
This is evident in the fact that they have gained their status as marja‘ for being 
able to precisely understand and preserve traditional approaches to Islamic 
law. As opposed to scholars in the Islamist and reformist categories, these 
scholars are not famed for their novel interpretations of Islamic law. They are 
conservative, in the sense described it by Kamrava, because they stay within 
the means of Islamic jurisprudence as traditionally understood. 
Prototypical reformists would be Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari and 
Abdolkarim Soroush. Both scholars call for a novel interpretation of Islamic 
law and, as Kamrava stated above, they make use of field of inquiry outside of 
fiqh and uṣūl. Kamrava himself names these scholars as being exemplars of 
this category.38 Shabestari in particular will be the focus of this dissertation for 
reasons that will become outlined below, and a more detailed introduction will 
be given later. Abdolkarim Soroush is the leading figure within the reformist 
approach. Soroush was at first a part of the newly formed Islamic Republic but 
then became a vocal critic. He argues for a more dynamic understanding of 
ijtihād based upon an epistemological grounding. He argues for a pluralistic 
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understanding of religion, including the uṣūl al-dīn, and that ultimately it the 
individual that must come to understand religion in their own terms.39 
Soroush’s theories will not play a central role to this dissertation because 
much literature has already discussed his positions,40 and because 
Shabestari offers a better introduction into the debate, as it will be shown 
below. 
Not all scholars fall neatly within this categorisation, and some scholars 
fall somewhere in-between two of these categories. One scholar of particular 
importance is Ayatollah Ja’far Sobhani, another marja‘ in Qum. During my 
studies at the hawzah Ja’far Sobhani’s books had become mandatory texts 
within the seminary curriculum. This included not only his books on uṣūl and 
ḥadīth sciences, but also his books on theology, exegesis, and history.41 I 
personally had to pass exams for courses that were centred on his books. 
This is significant given that the traditionalist scholars mentioned above either 
do not write at all on issues of theology and history, or if they do, their books 
do not a part of the seminary curriculum.  
Sobhani is simultaneously traditionalist in his personal approach to 
legal theory while being an active supporter of Khomeini’s concept of wilāyat 
al-faqīh.42 It is difficult to see how Sobhani’s books would have become an 
integral part of the curriculum had his positions not been traditionalist. 
Moreover, he actively engages in the rebuttal of reformist thinkers, such as his 
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debate about the nature of prophetic revelation with Soroush.43 These 
multiple positions - active support for the government and the wilāyat al-faqīh, 
his traditionalist approach towards jurisprudence, and polemical arguments 
with reformists - ground the reason as to why his books have become such a 
core part of the hawzah curriculum. I use Ja‘far Sobhani’s works as 
prototypes of traditionalist understanding within the seminary. 
Contemporary scholars 
One of the reasons that this dissertation focuses mostly on 
contemporary scholars is that the concept of autonomy is a modern concept. 
As stated in Kant’s analysis above, it was modernity and the social economic 
changes that it brought about which lead to an increased focus on this 
concept of autonomy. It is modern individuals that have been given the time 
and means to rationally pick and choose their own beliefs and values.44 In the 
history of philosophy, the concept of autonomy comes into focus in the works 
of Immanuel Kant.45 Autonomy grounds Kant’s approach to both epistemology 
and moral philosophy.46 It would therefore not be sensible to examine the 
concept of autonomy amongst the writings and works of pre-modern scholars. 
It is in modern scholarship that this debate takes shape.  
Moreover, as I stated earlier, this dissertation is a critique of a critique. 
It is a critique of the individualistic understanding of autonomy that has been 
put forward by reformist understandings of Shi’ism. After its establishment, the 
Islamic Republic began to regulate many aspects of the individual’s private life 
such as music, movies, satellite television, hijāb, weddings, and the choice of 
spouse.47 Reformist understandings of autonomy have been in reaction to 
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these paternalistic practices. In order curtail the encroachment of the state in 
personal affairs, they argued for an individualistic understanding of the self 
and of faith.48 As Kathleen Foody argues these reformers rethought religion in 
order to “make safe and retake space overwhelmed by the authoritarian state 
apparatus of the Islamic Republic and its claims to religious authority.”49 
As it will be shown, these scholars have tried to open up a greater 
domain for the individual. This individualism is unique to reformist thought, 
and it is from here that my analysis begins.50 For, I am not arguing simply that 
Shi’i thought should incorporate autonomy, but I am arguing for a specific 
understanding of autonomy. This specific type of autonomy, one that is 
embedded or situated within a social historical tradition, is itself a critique of 
the concept of autonomy that grew from the enlightenment. Again, this will be 
shown later, specifically in the works of the German philosopher Hans Georg 
Gadamer (d. 2002) the main figure in 20th century hermeneutics. 
It is for this reason that this research focuses so heavily on the works 
of Shabestari. For, on the one hand Shabestari argues for the greater role of 
the individual and for individual autonomy by grounding his approach in 
hermeneutics and existentialism. On the other hand, one of the most 
prominent philosophers working in hermeneutics, Gadamer, puts forward a 
situated understanding of the self. Thus, Shabestari embodies this very 
contradiction. He simultaneously argues for individualism while borrowing 
concepts from hermeneutics that argues against that individualism. This, 
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therefore, allows me to simultaneously present the concept of autonomy as it 
is understood within the reformist approach, while allowing me to critique that 
understanding and present an alternative.  
Shabestari’s works also provide a bridge between Western philosophy 
and Shi’i thought. Although, I might disagree with Shabestari’s understanding 
of autonomy and faith, I do agree with his approach, in the sense that it is 
possible to mix these different traditions together. This innovative approach 
towards Islamic legal theory has sparked a new genre within Shi’i fiqh known 
as falsafat al-fiqh, or the philosophy of fiqh.51 It is truly within this genre that 
this dissertation can be placed. The growth of this genre is due to the 
contributions of reformist scholars as well as the rebuttals of their critics. The 
Arab reformist intellectual, ‘Abd al-Jabār al-Rafā‘ī, writes that Shabestari was 
the first individual to coin the term falsafat al-fiqh.52  
Moreover, the growth of the genre of falsafat al-fiqh is in response to 
the radical changes brought about to Shi’i fiqh by the establishment of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. These changes are well documented by Asghar 
Schirazi.53 I will return to two issues in particular in later chapters in regards to 
the changes brought about to labour and marriage laws. As it will be shown, 
the changes in labour law required not only a change in positive law, but also 
a change in legal theory. It brought about the institutionalization of expediency 
and led to the establishment of the Expediency Council.  
Shabestari himself comments in this regard. In reply to an interviewer 
about the events that led him to develop his theories on hermeneutics, 
Shabestari replies that the catalyst was the reforms taking place within fiqh 
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and Iranian law after the revolution.54 He states that the haphazard approach 
towards reform is what led him to try to make sense of what was occurring 
and to try to find a more systematic approach. Thus, Shabestari uses the 
reforms made by the Islamic republic to justify his reformist approach to 
Islamic legal theory. It grounds his philosophy of fiqh. 
Yet, it would be wrong to assume that because these debates 
happened in Iran that these debates are necessarily specific to Iran. Non-
Iranian Shi’i scholars have not only consumed the debates that have been on 
going within the Iranian context, but have also been active participants. For 
example Hassan Beloushi in his study of the Iraqi marja‘ Mohammad Taqi 
Modarresi states that it has been the changes and dynamism within Iran that 
prompted Modarresi to put forward a new approach in Shi’i legal theory.55 
Ḥaydar Ḥuballāh, an influential Lebanese scholar that teaches in Qum, not 
only actively writes about the issue of the philosophy of fiqh, but also lectures 
on the topic.56 Moreover, the works of the Iranian reformists have been 
translated into Arabic by al-Rafā‘ī, who himself is an influential reformist 
thinker.57 The debates within Iran, and the practical application of the Islamic 
law to modern society have clearly attracted and influenced non-Iranian Shi’i 
thought. 
Although I have indicated where theoretically I place my research 
within Shi’i thought, the concept of autonomy has not been discussed directly 
in the literature, and definitely not to the extent that it is discussed within the 
Western philosophical tradition. Concepts that overlap with autonomy, such 
as freedom and choice, are of greater focus. It requires, therefore, for one to 
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extrapolate the concept of autonomy from the works of these individual 
scholars. Given that autonomy is a concept that affects multiple fields of 
inquiry, research into a scholar’s conception of autonomy also requires that 
one take into consideration these various fields. Thus the chapter on 
Shabestari investigates how Shabestari’s conception of autonomy plays a role 
in his understanding of faith, hermeneutics, and political philosophy. 
Western Philosophy 
This research is not only situated within a particular discourse in Shi’i 
thought, but also in an on-going discussion in Western philosophy. This 
research is heavily indebted to contemporary strains within Western 
philosophy that have put forward an understanding of the self that is 
embedded in a social and historical tradition. This new model of the self can 
be found amongst different trends within Western philosophy and sociology. 
My research will pull from various traditions including the analytical, 
continental, hermeneutical, and feminist traditions.  
 The launching point of my discussion is the liberal-communitarian 
debate.  During the 1980s communitarian thinkers critiqued liberal philosophy 
on various topics, the crux of which was the individualistic conception of the 
self.58 This debate compromised of some the most influential philosophers in 
the English-speaking world, specifically philosopher’s based in America, on 
the topic of philosophical anthropology. The argument levied by 
communitarian thinkers, such as Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, and 
Alasdair Macintyre was that the philosophical anthropology underpinning the 
political philosophy of liberal thinkers, more specifically John Rawls, was too 
individualistic, and each of these philosophers put forward a more social 
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understanding of the self. The outcome of this debate was not the 
abandonment of liberal political philosophy, but actually the incorporation of 
this understanding of the self within liberal thinking. I will show how this is the 
case with specifically two liberal thinkers Kwame Appiah and Will Kymlicka. 
Moreover, I will show how philosophers from the feminist and 
continental traditions have also argued for a similar understanding of the self. 
I have already remarked about how I will use the philosophical hermeneutics 
of Hans George Gadamer to argue against the individualism put forward by 
Shabestari. In the process I will highlight how Gadamer borrows ideas from 
his own teacher, Martin Heidegger (d. 1976), one of the most influential 
thinkers of the 20th century.  
I also show the development of the concept of relational autonomy 
within feminist philosophy. Relational autonomy is the understanding that 
“persons are socially embedded and that agents’ identities are formed within 
the context of social relationships.”59 Feminists critique individualistic 
conceptions of autonomy for privileging patriarchal values in society, and put 
forward relational autonomy as an alternative understanding of the self. 
The debates discussed above set out the scene for two ways that I 
believe Shi’i thought can incorporate an embedded understanding of 
autonomy. This has to do with the internalisation and formation of tradition. 
My arguments based on the relationship of autonomy and the internalisation 
of tradition are grounded in the works of Self Determination Theory (SDT). 
SDT is a theory in positive psychology that argues that autonomy supportive 
contexts help individuals to internalise tradition.60 The history of SDT will be 
described in a later chapter, but it should be noted that SDT’s understanding 
of autonomy is inspired by many of the debates described above.  
My debates about the importance of autonomy for the formation of 
tradition rely on contemporary works within the fields of pragmatism and 
epistemic democracy. Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that originated 
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in the United States in the 19th century. One of its principle founders was 
Charles Sanders Peirce (d. 1914). Pragmatism has undergone a resurgence 
in the twentieth century giving birth to new strands of thought within the 
tradition such as the Neo-Pragmatists and the New Pragmatists.61 
The reason I appeal to Pragmatist philosophy is twofold. First, the 
pragmatic understanding of truth as the end of inquiry is quite similar to the 
concept of ijtihād as described above. Second, this understanding of truth has 
had ramifications in the field of epistemic democracy. The field of epistemic 
democracy emerged in the 1980s and is focused on the epistemic 
justifications for democracy.62 I analyse the arguments of Cheyrl Misak, one of 
the leading figures within the New Pragmatist movement, that a pragmatic 
understanding of truth entails that the process of deliberation be opened up 
for a greater degree of participation from people of various backgrounds. I 
argue that since the understanding of ijtihād matches well with the pragmatic 
understanding of truth, Misak’s argument for a broader participation in inquiry 
holds true for the Shi’i uṣulī understanding of ijtihād as well. 
However, I found the arguments by epistemic democrats about how 
laypersons contribute to technical debates to be lacking. It is here that I turn to 
contemporary debates within the philosophy of science, for this issue of 
democratic participation has also become an important theme in discussions 
on the social dimensions of scientific knowledge.63 Two notable thinkers in the 
field are Philip Kitcher and Helen Longino, and I appeal to Longino’s social 
                                                        
61 For overviews of pragmatic philosophy see Richard J. Bernstein, The Pragmatic Turn 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2010) Cheryl. J. Misak, The American Pragmatists, Oxford History of 
Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Robert B. Talisse and Scott F. Aikin, 
Pragmatism: A Guide for the Perplexed, Guides for the Perplexed (London1; New York: 
Continuum, 2008). 
62 For an overview of debates in epistemic democracy see Melissa Schwartzberg, 
“Epistemic Democracy and Its Challenges”, Annual Review of Political Science 18, no. 1 
(2015): 187–203; David Estlund, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Approaches to Democracy’, 
Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 5, no. 1 (2008): 1–4; Fabienne Peter, 
Democratic Legitimacy (London: Routledge, 2011). For more foundational texts in the 
field see William H. Riker, Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation Between the 
Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (San Francisco: WHFreeman, 
1982). Joshua Cohen, ‘An Epistemic Conception of Democracy’, Ethics 97, no. 1 (1986): 
26–38. David M. Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009). 
63 Helen Longino, “The Social Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge”, in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2016, 2016, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/scientific-knowledge-social/. 
epistemology to defend the positions argued by Misak above.64 More 
significantly, however, I rely on Henry Collins and Robert Evans’ rethinking of 
expertise. They argue they argue for the inclusion of laypersons that have 
practical experience in a field but do not have formal credentials, which I have 
here labelled as unaccredited expertise. Layperson expertise sounded like an 
oxymoron. Collins and Evans give various examples as to how laypersons 
have advanced scientific knowledge. This in turn becomes the foundation for 
my argument as to why the opinions of laypersons should be considered 
within the process of ijtihād. 
Structure of the Dissertation 
With the use of this understanding of a discursive self, I hope to bring 
about a new equilibrium between the concepts of autonomy and tradition. The 
structure of the dissertation is therefore modelled after the two sides of the 
debate, with there are three parts in total. 
The first part is the groundwork that lays the method, and the concept 
of the socially embedded self. This part begins by clarifying my method. I will 
be using Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium, a fancy word for a rather 
straightforward approach. In short, the method requires that one bring 
disparate ideas into coherence, or equilibrium. It is rather suitable to my 
argument given the various disciplinary fields I will be drawing from. After the 
chapter on method, I discuss the definition of autonomy. I will not be trying to 
give a definitive definition, but rather draw out the important attributes of 
autonomy. I then show how these attributes already have a place within Shi’i 
thought. From there I focus on Mohammad Mojtahid Shabestari’s 
understanding of the self. The reason I focus on Shabestari is because his 
existentialist understanding of the self has been influential in Shi’i thought, 
under analysed in Western literature, and directly in conflict with the very 
hermeneutical tradition that he is working in. I compare Shabestari’s 
understanding of the self and hermeneutics and compare it to that of 
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Gadamer in order to highlight the individualism inherent in Shabestari’s 
understanding of the self. The becomes a foundation for the next chapter 
which examines the overlapping consensus about the embedded self. 
Part two is where my first argument is centred. I focus on one aspect 
within Shi’i thought that is at times used to deny autonomy, and that is the 
commandment of forbidding wrong and promoting good. My argument is that 
the concept of forbidding wrong has a condition of efficacy, and that condition 
is met by supporting autonomy and not by denying it. The first chapter in this 
part is focused on the concept of forbidding wrong, and the condition of 
efficacy. The second chapter is focused on the empirical research of SDT. I 
argue that autonomy is important for the internalisation of tradition. Supporting 
autonomy helps to internalise beliefs and values motivates individuals towards 
those internalised goals. 
The third part is centred on the second argument. This part is focused 
on the relationship between ijtihād and autonomy. I argue that the layperson 
has a degree of unaccredited expertise which must be taken into account in 
the process of ijtihād. The first chapter in this part focuses on the 
understanding of tradition as discursive. This chapter builds upon the works of 
Talal Asad. The next chapter discusses the epistemology of contemporary 
Shi’i ijtiḥād: a ruling is considered true after an ideal state of inquiry. This 
epistemology is then compared with the pragmatic understanding of truth in 
the following chapter. It is then argued that an epistemology based upon an 
ideal state of inquiry requires one to include all participants who would bring 
about an epistemic gain to the inquiry. It is here that I provide evidence for the 
unaccredited expertise of the layperson, and how their inclusion has an 
epistemic gain. The following chapter then concludes by showing that there is 
already room within ijtiḥād for outside expertise, and that unaccredited 
expertise has already had in impact in Shi’i thought in terms of the Iranian 
labour law, and family law. 
 
  
Method 
The method used to study a phenomenon has some bearing on the 
nature of the phenomenon itself. The concept of autonomy is a 
comprehensive doctrine. It spans a variety of different fields of inquiry, such 
as economics, psychology, philosophy, anthropology, and theology. The 
names given to the fields of inquiry that try to focus heavily on the topic of 
autonomy, such as philosophical anthropology and social philosophy, are 
reflective of the comprehensiveness of autonomy. Therefore, a method should 
be used that takes this comprehensive nature of autonomy into account. One 
such method is Rawls’ reflective equilibrium (RE). 
RE is generally considered to be a coherentist approach to justification 
and is now seen as the appropriate method of inquiry in Anglo-American 
political philosophy. While coherentism was established as a method for 
justification before Rawls, Rawls was able to popularise it for the use of moral 
and political philosophy. In what follows I will briefly describe coherentism and 
how it differs from foundationalism, and I will describe how Rawls and 
subsequent philosophers have used RE. I will then explain why RE is an 
appropriate method for the issue at hand, although I will be using that method 
with minor modifications. 
Coherentism vs Foundationalism 
What I will explain here are coherent and foundationalist theories of 
justification rather than their theories of truth. The emphasis is on a method of 
justification. I will explain only what is justified and not what is true. The 
concept of truth will be dealt with in later chapters. 
The easiest way to begin to describe coherentism is by stating what it 
is not. It is not foundationalist. Foundationalists argue that “all knowledge and 
justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of noninferential knowledge or 
justified belief.”65 That is to say that all arguments regress back to a series of 
beliefs which in of themselves require no further justification. Inferential 
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knowledge is knowledge that is deduced from other beliefs. I have a justified 
belief in P because of my beliefs in A and B, thus P is inferred from A and B. 
Coherentism on the other hand states that belief is only justified if “the 
belief coheres with a set of beliefs, the set forms a coherent system.”66 The 
common metaphor is that is that beliefs are like a ship at sea that needs 
continuous repairs to stay afloat. A specific belief is justified only if sits well 
with other beliefs in this “web of belief.” 
Reflective Equilibrium 
Rawls popularized the method of reflective equilibrium in A Theory of 
Justice. There he writes that justification “ rests upon the entire [moral] 
conception and how it fits in with and organizes our considered judgments in 
reflective equilibrium.”67 Elsewhere he describes his method as such: 
By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual 
circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to principle, I 
assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both 
expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered 
judgments duly pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as reflective 
equilibrium.68 
Norman Daniels, one of the earliest and most influential proponents of 
RE, describes RE as a discursive project that goes back and forth between 
beliefs such that it would provide a level of coherence: 
The method of reflective equilibrium consists in working back and forth among our 
considered judgments (some say our “intuitions”) about particular instances or cases, the 
principles or rules that we believe govern them, and the theoretical considerations that we 
believe bear on accepting these considered judgments, principles, or rules, revising any of 
these elements wherever necessary in order to achieve an acceptable coherence among 
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them. The method succeeds and we achieve reflective equilibrium when we arrive at an 
acceptable coherence among these beliefs69 
The Pragmatic Turn 
There are three ways which I would like to use philosophical thought of 
pragmatism to augment Rawls’ RE. These three ways consist of trying to 
include elements of foundationalism, highlighting the importance of 
coherence, and incorporating a pragmatic theory of truth. The latter two 
concepts are borrowed from Pierce, and while the first is a newer theory 
presented by Susan Haack. 
There are a few debates to the degree that RE is coherentist. Many 
proponents of RE themselves label RE as being coherentist. Daniels states 
that RE is “broadly coherentist.”70 Others, however, claim that RE is not a 
pure coherentist method of justification, but rather it is a weak form of 
foundationalism that also takes into consider the justification of a belief in a 
web of beliefs. One such argument is put forward by Roger Ebertz. He argues 
that Rawls’ RE is not coherentist, but is instead a form of modest 
foundationalism.71 He states that “Both considered moral judgments and the 
common presumptions turn out to serve as modest foundations in a system of 
ethical beliefs in reflective equilibrium.”72 
The particulars of Rawls’ approach to RE and its classification are not 
of terrible significance. The justifiability of coherentism or a modest 
foundationalism, however, is significant. I don’t believe that either 
foundationalism nor coherentism provide valid methods of justification. 
Instead I think a form of modest, or weak, foundationalism is appropriate. 
More specifically, a pragmatic approach to justification, one that is rather 
similar to Susan Haack’s oddly named pragmatic approach, “foundheretism.” 
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She describes her approach in a rather clever analogy of how “foundheretism” 
is similar to a crossword puzzle: 
How reasonable one’s confidence is that a certain entry in a crossword puzzle is correct 
depends on: how much support is given to this entry by the clue and any intersecting 
entries that have already been filled in how reasonable, independently of the entry in 
question, one’s confidence is that those other already filled-in entries are correct; and how 
many of the intersecting entries have been filled in73 
Thus, this approach takes has two main steps. The first is that a belief 
must have some sort of justification independent of other beliefs. It stands by 
itself within that particular field. The second is that this belief must be coherent 
with other beliefs in wide reflective equilibrium. It is coherent with other beliefs 
in other fields. 
This will hopefully overcome one of the criticisms of RE. A method is 
valued if it different individuals can apply that method and still arrive to the 
same conclusions. It is however possible to apply RE and have different 
people arrive to different conclusions.74 The reason being that each individual 
can adjust concepts in different ways in order to have them reach a point of 
coherence. I hope to overcome this by using foundheretism to justify concepts 
through a series of foundations as well as having them form a coherent web 
of thought. 
This leads to the second point of the incorporation of pragmatism: the 
importance of incoherence. One of the primary benefits of RE in that it allows 
us to check for incoherence. I will be able to check for incoherence in the 
concept of autonomy across different major fields such as philosophical 
anthropology, psychology, and Shi’i kalam. This is following with the 
pragmatic approach to justification, and as Olsson summarizes Pierce: 
“Coherence may not suffice to justify our beliefs, but incoherence is what 
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forces us to give them up.”75 Thus, my refutation of certain arguments will be 
based on their incoherence in the web of thought. 
The third point of incorporation from pragmatism is in regards to 
fallibilism. RE and fallibilism do not state that all of our background theories 
are necessarily true, nor do they give the same weight to all theories. Some 
theories are more central to others and less flexible to adjustment. For 
example the concept of tawhīd is more foundational in Shi’i thought than 
certain principles in uṣūl al-fiqh, because it is a part of the uṣūl al-dīn.76 This 
does not mean however, that all of these background theories are necessarily 
true. Rather than start from a position of global skepticism, such as the 
Cartesian methodology, we instead begin from a position of fallibilism. We 
assume that the background theories we are relying upon are true but we can 
revise these theories at any time in the future. Inquiry can only be done in a 
piecemeal fashion, and if we discover any incoherences in our thought, we 
will adjust accordingly. This concept of fallibilism will be elaborated in further 
chapters.77 
The Precedence of Empiricism 
A Shi’i traditionalist might object to our research approach on the 
grounds that we are developing our concept of autonomy first, then trying to 
make it work within Shi’i thought. They might object to the fact that I give 
rational and empirical methods priority over the Shi’i tradition literature. Why 
not, instead, develop a theory of autonomy from within the tradition and then 
bring that theory into reflective equilibrium in other fields such as psychology 
and philosophy. 
This criticism is misguided. Simply because I do not begin my analysis 
with an in-depth analysis of the tradition literature does not mean that I am 
ignoring that tradition literature. Instead I am building upon the views of the 
scholars that dedicated their lives, over centuries, to the development of the 
Shi’i tradition. I begin with the premise that many of the notions of autonomy 
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are already developed within Shi’i tradition. This will become evident in the 
early chapters. I also take a as given current Shi’i uṣūlī understandings of 
ijtihād and understandings of the conditions of forbidding wrong. If anything 
this work is already heavily steeped in the Shi’i tradition. What I am trying to 
do, however, is push the boundaries in the way Shi’i tradition understands 
how these separate concepts fit together. I am in search of a new type of 
equilibrium. 
As it will be seen later on, I do give special weight to empirical results 
obtained in psychology, especially by those that work in the field of Self-
Determination Theory (SDT). The reason I give precedence to empiricism, 
and the results put forward by SDT, is that it the study of autonomy is 
primarily a study of how people really live, how they make decisions, 
internalize concepts, and are motivated towards goals. It is an inquiry into real 
lived lives of individuals. Any inquiry, whether they start with philosophy or 
theology, will eventually have to map the understanding of autonomy to the 
real experiences of individuals. This is in fact what has happened within 
psychology and the theories put forward by SDT. The founders of SDT were 
initially profoundly influenced by philosophy, especially philosophical theories 
that dealt with experience such as phenomenology.78 Philosophy provided the 
paradigm for which they began their experiments. 
Moreover, the arguments I will try to defend in psychology and the 
philosophical traditions are in part informed by an understanding of Shi’i 
thought. For example, Shi’ism has a strong intellectual history defending free-
will. One that has developed historically alongside the arguments put forward 
by Mu`tazalī thinkers. None of the philosophical or psychological trends that 
support determinism will be considered in this dissertation. The reason being 
that such an undertaking would require a major rethinking of the Shi’i tradition, 
and require a dissertation in of itself. 
More importantly, some concepts within Shi’i thought require that 
arguments be grounded in empirical data. As it will be argued further, the 
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concept of forbidding wrong is accompanied by multiple conditions, one of 
which is the condition of efficacy. Forbidding wrong is obligatory if one knows 
that one’s admonitions will have an effect. This question can only be 
answered by empirical data. 
An Instrumentalist Defense 
This dissertation will argue for the importance of autonomy in way that 
differs from current debates within political and moral philosophy. I will, 
ultimately, be advocating for an instrumentalist defense of autonomy. I will 
argue that respecting autonomy is important for other goals that are currently 
valued in Shi’i thought. This differs from approaches towards autonomy in 
Western philosophy, especial in liberal political philosophy, where it is valued 
as a good in and of itself. For western philosophy autonomy, to borrow a term 
from Charles Taylor, is a hypergood. It is foundational idea that supports other 
beliefs. It even serves as the foundational building block to Rawls moral 
philosophy, constructivism. 
For constructivists, there is no concept of truth outside of human 
deliberation. Constructivism argues that “insofar as there are normative truths, 
for example, truths about what we ought to do, they are in some sense 
determined by an idealized process of rational deliberation, choice, or 
agreement.”79 Truth is “constituted by what agents would agree to under 
some specified conditions of choice.”80 Thus autonomy and deliberation are 
core to Rawls’ moral philosophy. Autonomous individuals in an idealized 
process of deliberation construct the truth. It is clear that in this moral 
philosophy paternalistic actions are detrimental, for it is not only coercive but it 
hampers the very process which defines truth and proper moral action. In his 
communitarian critique Rawls philosophical anthropology, Michael Sandel 
brilliantly captures how the concept of autonomy, sits within this backdrop of 
moral philosophy: 
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In Shi’i thought, in comparison, there are moral truths that exist outside 
of rational deliberation, what will be discussed as the al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī, and 
the motivation for attaining these moral truths is to reach God. As it will be 
shown morality is seen as a means of approaching God. It is within this 
backdrop that I make an instrumental defense of autonomy. I argue that 
respecting autonomy is important because it helps the community to discover 
the truths that God intended and it helps individuals internalize these truths. 
Others have also made instrumental arguments as to why religious 
communities should respect autonomy. Lucas Swaine and Robert Talisse are 
two liberal philosophers who try to argue why religious communities should 
adopt liberal positions. Lucas Swaine puts forward an argument for the 
freedom of conscience and liberal institutions directed towards religious 
communities, theocrats in his terminology. Swaine argues that “[c]onscience 
must be free, for the theocrat, to reject errant faiths where they may arise, to 
gravitate toward the good, and to have the ability to distinguish among 
competing alternatives.”82 
Robert Talisse has a similar argument in his defense of folk 
epistemology and why religious communities should value democracy, he 
states: 
I argued that the fact that we hold beliefs at all commits us to the norms associated with 
assertion, and chief among these is the norm of articulating, exchanging, and responding 
to reasons. Yet these activities can be engaged only within a certain kind of social context. 
That is, in order to engage in activities of reason-exchange and argument, not only must 
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individuals be afforded the protections and liberties associated with freedom of thought 
and expression, they must also have access to a variety of reliable sources of information. 
Accordingly, a political order under which information is strictly controlled and the 
exchange of arguments and reasons is suppressed is incompatible with proper believing.83 
My argument differs from Swaine and Talisse in two ways. First, I am 
not making any direct political arguments. I am not arguing for the justification 
of democracy or liberal institutions. What political arrangements best fit the 
model of autonomy I am defending is a separate question, although this 
research does have implications as to the type of political organisation could 
be best defended by this research. Second, the arguments put forward by 
Swaine and Talisse are not universally applicable. These arguments are not 
modular, it is not easy for a particular comprehensive doctrines to incorporate 
the philosophical arguments that Swaine and Talisse have presented. Both 
arguments rest on a premise that rationality is important for the understanding 
of morality. Their arguments only apply to understanding of religion that 
correlate belief with rationality. 
There are certain religious views that try to undermine the role of 
rationality in religious thought. One example would be the tafkīkī tradition 
within Shi’ism. The maktab-e tafkīk, a movement that denounces the 
philosophical rationalist trend in Shi’ism, have a fideist conception of faith. 
Fideists argue that faith is independent from reason and that reason is not an 
independent source of knowledge. The proponents of maktab-e tafkīk argue 
that: 
humans are hardwired to recognise the divine because, unlike philosophers who argue 
that knowing God is incumbent, they argue that one only needs to prove something that is 
doubted. Rather naively perhaps, tafkīk argues that God is not a dubitable entity and to 
this end quotes numerous texts that demonstrate that recognising God involves simple, 
innate knowledge that exists within each of us and merely needs to be activated or 
recollected through contemplation of the Qur’an and the teachings of the Imams.84 
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My argument differs from Swain and Talisse in that I make an 
instrumentalist defense of autonomy in relation to a particular religion. A 
comprehensive doctrine such as autonomy has many ramifications for 
religious thought, and the quality of faith is one aspect which a religious 
doctrine must balance. Yet, given this, Shi’ism is well placed to incorporate 
autonomy. Values such as free-will, rationality, and positive moral disposition 
that are central to autonomy are already found within Shi’i thought. I expand 
on this in the next chapter. 
The Structure of the Study 
The layout of this dissertation will therefore follow this coherentist 
approach of RE. I will begin by describing autonomy and the particular 
attribute of social-historical embeddedness. I will then show how reformist 
Shi’i thinkers do not consider this embeddedness as being an attribute of 
autonomy, and that they argue for a more individualistic understanding of 
autonomy. This individualistic understanding will be shown to conflict with the 
near consensus within Western political philosophy of the embeddedness of 
individuals. The arguments for an embedded understanding of autonomy and 
the intellectual history that led to this consensus will be examined. 
The next phase is to show how this concept of autonomy can be 
brought in to reflective equilibrium within Shi’i thought. This will have to do 
with the balancing several concepts in regards to the internalization and 
formation of tradition. There are two major concepts which would seem to 
contradict individual autonomy. First is the concept of forbidding evil, such that 
it gives the community permission for paternalistic actions towards the 
individual so that individual can live up to the standardized of the idealized 
religious self. Second, is in regards to moral responsibility. The moral 
regulations that that help to form this idealized self are said to be the sole 
domain of the mujtahid. Thus the individual neither develops this 
understanding of the idealized self and the moral stipulations they have to 
follow, and paternalistic actions are justified to coherence the individual to 
follow these stipulations. 
I will show, instead, that this relationship between the autonomy and 
tradition is in fact much more complicated. I will first argue that religion is 
internalized when autonomy is respected. Thus paternalistic actions are 
counter productive. Second, I will show that the formation of tradition benefits 
when it takes into consideration the lived experiences of autonomous 
individuals. Thus the muqalid can help the mujtahid in discovering God’s 
rulings. 
The Definition of Autonomy and Its Foundations 
in Shi’i Thought 
One of the difficulties about discussing autonomy is that it is very 
difficult to define and describe its limits. While there are certain definitions that 
have gained currency, these definitions are not without their critics. There is a 
further complication in trying to classify different types of autonomy such as 
moral or personal autonomy. All of this adds to the complexity of trying to 
write a coherent theory about the concept. 
A large degree of this conflict is caused by the classical approach to 
definitions, an approach that seeks the essential essences of objects. I will 
eschew this approach and instead opt for an approach that is based on 
prototypes and schemas. I will begin by arguing why the classical approach 
fails at describing concepts and why prototypes are a better alternative. 
With the prototype approach to defining autonomy, I will discuss how 
certain attributes of autonomy, such as rationality and free-will, have long 
been considered as essential attributes of the concept. I will also show how 
these concepts are already a part of the Shi’i conceptions of the self, and that 
it is possible to ground autonomy within comparable Shi’i conceptions. 
Moreover, I will introduce an attribute of autonomy that has come under 
focus more recently within philosophy. That is the attribute of of social 
embeddedness. I will examine how the concept of social embedded autonomy 
has gained currency through the arguments put forward by feminist 
philosophers. What I wish to defend is a broad overlapping consensus that 
social embeddedness is a vital attribute of autonomy. While I will be merely 
presenting a definition of that embeddedness in this chapter, I will explore the 
ramifications that it has had for liberal political philosophy in a later chapter. 
This social turn in autonomy will help to open up the possibility of balance 
between tradition and autonomy. Where the Enlightenment conception of the 
authority of reason and the negation of tradition is rebalanced such that it is 
within the backdrop of tradition that makes autonomy and reason possible. 
I do not wish, however, to enter into the lengthy debate about the exact 
nature of autonomy such as the procedural, normative competency, 
dialogical, or strong substantive approaches. The reason being that a broad 
general description of autonomy by itself poses a challenge to other 
conceptions in Shi’i thought. These broad attributes have an overlapping 
consensus, such as autonomy being constitutive of rationality, free-will, and 
being socially embedded. I am, therefore, more interested in the relationship 
between autonomy and tradition. What I am interested in is more what is 
inferred by autonomy in Shi’i thought than its mental representation. That is 
that I am interested in how this broad understanding of autonomy can be 
incorporated into Shi’i thought, and its subsequent ramifications. 
Moreover, the definition of autonomy used in SDT reflects this broad 
understanding. They do not go into detail about the particulars of the term, but 
are more interested in the ramifications of this concept in terms of motivation. 
Thus, they begin with a broad understanding of autonomy and tease several 
concepts such independence, control, and structure as they relate to the 
concept of autonomy and motivation. 
A Prototype Approach to Defining Autonomy 
The classical approach to definition was based on Aristotelian 
principles of essence and accidents. Similarly, the traditional Islamic approach 
to definition in mantiq is still based on these Aristotelian principles. Aristotle 
made a distinction between the essence of an object (dhāt) and it’s accidents 
(`arḍ). The essence captures the core properties of the thing, such that 
without them it is something else, while accidents are incidental properties.85 
The Aristotelian approach tried to find strict demarcations between essences 
of objects, and it made no distinction between degrees of membership; a thing 
is either a part of the category or it is not. In this view it makes no sense to 
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describe i as being more of a vowel than o, or of chair being more furniture 
than radio.86 
There is, however, a significant amount of empirical evidence that 
challenge this Aristotelian foundation.87 Willett Kempton, for example, found 
that in descriptions of ceramic vessels in Mexican Spanish that there was no 
consensus on characteristics that could be used to define the essence of the 
vessels.88 Hampton, after a series of experiments which asked subjects to 
rate category members, concluded that the “results of the two 
experiments…suggest that an important aspect of the definition of concepts 
such as FRUIT or FURNITURE is that there are no features which taken in 
conjunction provide a necessary and sufficient definition.”89 
The most foundational studies have been those put forward by Eleanor 
Rosch. Her initial experiments found that, in contrast to the classical view, our 
understanding of objects are in terms of degrees of membership. Such that 
certain objects better define the category than others. Through several 
experiments, especially those having to do with our categorization of form and 
color, she discovered that our categorization revolves around certain 
prototypes, and that it was these exemplars that define the category.90 Thus, 
instead of defining an object by certain essences and categorizing them by 
these essences, categories have a prototype which are the standards by 
which we judge other members: “Entities are assigned membership in a 
category in virtue of their similarity to the prototype; the closer an entity to the 
prototype, the more central its status within the category.”91 
Prototyping 
The prototype approach argues that some members of the category 
are more central than others and become a basis for defining members within 
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that category; they are better examples for that category. A chair is a 
prototype for furniture, because it is a better example of furniture than a 
radio.92 
There is a debate in regards to prototypes about whether one should 
begin the categorization based on concrete or abstract prototypes. One can 
either develop the category of bird based on a real robin, or they can develop 
a mental schema that would encompass the attributes of a bird. Some, such 
as John Taylor, argue for the use of abstract prototypes. His argument lies in 
part that even in concrete prototypes, one still needs to develop a mental 
representation in order to identify prototypes on different occasions.93 Within 
this abstract prototype some attributes are weighted more heavily than others. 
The attribute of wings will be more essential for the understanding of bird than 
the attribute of gender. 
Murphy describes these as summary representations such that the 
“concept is represented as features that are usually found in the category 
members, but some features are more important than others.”94 He gives an 
example with weapons: 
It is important for weapons that they be able to hurt you, but not so important that they be 
made of metal, even though many weapons are. Thus, the feature ‘‘can do harm’’ would 
be highly weighted in the representation, whereas the feature ‘‘made of metal’’ would not 
be.95 
Schemata 
There are a few ways in which this abstract prototype view has been 
implemented, of which I will discuss two: lists and schemas. The list approach 
simply lists the attributes and gives each attribute a specific weight. It however 
does take into consideration the relationships between features. 
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A schema, however, is a “structured representation that divides up the 
properties of an item into dimensions (usually called slots) and values on 
those dimensions (fillers of the slots).”96 
The slots have restrictions on them that say what kinds of fillers they can have. For 
example, the head-color slot of a bird can only be filled by colors; it can’t be filled by sizes 
or locations, because these would not specify the color of the bird’s head. Furthermore, 
the slot may place constraints on the specific value allowed for that concept. For example, 
a bird could have two, one or no eyes (presumably through some accident), but could not 
have more than two eyes. The slot for number of eyes would include this restriction. The 
fillers of the slot are understood to be competitors. For example, if the head color of birds 
included colors such as blue, black, and red, this would indicate that the head would be 
blue OR black OR red. (If the head could be a complex pattern or mixture of colors, that 
would have to be a separate feature.) Finally, the slots themselves may be connected by 
relations that restrict their values. For example, if a bird does not fly, then it does not 
migrate south in winter. This could be represented as a connection between the 
locomotion slot (which indicates how the bird moves itself around) and the slot that 
includes the information on migration.97 
I am not proposing, however, that the schemata must necessarily be as 
complicated as stated above. For our purposes simpler schemata would 
probably be more useful. Schemata are in general are useful cognitive tools, 
in that they “aid cognition because they are organized: they have a familiar 
structure, and people can rely on that structure to facilitate memory, 
communication, and reasoning.”98 In the context of the prototype approach 
they would act as a basis for defining the key attributes of autonomy. 
Defining Autonomy 
There is much literature on trying to define autonomy, and trying to 
discover examples that would fit those definitions. Much of the debate 
surrounds the fuzzy outliers, examples that seem to be both autonomous and 
heteronomous. There have been procedural, content-neutral, normative 
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competency, and relational definitions of autonomy.99 This list is not 
exhaustive. Each definition tries to uncover a new layer of understanding of 
the concept. 
A few authors have taken a different approach, and have attempted the 
above mentioned schema approach to defining autonomy. Uleman, in her 
introduction to the moral philosophy of Kant, decided to focus on three 
attributes of autonomy: freedom, rationality, and will. Her argument, however, 
is that the word autonomy is burdened with different definitions that makes it 
unusable: 
In early work on this book, I found myself using ‘autonomy’ to describe free rational willing. 
Autonomous activity is more or less the same as free rational activity of the will; 
‘autonomy’ is characteristic of a will that (freely) gives itself a (rational) action-guiding law. 
‘Autonomy’ thus has the advantage that it encompasses and inextricably relates, in one 
word, Kantian freedom, rationality, and will. But I have decided not to use the term here, at 
least not very often, despite its being, in some contexts, a key term for Kant himself. Not 
unlike ‘freedom,’ ‘rationality,’ and ‘will,’ the term ‘autonomy’ is so freighted, its accreted 
connotations so thick, its post-Kantian adventures so various and storied, that I prefer less 
felicitous terms and phrases, like ‘free rational practical activity’, ‘free rational willing,’ and 
‘free rational activity of the will.’ Besides triggering fewer associations for readers, these 
also have the advantage, when they come as phrases, of reminding us just what Kant is 
seeking to encompass and inextricably relate.100 
John Christman, arguably one of the foremost authors on the concept 
of autonomy in moral and political philosophy, reaches a similar conclusion. 
After naming a variety of different definitions, he argues 
Nevertheless, it is clear that formulating a “theory” of the concept will involve more than 
merely uncovering the obscure details of the idea’s essence, for autonomy, like many 
concepts central to contentious moral or political debate is itself essentially contested. So 
a theory of autonomy is simply a construction of a concept aimed at capturing the general 
sense of “self-rule” or “self-government” (ideas which obviously admit of their own 
                                                        
99Natalie Stoljar, “Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2014, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/feminism-autonomy/.  
100Jennifer K. Uleman, An Introduction to Kant’s Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2.  
vagaries) and which connects adequately with the other principles and norms typically 
connected to those notions.101 
This schemata based approach best fits the research at hand. For I do 
not intend to put forward a complete theory of autonomy and provide evidence 
for my theory. Instead I am trying to show how autonomy fits within Shi’i 
thought. What I am interested is how autonomy, as a broad general concept, 
is able to coherently exist within the Shi’i web of thought. There are certain 
attributes of autonomy which are of importance to this coherence, and I will 
focus on these attributes. 
A Schema of Autonomy: Relevant Attributes 
I do not wish to put forward a complete schema of the attributes of 
autonomy. That in of itself is a daunting task. What I would like to focus on 
instead, are a list of attributes that central to the concept of autonomy and will 
be central to the debates I will be pursuing. I will begin the analysis of 
autonomy by examining some of the attributes that have already been put 
forward within the literature. 
We have already discussed some of the attributes of autonomy given 
by Uleman. These are freedom, rationality, and will. Christman puts forward a 
somewhat similar list of attributes, although organized differently. He puts 
forward two attributes as the core understanding of autonomy; independence 
from coercion, and self-rule. Self-rule is given greater weight and is 
considered as the core of autonomy because a “full account of that ability will 
surely entail the freedom from external manipulation characteristic of 
independence.”102 Self-rule, in short, encompasses independence from 
coercion. 
Self-rule, in turn, has two major attributes, these are competence and 
authenticity. He describes competence as including “various capacities for 
rational thought, self-control, and freedom from debilitating pathologies, 
systematic self-deception, and so on.”103 And authenticity often includes “the 
                                                        
101John Christman, “Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy. The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy,” 2011, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/autonomy-moral/.  
102Ibid.  
103Ibid.  
capacity to reflect upon and endorse (or identify with) one’s desires, values, 
and so on.”104 Different accounts, will in turn, offer different conditions. Its 
prototypes all the way down. 
Christman and Uleman’s list of attributes do correlate. Christman’s 
concept of authenticity incorporates freedom and will, and his concept of 
competence incorporates will and rationality. Although these concepts do not 
necessarily correlate perfectly, the benefit of the prototype approach is that 
we can consider all of these attributes to be a part of what it means to be 
autonomous. Some of these attributes, freedom, rationality, will, competence, 
and authenticity, overlap with others, but none of the exclude the others. I will 
give greater weight to Uleman’s understanding of autonomy as freedom, 
rationality, and will. The reason being that these concepts make it easier to 
understand what is meant by Christman’s notion of self-rule. 
Autonomy and Social Embeddedness 
Missing from Uleman’s list attributes is independence, and rightly so. 
There is a tendency in popular culture to equate autonomy and 
independence, but the two concepts are not interrelated for many working in 
academic circles. The opposite of autonomy is not dependence, but 
heteronomy. One of the core attributes of autonomy that has become 
discussed heavily in recent literature is embeddedness; the fact that 
autonomy is embedded in a social-historical context. 
An individualistic understanding of autonomy assumes that the agent is 
able to choose values and structure their life independent of the social 
context. Instead, the attribute of social embeddedness states that agents are 
in part products of the social environment in which they live, that they are 
interdependent on others, and that this independence is not oppressive but 
empowering. It helps us to develop our identities and gives us the epistemic 
tools necessary for making informed decisions. Others argue that because we 
come to understand that we are shaped by social-historical means, that 
empowers us to come to understand ourselves a different way. 
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This is a broad understanding of embeddedness. Some take this to a 
further conclusion that their is no autonomy and instead all agents are 
products of their social environment.105 I will not be analyzing this view of 
embeddedness as social determinism because it would run counter to both 
the theological understanding of free-will within Shi’ism and the empirical 
evidence provided by psychology that agents do in fact have autonomy. 
This concept of embeddedness has gained currency in the term 
relational autonomy. This term, unfortunately, has stayed within feminist 
circles. Communitarian discussions of a similar concept have used a different 
vocabulary although they arguing along similar lines. Feminists argued that 
“the notion of individual autonomy is fundamentally individualistic and 
rationalistic.”106 This individualistic understanding of autonomy is well 
characterized by Code. She argues that the current understanding of 
autonomy has moved passed its Enlightenment definition. She states that the 
Enlightenment conception of autonomous man celebrated his freedom to 
“trust in the power of his own reason and ready to shed the constraints of 
heteronomy.”107 In a often cited passage from What Can She Know Lorraine 
Code writes: 
Autonomous man is—and should be—self-sufficient, independent, and self- reliant, a self-
realizing individual who directs his efforts towards maximizing his personal gains. His 
independence is under constant threat from other (equally self-serving) individuals: hence 
he devises rules to protect himself from intrusion. Talk of rights, rational self-interest, 
expedience, and efficiency permeates his moral, social, and political discourse. In short, 
there has been a gradual alignment of autonomy with individualism.108 
This individualistic conception of autonomy is seen to be an extension 
of the patriarchal values within society. Individualism is valued because it has 
been valuable for men to gain power. This conception of autonomy is seen to 
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be alienating and to have had negative social consequences. Jonathon 
Herring, for example, argues that this individualistic understanding of 
autonomy has had negative consequences in family law. He argues that 
“autonomy as it is commonly understood should not be seen as a value of 
fundamental importance in family law.”109 This is based on the claim that 
``individualistic autonomy regards freedom to live as one chooses; a 
separation from others; and respecting an individual’s choice is simply 
inconsistent with family life as it is understood and experienced by most.``110 
He goes on to cite Pamela Scheininger’s argument among similar lines: 
Because the law is conceived of in its application to the isolated individual rather than in its 
application to the individual’s various associations and relationships, the law does not 
accurately reflect the reality of human existence. The legitimacy of the law is thus 
challenged. Individual persons do not operate as independent, separate entities, but as 
interdependent, connected parts of larger groups. In failing to deal with laws as they affect 
human relationships, lawmakers ignore a fundamental aspect of our humanity…111 
Herrings argues that because family law is based on an individualistic 
understanding of autonomy it is oppressive. This is in stark contrast to the 
reformist theories that will be discussed in the follwing chapters. They put 
forward and individualistic understanding of autonomy because they believe it 
is liberation. Although reformists are trying to curb certain paternalistic 
behaviours they have gone to the other extreme and presented a model of 
autonomy that in of itself would be oppressive to certain members of society. 
Feminist thinkers have offered a relational conception of autonomy to 
replace the individualistic understanding of autonomy. It is an umbrella term 
designed to encompass a variety of similar approaches, which share a core of 
values related to the embedded nature of the autonomous agent. Two 
prominent feminist thinkers on the conception of relational autonomy, Catriona 
Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, explain the concept as such: 
These perspectives are premised on a shared conviction, the conviction that persons are 
socially embedded and that agents’ identities are formed within the context of social 
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relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants, such as race, 
class, gender, and ethnicity. Thus the focus of relational approaches is to analyze the 
implications of the intersubjective and social dimensions of selfhood and identity for 
conceptions of individual autonomy and moral and political agency.112 
This relational aspect of autonomy has been influential in care ethics 
as well. Richard Ashcroft in his review of the role in autonomy within care 
ethics argues that care ethicists “criticise the central role that the notion of 
self-sufficient independence tends to play in moral thinking in Western 
culture.”113 
Relational autonomy thus argues for an understanding of autonomy 
that is embedded in social-historical contexts and interpersonal relationships. 
This notion of social embeddedness is not, however, specific to feminist 
critiques of autonomy. It is in fact now a widely accepted attribute of autonomy 
throughout liberal and communitarian approaches. How this social 
embeddedness came to dominate liberal philosophy is the subject of a 
following chapter. 
Liberals, however, reject that their conception of autonomy is 
individualistic. They argue that this atomistic understanding of autonomy is 
only applicable to very few liberals, and libertarians in particular. Daniel Bell, 
in his overview of the communitarian understanding of the self makes a 
similar comment. He states that Charles Taylor’s influential paper ‘Atomism,’ 
was directed towards Robert Nozick, but Rawls’ understanding of autonomy 
and the self does in fact capture this social nature of the self.114 
There is, however, a noteworthy difference between feminist and 
communitarian approaches. Linda Barclay writes that the difference between 
communitarianism and feminist conceptions of autonomy is based upon their 
different motivations. Communitarians are motivated by political aspirations 
and to the extent that then current liberal political philosophy, and Rawls 
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specifically, was reliant on an atomistic understanding of the self. Feminists 
on the other hand, had different goals: 
But for feminists, the importance of this insight is that it opens up the possibility of 
changing our identities and challenging existing social structures. Precisely because our 
identities — our aims, aspirations, and capacities — are socially determined, we can 
repudiate the historically entrenched view that women (and others) have a certain fixed 
and immutable nature, a nature that suits them for specific roles and dis- qualifies them for 
others.115 
I would like to strengthen the argument of social embeddedness in 
showing how this concept has been incorporated into liberal moral and 
political philosophy. It is generally liberalism that is accused of presenting and 
atomistic conception of the self, thus by showing how liberal thought has 
incorporated this social conception of the self leaves very few critics. It is from 
here that I will critique how this concept of social embeddedness is denied in 
the philosophical anthropology of reformist Iranian intellectuals. This will be 
done through a case study of the works of Shabestari. Reformists deny or 
minimize the social embeddedness of autonomy in order to limit state 
paternalism. This individualism has the sort of problems which are stated by 
the feminists, Communitarians, and even liberal philosophers. 
How Shi’ism has made room for autonomy 
Incorporating autonomy into a comprehensive doctrine such as Shi’ism 
has its challenges. The first is that the concept of autonomy is itself 
comprehensive. It requires that one adhere to a certain philosophical 
anthropology that could have possible ramifications in terms of theology. It is 
along these lines that certain Christian theologians have argued that 
Christianity and autonomy cannot exist together. As it will be shown, Shi’ism 
can incorporate autonomy in terms of theological abstract concept. 
Ramifications of autonomy for normative behavior will be discussed later. 
Autonomy as a Comprehensive Doctrine 
The fact that autonomy is a comprehensive doctrine as well as its 
ramifications has been well pointed out by Rawls. Rawls believed that 
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autonomy was a comprehensive and it was in part to this that he decided to 
move to a political conception of liberalism. Rawls argued that it would not be 
possible to develop an overlapping conception on such a concept. Thus, if a 
government or political structure were to be developed on this would 
eventually require oppressive forces to keep that government or political 
structure in power. He called this the fact of oppression. He argued that “a 
continuing shared understanding on one comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained only be the oppressive use 
of state power.”116 He held this to be true of the concept of autonomy as well. 
Rawls states that Kantian moral autonomy would not be acceptable to all, 
especially those belonging to religious traditions, and that “[m]any citizens of 
faith reject moral autonomy as a part of their way of life.”117 Rawls therefore 
tries to develop a political notion of autonomy, one that constrains autonomy 
to the domain of politics, in the hopes of achieving a greater consensus. 
This conflict between religion and autonomy is evident in a few 
Christian responses. Kant’s conception of autonomy looks favorably upon 
humanity and its ability to rational decipher the good. This concept contradicts 
certain Christian theological conceptions of the human as ‘fallen,’ and 
depraved both in nature and intelligence.118 Pamela Anderson and Jordan 
Bell highlight two ways in which Kantian concept of autonomy conflicts with in 
Christian thought. The first, is that reason in Christian thought is mistrusted, 
since it is driven by selfish and sinful motives. The second, is that autonomy 
builds pride and that pride destroys communities. “Both reason and autonomy 
are wrongly supposed by certain Christian theologians, especially those 
influenced by Barth if not Calvin; to be the ’cause’ of broken communities, 
broken families, wrecked marriages and sexual immorality generally.”119 
These are rather harsh claims against autonomy. 
However, autonomy as a comprehensive doctrine does not pose as a 
similar problem for Shi’i theology. Shi’ism already incorporates concepts that 
are complementary to autonomy such as free-will and the concept of ḥusn wa 
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qubḥ al-`aqli, which establishes the moral capability of the individual to 
rationally discern between right and wrong. This correlates well to Uleman’s 
distinction of autonomy, discussed above, as constituting three distinct 
attributes: freedom, rationality, and will. In this section two of these attributes 
will be discissed, the Shi’i notion of free-will, and Shi’i notion of rationality in 
terms of moral actions. Both of these concepts have long established history 
in Shi’i thought. The concept of free-will is central tenet to Shi’ism such that it 
helps to define Shi’ism, and the concept of ḥusn wa qubḥ al-`aqli has long 
history in uṣūlī thought. This is in contrast to the Christian mistrust of 
rationality and the concept of the ‘fallen.’ 
Given that these concepts have a long history within Shi’i thought, and 
in the interest of space, no lengthy intellectual history will be discussed. The 
purpose of this section is only to show that these attributes already have a 
place in Shi’i thought, and that I plan to build on these attributes for my 
forthcoming arguments. I am simply trying to clarify a few of the background 
assumptions in the discussion of autonomy. 
Jafar Sobhani ultimately sums up the various attributes of autonomy 
that I have been trying to describe. He writes: 
Insofar as an individual benefits from his wholesome, innate nature, from his capacity to 
discriminate between good and evil, and from his ability to exercise his free will—on these 
foundations his ethical and spiritual development becomes a real possibility. The gateway 
to the transcendent path of right guidance leading back to God is always open to man; it is 
only at the moment of death that it closes, that is, when repentance is no longer 
accepted.120 
There are three aspects of the individual that Sobhani describes, that 
will be described in further depth. The first is the wholesome innate nature, or 
fiṭra. Shi’i thought sees the individual as being as being innately good. Second 
is the ability to discriminate between good and evil, the ḥusn wa qubḥ al-`aqli, 
and the third is free-will. I shall briefly describe these three concepts and how 
they are placed within Shi’i thought. 
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Fiṭra and the Good Innate Nature 
Shi’i thought sees human nature as being innately good, and that 
individuals have an inclination towards the divine. The roots of the debate can 
be found in the Qur’an, where there are verses that God has instilled an 
innate nature in mankind that drives them toward the divine: 
So [Prophet] as a man of pure faith, stand firm and true in your devotion to the religion. 
This is the natural disposition [fiṭra] God instilled in mankind - there is no altering God’s 
creation - and this is the right religion, though most people do not realize it.121 
Muhammad ibn ‘Alī ibn Bābawaih al-Qummi al-Shaykh al-Sadūq (d. 
380/ 991), the most eminent traditionist and jurist of the 9th and 10th centur, 
writes that “[God] gave all of creation a natural dispotion (faṭara) to towards 
the oneness of God (tawhīd).” 122 After this explanation Sadūq brings a hadith 
in support of his view. Mufīd in his commentary Sadūq’s views, upholds 
Sadūq’s position.123  
This concept of fiṭra has been expounded upon by contemporary 
scholars, such as Motaharri.124 For Motaharri, the concept of fiṭra has taken a 
philosophical turn, one that has become as a backdrop for his epistemology. 
Those philosophical arguments aside, Motaharri comments about this innate 
nature of mankind throughout his various works.125 In a commentary on the 
meaning of the word fiṭra Motaharri writes: 
The issue is that God the most high has created all of mankind with a single pure natural 
disposition (fiṭra) that is drawn to the monotheism, the truth, the good, and the divine.126 
It is this innate disposition towards the good that Subahani argues 
provides the groundwork for humankind’s moral development. It is clear to 
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see how this notion of the fiṭra differs from the Christian notion of the “fallen,” 
discussed above. Mankind is designed in such a way that they move towards 
the good and the divine. 
This concept of fiṭra has implications for autonomy. It means that if 
humankind is inclined toward the good, then supporting their autonomy would 
also be supporting them toward this good. They are given the ability to drive 
towards the good that they are innately drawn towards. The concept of fiṭra 
positions autonomy in a positive light. In a sense, by helping someone to 
become autonomous, one would be helping the inner nature to come forward. 
Free-will 
The debate about free-will is a long standing debate that has divided 
the various schools of thought. It was one of the cornerstones of the debates 
put forward by the Mu‘tazila.127 The debate was between jabr, determinism, 
and tafwiḍ, meaning to delegate, as in God has delegate the actions of the 
individual to the individual. Shaykh Sadūq in his al-Itiqādāt simple cites a 
hadīth from Imam Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq stating that “lā jabr wa lā tafwīẓ wa lākin amr 
bayn amrayn”, “neither complete constraint nor complete freedom but 
something inbetween.”128 Shaykh Mufīd in his commentary states that what is 
meant by being inbetween these two positions is that God has not determined 
man’s actions, but he still bound by moral guidelines.129  
Ayatollah Motaharri in his An Introduction to Ilm al-Kalam summarises 
the various debates that have been held within Islamic theology. He has a 
chapter titled “The Shi’i Standpoint” in which he summarises contemporary 
Shi’i positions on theological issues. On the issue of free will he writes: 
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Freedom and free will, as believed by the Shi’ah, mean that men are created as free 
beings. But they, like any other creature, are entirely dependent on the Divine Essence for 
their existence and all its multifarious modes, including the mode of action, all of which are 
derived from and are dependent on God’s merciful care, and seek help from His Will. 
Accordingly, free will and freedom in Shi’ism occupy an intermediate position between the 
Ash’arite (absolute) predestination (jabr) and the Mu‘tazilite doctrine of freedom (tafwid). 
This is the meaning of the famous dictum of the Infallible Imams (A:): “la jabra wa la 
tafwida bal ’amrun bayna ’amrayn”130 
Similarly, Ayatollah Jafar Sobhani has summarised contemporary Shi’i 
positions on theology in his book Doctrines of Shi’i Islam. On the issue of free 
will he writes: 
Man is endowed with free will; he is capable of exercising independent choice - this means 
that, when deciding whether or not to undertake a particular action, he takes account of its 
various dimensions in the light of his intellectual faculty.131 
The ability to exercise independent choice supports the notion of 
autonomy. One is has the capability to pick and choose one’s course of life 
and beliefs. One is not completely bound to the will of God. 
The Intelligibility of Good and Evil 
One of the cornerstones to the concept of autonomy is the ability of 
individuals to rationally decipher what is right from what is wrong. That is not 
to say that one must understand individuals to be rational in a mathematical 
sense; that they are able to deduce conclusions from premises. Rather, it is to 
understand individuals as being able to differentiate good moral actions from 
bad moral actions by simply using their rational faculties. Even though one 
has a natural inclination towards God and can freely exercise his will, one 
must also have the ability to distinguish between right and wrong. 
The debate regarding the intelligibility of good and evil, ḥusn wa qubh 
al-`aqlī, began initially as theological debate, and has been later incorporated 
into jurisprudential matters. The core of the debate is that individuals have the 
ability to discern between good and evil based on rational reasoning. Allamah 
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al-Ḥillī dicusses this issue under the category of the al-af‘āl, actions, of God. 
He states that once the existence of God has been established it is then 
necessary to explain God’s justice.132 He states that good and evil are 
rationally discernable and that God does not perform evil actions. He 
attributes this stance to the Mu’tazilites and states that the ‘Ash’aris on the 
other hand, believe that good and evil is only understandable through the 
sharia.133 
Sobhani states that “the principle of ‘the intelligibility of good and evil’ is 
the foundation of many Shi’i beliefs”134 One of the arguments that Sobhani 
puts forward in defense of the intelligibility of good and evil is that if good and 
evil can only be distinguished through the use of religion, then we could never 
validate the goodness of the religious doctrines: 
If we were to suppose that the intellect were incapable - in a universal fashion - of 
grasping the distinction between good and evil acts, and that all people must refer to 
religion to enable them to perceive the goodness or evil of a given act, then we would be 
forced to accept the concomitant argument that even the validity of the religiously 
sanctioned distinction between good and evil could not be proven.135 
Sobhani’s quote gives the impression that the concept of the 
intelligibility of good and evil means that individuals can independently verify 
the goodness of religious doctrines and injunctions. This would imply that it 
would have implications for Islamic law, and it is for this precise reason that 
there are lengthy debates about this concept within the books of uṣul al-
fiqh.136 The ramifications of the intelligibility of good and evil has led to the 
creation of legal maxim about the coherence between Islamic law and 
rationality, qā’idah al-mulāzimah bayn al-`aql wa ḥukm al-shar`, and the 
famous slogan that whatever the shar` rules, rationality rules as well, kulumā 
                                                        
132 Hasan ibn Yusūf al-Ḥillī, Kashf al-Murād gī Sharḥ Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād, ed. Jaʻfar Subḥānī 
(Qum: Mu’asasah al-Imām al-Ṣādiq, 2003); ‘Abd al-Jabbār al-Hamadānī, Sharḥ Al-Uṣūl 
Al-Khamsah, ed. Aḥmad ibn Ḥusayn Abī Hāshim (Beirut: Dār al-Iḥya al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, 
2001), 326. 
133 Ibid. 
134Subḥānī, The Doctrines of Shi’ism, 10.   
135Ibid., 50.  
136 Muḍaffar, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, vol. 3. 
ḥakam bihi al-`aql hakama bihi al-shar‘.137 This is discussed in depth in 
Muḍaffar’s Uṣūl al-Fiqh.138 This rather significant given that Muḍaffar’s 
introduction to uṣūl is one of the standard books required in the hawzah 
curriculum. It is a sign as to how deep, and well grounded this concept is 
within Shi’i thought. 
These three concepts - fiṭra, free will, and the intelligibility of good and 
evil - provide a firm foundation for the concept of autonomy. One is inclined 
toward the good and can freely choose the what one deems good based on 
one’s rationality. However, deciphering good from evil is not an easy task. It is 
here that Shi’i thought seems to limit autonomy in favor of expertise, or more 
specifically, ijtihād. The next section will discuss the dilemma between 
autonomy and taqlīd. 
The Scope of Taqlīd 
Autonomy is not without conflict in Shi’i thought, particular the 
understanding of autonomy praised by the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment 
saw the rise of the authority of reason to the detriment of the authority of 
tradition. The autonomous agent should bend his will only to the convincing 
arguments of good reason and not to tradition or any external moral authority. 
This spirit of the Enlightenment is still relevant in many contemporary 
understandings of autonomy, as Robert Paul Wolff argues about the moral 
position of the individual: 
He may learn from others about his moral obligations, but only in the sense that a 
mathematician learns from other mathematicians-namely by hearing from them arguments 
whose validity he recognizes even though he did not think of them himself. He does not 
learn in the sense that one learns from an explorer, by accepting as true his accounts of 
things one cannot see for oneself.139 
This conception of autonomy will present problems for Shi’i thought for 
Shi’ism states that one should listen the moral expert, the mujtahid, namely 
the concept of taqlīd or emulation. The mujtahid does not derive rulings from 
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purely rational premises but instead depends upon the tradition literature. The 
autonomy of the individual is in a way bound by the opinions of these moral 
experts. Yet, this type of epistemic dependence is now beginning to have 
resurgence in Western philosophy. Take for example Gerald Dworkin’s reply 
to Wolff’s comment above. 
This picture is inaccurate even for the mathematician. Mathematicians often accept results 
on the word of other mathematicians without going through the proofs for themselves. And 
they may do so (particularly) in fields in which they do not possess the techniques to 
assess the proof even if they were inclined to do so.140 
I have already stated how this concept of social-embeddedness is a 
part of autonomy, and that it is a concept I will explore further in regards to the 
relationship between mujtahid and muqalid. Shi’ism, however, confines this 
concept of taqlīd to the practice of religion. When it comes to theology, there 
is no taqlīd and each individual must come to a rational decision regarding 
these theological concepts. Most contemporary marāja` emphasis this point in 
their handbook of laws. For example, Ayatollah Khorasani writes that: “A 
person’s belief in the fundamentals of Islam must be based on his own 
research and knowledge. Taqlīd — following others in an issue without 
knowledge of the issue — in these fundamentals is invalid.”141 
It is therefore not sufficient that an individual holds a belief that can 
theoretically be justified, but it is necessary that the individual go through a 
process of justification. This process of justification itself, in turn, must be 
accepted by the community of inquirers. Hence, there is an emphasis by Shi’i 
jurists that beliefs must be based on rationality, for rational inquiry is accepted 
as valid means of inquiry to issues of theology. 
The only authority that remains in the field of theology is the authority 
of reason. Muḥammad Riḍā al-Muẓaffar, whose book on uṣūl al-fiqh is part of 
the standard ḥawzah curriculum, succinctly summarizes this standard position 
on the issue of taqlīd in theology, or usūl al-dīn, in his book `Aqā`id al-
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Imāmīyah. He argues that it is necessary for the individual to use reason to 
gain knowledge about these topics, and that this necessity is itself based on 
reason.142 He writes that it is “necessary upon [the individual] based upon 
one’s rational disposition – that is also supported by Quranic text – to do 
research, ponder, develop an opinion and think about the foundational topics 
of their belief, namely the usūl al-`aqāid.”143 The scope of this knowledge is, 
however, limited to the very basics of theological beliefs; such as the oneness 
of God but not his attributes. 
Although Muẓaffar clearly states that this principle is itself a rational 
principle he does bring Quranic verses to support his argument. One verse in 
particular is in regards to following what one’s forefathers believed. “But when 
it is said to them, ‘Follow the message that God has sent down,’ they answer, 
‘We follow the ways of our fathers.’ What! Even though their fathers 
understood nothing and were not guided?”144 It is quite common to refer to 
this verse in regards to the illegitimacy of doing taqlīd for theological beliefs. 
Another verse that Muẓaffar cites is the verse that admonishes disbelievers 
for following ẓann or speculation: “If you obeyed most of those on earth, they 
would lead you away from the path of God. They follow nothing but 
speculation; they are merely guessing”145 
Ayatollah Sobhani in an article on āzādī, freedom, summarizes the 
dependence of theological beliefs on reason as such: “…the religion of Islam, 
according to several verses of the Qur‘an…, supports the logic of reason and 
dialogue and therefore cannot put forward an approach based on force or 
reluctance.’’146 Later on, it will be shown how Ayatollah Beheshti develops on 
this relationship between freedom and belief even further.147 
The reason taqlīd is not accepted in theological matters is because qat` 
or certainty is the only acceptable epistemic state for theological beliefs. Ẓann, 
in general is considered to be epistemically useless. Many uṣūlī’s refer to 
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verses of the Qur’an that that state that ẓann does not count as knowledge148: 
“Guesswork ẓann is of no value against the Truth.”149 In terms of theological 
belief, one is required to have qat`, certainty. Taqlīd does not lead to qati`, but 
only leads to ẓann or a probability of truth. Qat` is however different from 
yaqīn as used within Islamic philosophy. Yaqīn implies that one is certain of 
an opinion and that there will be no evidence to the contrary. Qat` is just the 
epistemological status of certainty, irregardless if one thinks that they might 
discover evidence to the contrary.150 I will expand on this notion of fallibalism 
in a later chapter. Therefore, the only means of reaching qat` is through 
epistemic self-reliance, to use the term coined by Zagzebski. 
Arguably, the bar for reason is set too high within Shi’i thought. This 
condition of qat` for theological beliefs raises a problem in Islamic law, for 
many people do not reach qat’. How are we to then evaluate their faith? 
Shaykh Ansari, for example, concludes that if one where to know that it is an 
obligation to reach certainty in one’s theological beliefs, and does not do so, 
then one is fāsiq, transgressor, and that there is a probability that one is a 
kāfir, infidel. Yet if one were to try one’s best to reach certainty and fail, or that 
one did not know that it was obligation, then they would be forgiven on the 
day judgement, even though there is possibility that they are kāfir.151 The end 
goal is to reach certainty in terms of beliefs. 
There is therefore a clear space in which the individual not only uses 
their rational free will to develop their beliefs, but that they are religiously 
obligated to do so. Thus, their faith must be an expression of their autonomy. 
Faith by any other means is not considered faith, and if one does not use their 
autonomy to develop this faith they are on the brink of kufr. It is here, 
however, that key questions on what it means to be autonomous arises. That 
clearly this expression of autonomy differs from Enlightenment notions. 
The way that one is expected to reach qat` reflects this difference. 
Although there are no extended discussions in the books about how one is to 
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reach qat`, the books written on uṣūl al-`aqaid by the uṣūlī`s themselves 
reflects the general outlook. None of these books, for example, begin with 
Cartesian doubt, or some type of global skepticism were one is supposed to 
build there belief on beginning from certain foundations. If anything, the uṣūlī 
approach reflects Peirce’s pragmatism. Peirce argued that “there is but one 
state of mind from which you can ‘set out’, namely the very state of mind in 
which you find yourself at the time you do ‘set out’ - a state in which you are 
laden with an immense mass of cognition already formed, of which you 
cannot divest yourself if you would”152 The arguments provided by these 
books begin from the state of mind of the general public. They will begin with 
a series of arguments that build up from commonly accepted principles. 
Musawi Lari‘s God and His Attributes is a good case example. 
Although Musawi Lari’s books have not gained popularity in its original Farsi, 
my own experience amongst Muslims living in the West, in both America and 
England, is that the English translations of his books have become an 
important resource for many English speaking communities. This is due in 
part to Professor Hamid Algar’s excellent translation and the lack of 
competition in English. The books have subsequently found their ways into 
many Western academic libraries. The popularity of the book is also found in 
that it speaks directly to a liberal Western audience that is rooted in scientific 
materialism. Many older books included sections that would begin by refuting 
Marxist thought.153 Musawi Lari begins instead by tackling empiricism, namely 
his chapters on ‘God and Empirical Logic’ and ‘Pseudo-Scientific 
Demagoguery’. There is an appreciation for the mental state of the audience, 
and it is from here that Mousavi Lari will begin his arguments. Thus the 
chapter on ‘God and Empirical Logic’ argues for the limits of empiricism and 
comes before Musawi Lari presents any arguments for the existence of God. 
Lacking in the book are any typically foundationalist approach. There is no 
search for Archimedean points, but rather a dialogue that begins from the 
readers’ real doubts. 
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Pushing the Boundaries of Autonomy 
In this chapter we have given a definition of autonomy based on a 
prototype model. Autonomy consist of freedom, rationality, will, and is 
embedded in a social-historical context. These attributes of autonomy can 
also be found within Shi’i thought. Here I wish to not only summarise these 
attributes but also explain how they ground two concepts which I will discuss 
later on. These two concepts are al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī, the real ruling, and ’amr bi 
al-ma`rūf wa naḥī an al-munkar, forbidding wrong and enjoining good. 
In order for humanity to reach God, God has endowed humanity with 
certain traits. Three that are relevant to our discussion are ikhtīyar (free-will), 
`aql (rationality), and fiṭrah (natural disposition towards God and the good). 
With these faculties humanity is able to rationally discern between good and 
evil, the principle of ḥusn wa qubḥ al-`aqlī. Guides, as Imams and Prophets, 
were sent down to humanity to help them find the path to God. We live in an 
unfortunate time where the last Imam is occultation. With the use of of the 
tradition literature that remains from the Prophet and Imams, along with our 
rational faculties, humanity must now strive, ijtihād, to find the moral path to 
God. We might never know the rulings of God, al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī, but our 
sincere attempt at trying to arrive to these rulings will suffice for us on the day 
of judgement. 
Clearly there is an overlap between the philosophical understanding of 
autonomy and Shi’i theology. Shi’i theology and the liberal understanding of 
autonomy both argue that individuals have free-will, that they are inclined to 
the good, and that they are rationally able to decipher good from evil. There a 
few differences between the two approaches in that they each value 
autonomy for different reasons. Liberalism tends to value autonomy as a good 
in of itself. It becomes a premise to support other liberal conclusions, such as 
the concept of justice as fairness. Shi’ism supports autonomy because it 
brings one closer to God. 
Shi’I tradition views humanity as a social being, as is evident in the 
concept of promoting good and forbidding wrong, al-’amr bi al-ma`rūf wa naḥī 
an al-munkar, which will be discussed in full later on. The concept of 
forbidding wrong states that individuals have an obligation to the well being of 
other members of society. They also have an obligation to help others find 
their path to God. It is under this principle of forbidding wrong that many 
paternalistic acts are justified, and it is this principle that regulates 
relationships between individuals. 
I will therefore build upon this understanding of autonomy in Shi’i 
thought and try to push its boundaries. If anything I will give more weight to 
the discursive role that autonomy plays within tradition; through the giving and 
taking of reasons it becomes possible to understand the truth and leads to a 
greater internalisation of this truth. 
The following chapter, however, will deal with one of the hurdles to the 
discursive role that autonomy plays. The reformist conception of religious 
experience puts forward an understanding of faith that sees the individual as 
independent from others. Faith is a direct experience with the divine, and it is 
through this experience that one comes to understand religion. Although this 
understanding of religious experience was put forward to curtail the 
encroachment of the state in the private lives of citizens, it also the 
unintended consequence of denying the discursive role that is essential to 
autonomy. 
Shabestari and Reformist Conceptions of 
Autonomy 
In a struggle against the paternalistic practices of the state, Iranian 
reformist intellectuals have put forward an understanding of autonomy that is 
highly individualistic. For them, traditional institutions that would confer 
meaning upon the world are no longer valid and in their stead it is the 
individual that must give meaning to the world. For many reformists, this 
meaning is given to the world through personal experience. 
In this chapter I will examine the existential individualism developed by 
Muhammad Mojtahed Shabestari (Shabestari) as a case study. The reason I 
have selected one author as a case study is because the nature of autonomy 
is comprehensive and requires a sweeping analysis to show how all the 
disparate thoughts fit together in a coherent web. As stated early, Shabestari 
was chosen because there is already a great deal of work done about 
Abdolkarim Soroush’s thoughts in English, and that his use of hermeneutics 
offers a better platform for the discussion at hand. Soroush and Shabestari’s 
thoughts do overlap, such as their hermeneutics approaches to Islamic law, 
their defence of human rights, and their claims to the necessity of religious 
experience. 
Moreover, Shabestari’s appropriation of Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics puts him in a difficult position. Shabestari uses hermeneutics to 
critique the traditional methods of jurisprudence, while simultaneously putting 
forward an existentialist understanding of the self that is individualistic. This 
subjectivism is in tension with Gadamar’s understanding of the self as socially 
and historically embedded. This serves as a superb platform to discuss how 
contemporary philosophy in the West has moved away form an atomistic 
conception of autonomy to a socially embedded conception. This will be 
discussed further in the following chapter. 
Biography 
Over the past several years Shabestari has become one of the most 
prominent reformist thinkers in Iran. His religious education, however, began 
in a much more traditional setting. Shabestari was born in 1936 in Shabstar, a 
small city in the North of Tehran from which he has gained his surname. 
Shabestari came to further his studies in Qum in 1951, where he studied for 
18 years. It was in Qom in which he was able to reach the level of ijtihad, the 
ability to decipher rulings in Islamic law.154 
There were two thinkers in Qum that left a lasting impression with 
Shabestari, Allameh Tabātāba’ī (d.1981) and Ayatollah Khomeini.155 Allameh 
Tabātāba’ī was a prominent philosopher and commentor of the Qur‘an who 
the now famous al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr al-Qur‘ān. Shabestari was influenced not 
only by Tabātāba’ī works in philosophy and quranic exegesis, but also his 
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spiritual stature.156 In regards to Khomeini, Shabestari was impressed by 
Khomeini’s endeavour to move past an understanding of religion confined to 
personal worship and belief to an understanding of Islam that included politics 
and political philosophy.157 
In 1969, Shabestari, was appointed director of the Islamic Center in 
Hamburg, Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg, where he became fluent in German 
and became acquainted with philosophical hermeneutics and the works of 
German philosophers such as Gadamer over the nine years that he lived in 
Germany.158 He returned to Iran during the political turmoils of 1978.159 
Shabestari has been working mainly within the German hermeneutical 
tradition. The influence of hermeneutics is evident in the title of his magnum 
opus Hirminūtīk, Kitāb va Sunnat (Hermenuetics, the Book, and the Sunnah). 
Yet, hermeneutics only explains one angle of Shabestari’s approach to 
religion. From the German protestant tradition he also borrowed the concept 
of religious experience, which comes to the fore in his book Īmān va Āzādī, 
Faith and Freedom. 
After the establishment of the Islamic Republic the government took it 
upon itself to proceed with a program for cultural reform with the use of state 
television, education, and clerical networks.160 In protest, intellectuals began 
to call for the allowance of greater autonomy for the individual and for a 
greater emphasis of rights over values. This is reflective especially in the 
works of Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, and Muhammad Mojtahid 
Shabestari. Surūsh discusses the relationship between reason and freedom 
and places them as “primary values.”161 He argues that freedom is not only a 
necessity for reaching truth but is a truth itself.162 Mohsen Kadivar defines a 
reciprocal relationship between autonomy and religion. Religion, he argues, 
helps to safe guard autonomy by ensuring ethical standards. Yet, religion 
                                                        
156 Ibid. 
157Ibid.  
158Ashk Dahlén, “Deciphering the Meaning of Revealed Law : The Surūshian Paradigm in 
Shi’i Epistemology” (PhD thesis, Thesis doctoral–Uppsala universitet, 2002), 163.  
159“Zindigī Nāme. Vib Sāyt-E Shakhsī-E Muḥammad Mujtahid Shabistarī.”  
160Muḥammad Mujtahid Shabistarī, Naqdī Bar Qirāʼat-E Rasmī Az Dīn : Buḥrānhā, 
Chālishʹhā, Rāh-E Ḥalʹhā, Dīn Va Farhang (Tehran: Ṭarḥ-e Naw, 2011), 17.  
161‘Abd al-Karīm Surūsh, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam : Essential Writings 
of Abdolkarim Soroush. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) xiv.  
162Ibid. xiv.  
without autonomy will simply whither away.163 Shabestari makes one of the 
clearest ties between faith and autonomy. He argues that faith must be based 
on autonomy for it to have any sense of authenticity. For Shabestari, 
autonomy is a prerequisite for religion, and cannot be moderated by it. Any 
social order that tries to control autonomy is in fact hindering faith.164 
Reformism and the Authoritarian State 
Shabestari’s understanding of the self is part a reaction to the growing 
powers of the state. As stated earlier, the Islamic Republic tried to control 
varies aspects of personal life such as music, movies, satellite television, 
hijāb, weddings, and the choice of spouse.170  While autonomy is modern, so 
too is state authoritarianism. The levels of control that states, and 
corporations, have on the lives of individuals are beyond the powers of the 
pre-modern states. Talal Asad eloquently remarks on this contrast: 
A moment’s reflection will show that it is not the literal scope of the shari’a which matters 
here but the degree to which it informs and regulates social practices, and it is clear that 
there has never been any Muslim society in which the religious law of Islam has governed 
more than a fragment of social life. If one contrasts this fact with the highly regulated 
character of social life in modern states, one may immediately see the reason why. The 
administrative and legal regulations of such secular states are far more pervasive and 
effective in controlling the details of people’s lives than anything to be found in Islamic 
history. The difference, of course, lies not in the textual specifications of what is vaguely 
called a social blueprint, but in the reach of institutional powers that constitute, divide up, 
and govern large stretches of social life according to systematic rules in modern industrial 
societies, whether capitalist or communist.”171 
Although state paternalism finds grounds within certain concepts in 
Islamic thought, especially the concept of forbidding evil, that grounding does 
not necessitate it’s presence. Had there been a different history to Islamic 
modernity we would have found different stances toward state paternalism. 
The drive for state paternalism has in fact been in reaction to the excess of 
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the previous secular regimes. The despotic nature of these regimes tainted 
the concept of secularism such that it became considered to be a tool of 
oppression. As Nader Hashemi argues: 
Despotism, dictatorship, and human rights abuses, for a generation of Muslims growing up 
in the postcolonial era, thus came to be associated with secularism. Muslim political 
activists who experienced oppression at the hands of secular national governments 
logically concluded that secularism was an ideology of repression.172 
Amongst a core of these ideas about secularism where ideas about 
individualism and freedom. These concepts came to be associated in a 
negative light in terms of alienation and hedonism. State paternalism in turn is 
defended as being necessary in order to stop a tahājum-e farhangī, a cultural 
invasion. Their reactions are quite similar to American politicians during the 
McCarthy era, where a fear of foreign influence justified authoritarian 
means.173 Grounded in an understanding of forbidding evil, the state is seen 
as responsible for promoting Islamic belief and values. 
This mix of state paternalism as well as the new found technologies of 
the state has prompted many reformist Iranian intellectuals to develop an 
opposing understanding of religion. A corner stone of their rethinking of 
religion is religious egalitarianism where no single source of authority can 
define what is and is not Islamic, but it is instead up to the individual to make 
these distinctions. This egalitarianism in turn resides on individualism.174  
This individualism has been dominating Iranian discourse, such that 
Islamist and traditionalist authors discuss matters that are central to autonomy 
predominately to refute the views put forward by reformists. This reformist 
understanding of individualism has, however, indirectly come under attack 
from another source. Much of the philosophy that underpins reformist views 
towards individualism has been critiqued within liberal political philosophy 
itself. For, as it will be shown, the emerging consensus within liberal political 
philosophy is that a cornerstone of autonomy is that individuals are socially 
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and historically embedded.176 The image of the unhindered individual that 
starts from a world without meaning and begins to create her own 
understanding of religion finds no partners within this new paradigm. The 
paradigm instead emphasis how we are already grounded within a world full 
of meaning and history and that it is within this backdrop that we begin to 
create our sense of self. Our autonomy is made possible by this very 
community and its history. 
Epistemic Egalitarianism as a Social Movement 
Thus if both Islamists and reformists agree that change in Islamic law is 
a necessity, then what is that differentiates the two? One difference is the way 
that both groups want the change to occur. Reformists try to push Islamic 
thought towards understanding of believers that views them as equal, such 
that it provides a foundation for further liberal arguments, such as the 
incorporation of Human Rights. As we will see below, Shabestari establishes 
this egalitarianism through a rethinking of faith and religious experience. He 
argues that one gains faith and knowledge of Islam through a direct 
experience with the divine. The concept of religious experience provides the 
justification for the egalitarianism that would in turn justify liberalism. 
Part of the way that Shabestari defends his stance is through 
description. He describes how faith is gained. This is similar to other 
reformists who generally begin by describing the status of the individual as 
they actual are in the modern world.177 They spend a great deal of time 
describing the differences between the modern and pre-modern worlds, the 
changes that modernity brought about, and how individuals live today. This 
descriptive analysis, does however, lead to prescriptive ordainments that are 
based on this descriptive analysis. As Lorraine Code argues in her feminist 
critique of autonomy, she writes that: 
Autonomy-oriented theories rest on a cluster of assumptions about subjectivity that are as 
much prescriptive as descriptive. A descriptive premise, which casts human beings as 
creatures capable of sustaining self-sufficient existence, acquires prescriptive dimensions 
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in attendant assumption that the telos of a life is the realization of self-sufficiency and 
individuality.178 
Shabestari tries to deny any specific claim to knowledge by religious 
experts and put forward an approach that gives every individual equal access 
to religious knowledge. This access is usually presented under the rubric of 
religious experience. This ability to individually create meaning means that 
each individual is solely responsible for the creation of their own 
understanding of religion. If each person individual is personally responsible, 
then the state, or religious authority, should not interfere in this process. The 
creation of meaning is based on individual experience without the coercion of 
outside forces. It is this epistemic egalitarianism stance towards personal 
interpretation that differentiates the reformists from the traditional 
understanding of ijtihād. 
Arguably, this description is motivated by the prescription. That 
because we have a political desire to limit the role of the state in the lives of 
individuals we therefore ascribe to this description of the self. Alvin Goldman 
makes a similar remark to post-modernist critiques of epistemic privilege: “The 
postmodern rejection of epistemic privilege is not wholly rooted in displeasure 
with Cartesian epistemology. Much of it has a political cast. The language of 
‘privilege’ is the language of rank and honor, especially unearned rank and 
honor, which has a nasty anti-egalitarian odor.”179 This criticism is, however, 
well founded. There is an intrinsic relationship between epistemic privilege 
and social power, specifically when it comes to notions of credibility. We can 
deny credibility to certain individuals because of non-epistemic reasons. The 
social processes of the creation and transfer of knowledge can be used to 
unjustly exclude certain groups, themes that have been pursed further by the 
likes of Foucault and Bourdieu.180 Although the reformists, including 
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Shabestari, are not explicit about the relationship between credibility and 
power. 
This concern with the political is not a criticism of their efforts but an 
attempt to understand how reformists try to reconcile their prescriptions and 
their descriptions Although, one cannot deny that the popularity of this line of 
thinking is based more on its prescriptive conclusions than it’s descriptive 
merits. As Asef Bayat argues, 
Yet the significance of these ideas in the Iranian context lay not in their originality but in 
their popular appeal under a self-conscious Islamic state. Not only did these views shake 
up the conceptual foundation of the traditional clergy and theological seminaries, forcing 
them to rethink their perspectives; their convergence with the people’s political grievances 
rendered them a social force.181 
The social currents within Iran at the time had more to do to 
popularising reformist thought than the actual contents of their works. Bayat 
shows how reformist ideas resonated with people’s political grievances by 
focusing on rights, democracy, and pluralism, and how their ideas were 
spread through journals, periodicals, and lectures. 182 This is not unique to 
reformist thinkers, for social forces in general play a great role in not only 
popularising but also influencing thought. We would not be discussing the 
equal application of the concept of autonomy to everyone, rather than white 
property owning males as intended in the beginning of the Enlightenment, had 
it not been for various social movements that have tried to seek equality. I will 
discuss this topic further in a final chapter. 
Shabestari’s Hermeneutcis 
Shabestari has a clear goal in his magnum opus Hirminūtīk, Kitāb va 
Sunnat, first printed in 1996. The very first words in his introduction read: “The 
subject of this book is that the exegetes of the Islamic revelation have always 
conducted their exegeses of the Qur’an and sunnah based on their own pre-
understandings, interests, and expectations.”183 He laments the academic 
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establishments because “this idea is still prevalent that that it is possible, or 
that it is even necessary, that one must approach the exegeses of the Qur’an 
and sunnah with a mind clear of all pre-understandings, interests, and 
expectations.”184 
He argues that this approach to exegesis has meant that the pre-
understanding that influence exegesis have been ignored. Scholars have 
wrongly assumed that only certain types of knowledge, such as language and 
uṣūl al-fiqh, are important to exegesis and that the other types of knowledge 
play no role. Moreover, scholars have wrongly assumed that Islamic law as 
revealed during the time of the Prophet and the Imams are not historically 
bound and are applicable to all times.185 Ignoring these other sciences has 
had a detrimental affect on interpretation. In this book he is setting out to 
correct this outlook through the use of hermeneutics.186 
Shabestari uses hermeneutics in order to state that there are a series 
of pre-understandings that ground our interpretations, and that a correct 
interpretation is done not by ignoring these pre-understandings but rather by 
purifying these pre-understandings. Shabestari defines hermeneutics in a very 
narrow sense by stating that hermeneutics is “the grounding of interpretation 
in the pre-understandings, interests, and expectations of the interpreter.”187 
He then states that the goal of the book is to have them purify, rather than 
ignore, these prejudices: 
Thus, we want to draw the attention of religious scholars to this extremely important issue 
that a thorough purifying of prejudices, intentions, and expectations of the exegetes 
(mufasirān) and jurists (faqīhān), from all ages, is a fundamental condition of every 
acceptable interpretation, and the perfection of religious knowledge is not possible without 
this revision and purification.188 
Shabestari agrees with the concept of the hermeneutic circle. There 
are a series of pre-understandings that one has before one starts reading the 
text. These pre-understandings are what makes interpretation possible. It is 
through the engagement with the text that these pre-understandings can 
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come to be clarified.189 This of course is a reflection of Heidegger’s recasting 
of the hermeneutic circle. An idea that was further developed by Gadamer. 
Before Heidegger, the hermeneutic circle consisted of an interpretative 
interdependence: one’s understanding of the whole text consisted of 
understanding the parts, and the understanding of the parts consisted of 
understanding the whole.190 
However, there is a fundamental difference between Shabestari’s 
understanding of the hermeneutic circle from the Heideggerian understanding. 
For Heidegger, and following him Gadamer, this pre-understanding consists 
of being in the world.191 That we are already embedded in a particular social-
historical situation that makes understanding possible. Shabestari does not 
present these pre-judgments in this manner, as is evident from his examples. 
The pre-judgments for Shabestari consist of known facts. It is more about 
knowledege than being situated in the world. Thus his examples of a traveler 
trying to travel from Tehran to Shiraz deals with how this traveler knows what 
he wants to but is ignorant of the means of transportation. His more lengthy 
example about an academic author that is trying to write a book is along the 
same lines. His example begins by highlighting the fact that the author begins 
his journey by referencing an encyclopedia, or going to the library, and is able 
to understand the subject through a dialogue with various authors. Shabestari 
does not touch any concepts that would be reflective of Heidegger’s 
understanding of being in the world.192 Ultimately, Shabestari’s example of the 
author falls back to the older understanding of the hermeneutic circle. He 
states that the understanding of a whole text is possible through the 
understanding of its parts and vice versa.193 It is already possible to see 
where Shabestari and Gadamer differ. 
Shabestari states that the process that a faqīh is required to purify, or 
correct, his prejudices is through the use of the modern social sciences. The 
faqīh needs to understand that the way the modern individual lives is different 
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from the past. Thus when the faqīh understands the new context in which the 
modern individual lives, his rulings will also change to support this new 
context. 
Without a doubt, an academic method requires that contemporary jurists (fuqahā) must 
renew their foundations and fundamentals of ijithād when it comes to these issues. Issues 
and topics related to this ijtihād are related to types of knowledge outside of fiqh and uṣūl. 
These subjects require anthropology (both philosophical and social science), sociology, 
history, economics, politics, psychology, and similar fields of study.194 
Shabestari argues that the problems that the Islamic Republic of Iran is 
facing in terms of applying traditional Islamic law to a modern context can only 
be overcome when “new ideas about the changes to religious culture are 
accepted, and they become a part of the pre-understandings of jurists.”195 
Thus the understanding of concepts such expediency, maṣlaḥat, and 
necessity, ḍarurat, can only be answered if jurists approach fiqh through the 
use of social science methods.196 
Modernity and Choice 
One of the ways in which Shabestari describes the shift from the pre-
modern to the modern world is through the understanding of choice. This 
concept of choice plays a much more prominent thought in his later works, 
especially the Ta’amulatī dar Qirā’at-e Rasmī az Dīn. Farzin Vahdat is correct 
in stating that in Īmān va Āzādī Shabestari “rarely makes any explicit 
references to the individual as the carrier of modern subjectivity.”197 However, 
Shabestari wrote Ta’amulatī dar Qirā’at-e Rasmī az Dīn in 2004, four years 
after Vahdat’s article was published. It is in this book that Shabestari clarifies 
his positions on subjectivity. 
Shabestari argues that the modern subject has a greater variety of 
choices compared to the pre-modern subject. “The modern age has widened 
the range of choices available to an individual. Choice has replaced 
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predestination and destiny.”198 He is clear in that the concept of choice is the 
defining attribute of modernity that differentiates it from the pre-modern world. 
This might be the greatest difference between a modern and a pre-modern society. In a 
pre-modern society one would live thinking about destiny, but in a modern society one is 
continuously illuminating the ground in front of him and takes one step forward.199 
Although choice is not necessarily synonymous with autonomy, it does 
convey at least some of what is understood by autonomy. It conveys a sense 
of rationality, free-will, and an independence from others. The modern subject 
can choose her own life goals and projects. 
Many other existentialist philosophers also discussed this modern 
concept of choice.200 As Sartre argues in Being and Nothingness: “All these 
trivial passive expectations of the real, all these commonplace, everyday 
values, derive their meaning from an original projection of myself which 
stands as my choice of myself in the world.”201 Although choice for these 
philosophers, and for Shabestari as well, has more to do with authenticity than 
it does with autonomy specifically. By authentic I mean being ones true self. 
202 It is, however, difficult to understand how one can be existentially authentic 
without having autonomy. 
Thus if modernity is the bastion of choice, the pre-modern world should 
be the opposite. It is here that Shabestari describes the pre-modern world as 
being embedded in taklīf, duties or obligation. Since religion originally began 
in such a climate, it should be reflective of that very atmosphere. In terms of 
politics, for example, he states that political views would merely be an 
expression of their religious views, given the dominant paradigm was of duties 
and obligation. 
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In the past, if one spoke about duties and obligations in politics these duties would have 
relayed the message of religion, for people were not choosers (intikhābgar). In reality their 
only duty was to obey their religious obligations in politics.203 
Shabestari argues that not only has modernity brought about the more 
choice, it has also destroyed the authoritative structure that would mandate a 
particular choice. He states that modernity is constantly bringing the external 
world under question.204 The modern individual is journeying in uncharted 
territory, for “the natural order that designed political, social, and family order, 
as well as values, is no longer conceivable.”205 This creates an unstable 
circumstance for the individual, and the only way out of this turmoil is through 
choice. 
In such circumstances all the authorities that one would rely on have crumbled. When the 
world external to the individual becomes uncertain, all types of authority crumble…In these 
circumstances the individual, in all matters, must choose. One must rely on one’s own 
knowledge and experience.206 
Religion can give comfort to the individual by helping to regain some of 
life’s lost meaning. He writes that “the message of religion in our age can help 
giving meaning to one’s relationship with God.”207 Religion has lost its 
authoritative role in defining how people should live their lives. It’s new role is 
one in which it gives meaning to the choices that individuals make. 
Ultimately, Shabestari believes that modernity has brought about a 
dramatic change to our social lives. We live in turmoil and must find our way 
out by making difficult choices. The reason that we live in this turmoil is 
because modernity has destroyed the authoritative structures that we used to 
rely upon. 
Yet, how is one to make these choices in matters of religion? The 
paradigm that Shabestari has put forward is one that relies in religious 
experience. It should not be surprising given that the concept of religious 
experience echoes quite well the existential outlook we have described 
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above. It is this direct experience with the divine that enables us to choose the 
path that we want to live. 
Establishing Religious Experience 
Shabestari builds his conception of faith upon his existentialist views of 
the human self. Similar to other religious existentialists he values personal 
experience above rational reasoning and religious dogma.208 The majority of 
his discussions of faith are found in Īmān va Āzādī, although he elaborates on 
his theories in his later works. He initially begins his discussion on faith by 
trying to reconceptualize it as a human endeavor. He reinterprets traditional 
approaches to faith, and offers a new paradigm based on religious 
experience. 
Shabestari understands religion in general to be a human construct to 
the extent that in his most recent writings he argues that God did not intend to 
bring forth a set concrete religion dīn.209 This hermeneutical/existential 
paradigm initially began as a critique of contemporary ijtihād. The 
incorporation of fiqh into the state, and subsequent changes to that were 
required to fiqh in this process as well as the growth of the concept of 
expediency (maslaḥat) were motivations for Shabestari to try and rethink the 
entire process of ijtihād. He argued that ijtihād was in need of a new 
hermeneutics, one that would rethink current prejudices are reground them in 
modern social sciences. 
His redefinition of faith necessitates a greater autonomy. Shabestari 
rejects the notion that faith is simply an acceptance of a creed210 and instead 
constructs an existentialist conception of faith that would necessitate free-will 
and personal autonomy. He considers faith to be an “action,” in a sense an 
attraction where one loses one’s sense of self and instead becomes one with 
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God.211 Thus faith cannot be something learned but it must be something 
experienced. Faith as experience, cannot therefore come about via an 
external agent such as society or the state. 
Similar to some trends in Christian theology, Shabestari is striving to 
move from faith as a rational understanding of doctrine to a conceptualisation 
of faith as religious experience. In short, Shabestari wants to move from an 
Aristotelian framework to a framework based on religious experience.212 In 
Naqdī bar Qirā’at-e Rasmī az Dīn, A Criticism of the Official Reading of 
Religion, Shabestari includes an interview that was conducted for the popular 
magazine Kiyān. He states that: 
The dominate epistemic framework amongst the Jews, Christians, Muslims was based on 
an Aristotelian model, and thus they would approach these [religious] issues based on that 
model. If we decide to accept a different epistemic framework, such as the one based on 
religious experience, then we have to use this paradigm to understand revelation and see 
all religious issues through this paradigm.213 
The citations in Īmān va Āzādī make it clear that Shabestari is 
influenced in particular by the great German theologians whether they be neo-
orthodox protestant thinkers such Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, or liberal 
protestant thinkers such as Paul Tillich.214 The idea of faith as religious 
experience was originated by the influential Schleiermacher and his theories 
about faith and hermeneutics have had an substantial impact on Shabestari’s 
thought. 
Schleiermacher was developing his new conception of faith in an 
environment hostile to religion. The Enlightenment had brought with it certain 
core principles of reason, progress, and autonomy that had a fundamental 
effect on Christian theology.215 Some Enlightenment thinkers tried to adopt 
Christian theology to these new principles which spawned the creation of 
Deism. These thinkers considered traditional Christian theology to be a 
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corruption of reason. Towards the end of the Enlightenment there seemed to 
be only two basic options to choose. The orthodox scriptural understanding of 
the Church or skeptical rationalism. Some critical thinkers refused to submit 
either of these two options and ventured to crave out new terrain for religion. 
Kant found religion in morality, Hegel found it in intellectual idealism and 
Schleiermacher found it in human experience.216 
Experience as an attractive encounter with God 
In Īmān va Āzādī, Shabestari’s strives to discuss the relationship 
between freedom and faith. He begins by describing faith, and the different 
definitions of faith that have been given. He describes three understandings of 
faith, and it is the third type in which we will focus on.217 The reason being that 
it is a rethinking of the definition of faith, and it is a new alternative that he is 
putting forward for Shi’i thought. It is an existentialist understanding of faith 
that is tied in closely with the concept of choice. 
The third type of faith that Shabestari begins to describe is “an 
attractive encounter with God” (rūyārūī ma’jzūbāneh bā khodāvand). As it is 
evidenced in the footnote at the end of the chapter, this conception of faith is 
influenced by the Sufi understanding of “encountering God” (liqā’ allāh) and 
the theories of faith of Paul Tillich, Karl Rahner, and Emil Brunner.218  
Shabestari describes faith as being a type of action. The core of this 
action is being attracted to God in such a way that one losses ones finiteness. 
He describes the encounter as such: 
Faith in this discussion that I will present, is not belief; such as belief that this world has a 
God. Faith is not certainty (yaqīn). Faith is neither knowledge nor philosophy. So what is 
faith? Faith is an “action.” The substance and core of this action is that by being attracted 
towards God one loses his finiteness in front of God, in order to reach one’s real self, the 
self that is supposed to be. Faith is related to qualities like ‘trust,’ ‘love,’ the ‘feeling of 
safety,’ and ‘hope.’ It is an attractive encounter between man and God. In faith, two 
people, one which is finite and the other absolute, come into encounter.219 
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He continues to describe this experience as being similar to when a 
baby hugs his or her mother, and how they lose all sense of self and 
completely puts their trust in their mother. This is what faith is and the rest is 
just pretense. For Shabestari faith is not about knowledge nor is it about 
belief. It is about an experience. He begins to cite certain verses of the Qur’an 
to demonstrate this concept of faith, and concludes: 
The Qur’an does not say that the faithful are those who believe that the universe has a 
God. Even the word belief (`aqīdeh) is not to be found in the Qur’an. When you analyze at 
the state of the faithful in the Qur’an you will come across certain states of being. For 
example, the faithful are the ones who cry when they see the truth. They are ones who 
see the signs of God in this universe. They are the one’s that the Qur’an cures their pains. 
They are the one’s whose hearts are at ease with the remembrance of God. A faithful 
person is one who comes out of himself to live with God.220 
He reiterates this position in his later book Ta’amulātī Dar Qirā’at Insānī 
az Dīn. In an interview that has been republished as a chapter in the book 
Shabestari makes the relationship between faith and existentialism even 
clearer. He is forthright in stating that the concept of faith in the Qur’an is 
existential. 
When we search the Qur’an to discover the reality of faith, you deal with a series of 
existential concepts. The Qur’an speaks about a type of experience: believers are those 
who look at the heavens and earth and experience that God has not created this in vain; 
they are people who were brought to tears by the words of the Prophet. In essence, these 
verses want to describe the signs of faith, and they are describing an experience.221 
Shabestari’s incorporation of autonomy into religion had ramifications 
beyond faith. Shabestari’s theology also influences his political philosophy 
and brings him head to head with the context that has been shaping his work. 
It has been through Shabestari’s work on autonomy, and the necessity of 
autonomy in fostering faith, that has led him to reject the notion of “official” 
religion and instead propose a political philosophy based on justice and the 
UN Deceleration of Human Rights. 
He is quite clear about this relationship between faith and politics in 
Īmān va Āzādī. He writes that if faith is such as he has described above, then 
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it is not possible to have faith in just any type of political system.222 He writes 
that this type of faith rejects taqlīd, and is only made possible with intikhāb, 
choice. Faith is not a question about doubt and certainty it is a question of 
chose. Faith and taqlīd are opposites.223 Thus any political system that takes 
away the ability to choose is harming faith. 
In the later editions of Īmān va Āzādī, Shabestari added an interview 
about the book as a final chapter.224 In that interview, he defines his intentions 
about the book much more clearly. He states that the reason he wrote the 
book was to refute those who say that it is possible to attain faith without 
providing the basic rights for freedom of conscience. He wrote the book to 
prove that faith, as it is understood in the Abrahamic religions, is dependent 
on freedom of conscience.225 
In addition, he argues that it is not possible to bring about faith in 
society through some type of social engineering, or as he calls it the 
“technology of creating and guiding faith.”226 Faith is “a type of experience and 
living that one chooses.”227 It cannot be engineered from above. 
From the Abyss to Faith 
Shabestari moves past traditional understanding of faith and is instead 
trying to develop a humanistic understanding of religion. He sees religion as 
primarily being the domain of the human, due to the fact that humans are the 
ones striving towards God. This is in contrast to Islamist and traditional 
scholars who would begin the study of religion with the study of God. 
Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi (b. 1932), a prominent Islamist philosopher 
and member of the Council of Experts, at the beginning of his book Ma’āref 
Qur’ān (Qur’ānic Studies) debates whether he should begin his work with a 
discussion of God or humanity. He chooses to begin with God because he 
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believes that is more in line with the teachings of the Qur’ān.228 Shabestari 
argues instead that that the understanding of religioun should begin with the 
human. 
Religion belongs to humans, not God. Humans need religion, not God…When I talk about 
“a humanist reading of religion” I mean religion and religiousness as a human understands 
it according to his own humanity.229 
The opposite of this, is a reading of religion that is not humanistic. It is 
an understanding of religion that is against humanity. This means that 
humanity must forget its own social historical progress and only adhere to 
commandants that have been ordained from above. 
Shabestari develops his understanding of religion and faith on the 
premise that it is the individual that builds its own “self.” Thus the individual is 
morally and personally autonomous and discovers and experiences faith. 
Faith is therefore an individualistic endeavour and not one which can be 
brought about through institutions or creeds. Faith, as religious experience 
comes before theology and dogma. It is through our religious experience that 
we develop our rational understanding of religion. 
Although Shabestari is trying to argue for the freedom of conscience 
his description of experience and faith truly goes beyond that. His description 
of faith is such that the individual finds himself in an abyss. Modernity has 
destroyed the structures that would confer meaning to her life, and give 
authority to the understanding of religion. The only way out of this abyss is 
through making choices. 
For the modern individual religion as a certain form is no longer an issue. Today, the 
modern individual is an individual that is thrown into an infinite plane in which he must find 
himself. He must live with his own responsibilities and decide how he wants to live - just as 
the existentialists have discussed.230 
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Gadamer vs Shabestari 
It is interesting that Shabestari calls his approach hermeneutical when 
it runs against so much of Gadamer’s core beliefs. Shabestari is clearing 
putting forward an understanding of hermeneutics that differs from Gadamer, 
but unfortunately does not engage with Gadamer in any serious manner. 
Shabestari puts forward an approach that is grounded in subjectivism, and 
abjures authority and tradition. Gadamer, on the other hand, developed an 
approach “that rejects subjectivism and relativism, abjures any simple notion 
of interpretive method, and grounds understanding in the linguistically 
mediated happening of tradition.”231 In actuality, Shabestari appropriates all 
the values of the Enlightenment which Gadamer was criticising. 
Shabestari begins by stating that it is necessary to clear our prejudices 
so that we can correctly understand the text. Shi’i fiqh must re-examine its 
prejudices, as discussed earlier, before trying to understand the Qur’an and 
tradition literature. Gadamer instead believes that is because of prejudices 
that understanding is made possible. 
Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort the 
truth. In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of 
the word [pre-judgment], constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to 
experience. Prejudices are our biases of our openness to the world. They are simply the 
conditions whereby we experience something—whereby what we encounter says 
something to us. This formulation certainly does not mean that we are enclosed within a 
wall of prejudices and only let through the narrow portals those things that can produce a 
pass saying, ‘Nothing new will be said here.’232 
Moreover, Gadamer states that it is not possible to correct our 
prejudices before we begin the process of hermeneutics. Instead, prejudices 
are cleared through the practical effort of understanding. 
Shabestari believes that authority has crumbled and that now one 
“must rely on one’s own knowledge and experience.”233 Gadamer argues that 
neither has authority crumbed nor is it possible to simply rely on one’s own 
subjective knowledge and experience. Gadamer argues that the claim to 
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authority is a claim to knowledge. Authority is earned through the 
acknowledgment that certain individuals have gained a superior level of 
judgment and knowledge to one’s own. Gadamer’s statement about authority 
is similar to the arguments made for the necessity of taqlīd within Shi’i fiqh. It 
is an argument from expertise. Gadamer argues that 
the authority of persons is ultimately based not on the subjection and abdication of reason 
but on an act of acknowledgment and knowledge—the knowledge, namely, that the other 
is superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that for this reason his judgment takes 
precedence—i.e., it has priority over one’s own.234 
In regards to subjectivism, Gadamer writes that such an epistemic 
approach is not feasible for we are all already bound within a social and 
historical context. He states these claims to subjectivism are similar to looking 
at a distorted mirror: 
In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand 
ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-
evident way in the family, society, and state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a 
distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed 
circuits of historical life. That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his 
judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being.235 
Far from proposing the destruction of authority and the reliance on 
subjective experience, Gadamer argues that morality is best grounded in 
tradition. He considers classical moral philosophy superior to Enlightenment 
philosophy because of this reliance on tradition: 
The real force of morals, for example, is based on tradition. They are freely taken over but 
by no means created by a free insight or grounded on reasons. This is precisely what we 
call tradition: the ground of their validity. And in fact it is to romanticism that we owe this 
correction of the Enlightenment: that tradition has a justification that lies beyond rational 
grounding and in large measure determines our institutions and attitudes. What makes 
classical ethics superior to modern moral philosophy is that it grounds the transition from 
ethics to “politics,” the art of right legislation, on the indispensability of tradition. By 
comparison, the modern Enlightenment is abstract and revolutionary.236 
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Gadamer is generally criticized for being too conservative, and giving 
too much weight to tradition. His positive interpretation of authority and 
tradition has been critiqued by many including a lengthy series of debates with 
Habermas. Habermas argued that “Gadamer’s prejudice for the rights of 
prejudices certified by tradition denies the power of reflection.”237 Gadamer 
replied by stating that the type of ideal that Habermas was aiming for was 
merely an illusion and that it over estimates the capabilities of rational 
discourse. Nonetheless, none of this conservatism can be found in 
Shabestari’s hermeneutics. 
Shabestari puts forward an atomistic understanding of autonomy that is 
at odds with the very sources that inspired his philosophy. While this is itself 
not a critique, Shabestari must at least address this conflict and argue why he 
only appropriates certain conceptions from the hermeneutic tradition while 
rejecting others. Especially given that he labels his approach as 
hermeneutical. Shabestari’s particular appropriation of hermeneutics has 
dominated Iranian discourse and his version of hermeneutics was considered 
as a call for individualism and relativism. 
Nonetheless, this all calls for a new dialogue within Shi’ism in regards 
to autonomy. A dialogue that moves past atomism and into the socially 
embedded self. For even within liberalism, arguably where atomistic 
conceptions of autonomy are most at home, has moved passed individualism 
and towards a socially embedded understanding of autonomy. In regards to 
autonomy, they are more aligned with Gadamer then they are with 
Shabestari. In the next chapter, I will show even within liberalism the concept 
of a socially embedded autonomy has gained prominence. 
Rethinking Choice and Embeddedness 
There are several themes from Shabestari’s discussions that will 
become central to the discussion about autonomy and choice, the most 
important of which is experience. There are two ways to in which experience 
will be used in later chapters. 
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In one sense experience is about our practical encounter with the 
world. This is the sense in which Shabestari mostly uses the term experience. 
Although I argued that Shabestari’s conception of autonomy is individualistic, 
and that it places too much emphasis on subjective experience, the 
importance that he gives to phenomenology of experience itself important. 
Although I disagree with the existentialist notion that he is trying to describe, 
there is truth to the argument that choice is important for the development of 
identity. It will become central to the discussion of choice in the framework of 
SDT. SDT argues that the internalization of belief is a proactive action that 
requires one to situate an external belief among that other beliefs that one 
holds. Choice is important because it develops the notion that one is forming 
their identity themselves, and thus boosts motivation. 
The second important understanding of experience is how it relates to 
knowledge. Shabestari is clear that he is not trying to focus on knowldege and 
belief, but still his focus on the importance of experience helps to give a 
renewed focus to the epistemic gains of subjective experience. It is in a way 
an unintended consequence. It is similar to how the contribution of the 
phenomenological approach in philosophy has been “the manner in which it 
has steadfastly protected the subjective view of experience as a necessary 
part of any full understanding of the nature of knowledge”238 There is a level of 
knowledge gained from subjective experience that is not gained through 
theoretical approaches. In later chapters I will discuss this under the rubric of 
expertise. 
Just as importantly, however, is the concept that knowledge is also an 
interpretation. That the perspective from which we view the world will taint our 
understanding of the world. The reformists mostly use this to discredit our 
understanding of the world, yet I would agree with Gadamer that it is because 
of these viewpoints that any understanding of the world is possible. Hence 
Gadamaer’s reliance of tradition, which is also echoed by MacIntyre and Talal 
Asad. Yet this understanding of knowledge as interpretation, plays an 
important part in the internalization of religion. As will be discussed in the 
chapter regarding SDT, subjective experience of internalization will affect the 
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degree of internalization. Thus, if an individual sees an action as controlling 
this will hinder the process of internalization. 
Before I discuss SDT, however, it is important to explore the concept of 
the embedded self. The next chapter will discuss how this understanding of 
autonomy as being socially and historically embedded has gained 
predominance in both moral and political philosophy. It will be a basis on 
which the arguments in SDT will be built upon. 
A Social Self 
Within liberalism, there has been a shift from an atomistic to a social-
historical model of the self. The concept of autonomy, and individualism, takes 
a different turn after the communitarian critiques. I shall begin by describing 
this shift. This will be done by showing how communitarian critiques, partially 
in response to Rawls’ revival of political philosophy, were influential in forming 
this new landscape. In conclusion, a model of the self will be presented that is 
socially embedded and will incorporate notions of the public sphere. 
The various critiques about the self, especially the perception of an 
individualistic understanding of the self within liberalism, has brought about a 
shift in perspectives. There is now a broad consensus that the self and 
autonomy is one way or another a social self. As John Christman has noted: 
In fact, one could say that an uneasy consensus has developed in opposition to the 
assumption of a thoroughly individualistic conception of the person (as the subject of 
principles of justice), a conception where no reference is made to relations with other 
persons, traditions, historical practices, and social forms. The political self is, in some 
ways at least, a social self, marked in various ways by indicators of a social identity, 
however this is conceived.239 
In a previous chapter, in regards to the definition of autonomy, I relied 
heavily on feminist understandings of relational autonomy.240 That notion of 
relational autonomy shares much the other theories that will be discussed in 
this chapter. I had already mentioned the parallels between relational 
autonomy and communitarian conceptions of the self. I will not be analyzing 
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those theories again in this section, because I feel that have already 
adequately covered their theories. 
What I hope to accomplish in this chapter is to tell a story about a shift 
in liberal philosophy that supports the concept of a social self. Although I think 
there is much to be gained by feminist critiques of autonomy, it is unfortunate 
that the majority of works in political philosophy do not reference them. As it 
will be shown, most of the works in political philosophy will address 
communitarian critiques, mostly due to the fact that are working much more 
directly in the same field of philosophy. 
This chapter begins with an examination of Rawls’ moral and political 
philosophy. The role of autonomy within Rawls’ broader philosophy will be 
discussed, as well as his self-reflective critiques in his movement towards a 
political liberalism. Communitarian critiques will be discussed such as Alasdair 
MacIntyre, and Charles Taylor’s establishment of a narrative view of the self. 
The focus in this article, however, will be on Alasdair MacIntyre, for his 
critique of modern moral philosophy has been instrumental in the 
understanding of Islamic tradition as a discursive tradition. MacIntyre’s 
communitarian criticisms will be presented, as it serves as basis for both my 
understanding of discursive tradition and Kwame Appiah’s argument for 
collective identity. Kwame Appiah’s theory of collective identity as well as 
Kymlicka’s multiculturalism is discussed next. Both theories show the 
importance that the socially embedded understanding of autonomy has taken 
place within liberal philosophy. The chapter will concluded by examining how 
these ideas of the embedded self have influenced other fields of thought such 
as International Relations. 
Beyond merely an understanding of the self, communitarians have put 
forward ideas about religion, epistemology, and tradition, that bear heavily on 
the research goals of this project. Many communitarian defences of the social 
self are in part motivated by a sensibility towards the role of religion in a 
secular age. Communitarians, such as Charles Taylor and Alisdar Macintyre 
have written on this topic specifically, as it will be shown below. Moreover, a 
few of the communitarians analyzed in this section have also put forward a 
program of social epistemology. MacIntyre’s theory of tradition, and to a 
lesser extent Gadamer’s, plays heavily in my understanding of Islam as a 
discursive tradition. This will be explained in a later chapter that discusses 
how Talal Asad used MacIntyre’s idea of tradition of to recast the 
anthropology of Islam. 
This shift is of profound importance in terms of analyzing autonomy 
within Shi’i thought. The model of autonomy that has become the cornerstone 
of all discussion in post-Revolutionary Iran was the individualism inherited 
from post-war liberals and popularized by the modernists. The previous 
chapter showed the individualism that was inherent to Shabestari’s thought. 
Yet, if this concept of autonomy and individualism has been critiqued and is 
no longer the accepted model in the liberal tradition that gave birth to it, what 
ramifications will this have for intellectual thought in Shi’ism where this model 
of the self was one of the core issues of debate? 
Rawls and Justification 
Rawls’ conception of autonomy rests upon a meta-ethical theory of 
justification. I will try to show how Rawls considers moral ethics to be justified 
and how this justification entails autonomy. Although I have already discussed 
Rawls’ use of reflective equilibrium (RE), I will discuss RE here only as Rawls 
himself intended to use the method and without my own modifications. 
It is necessary to clarify in the beginning what Rawls’ means by 
justification. Justification can be taken to mean the rational grounds that one 
accepts in order to prefer one moral theory over another. Justification in this 
sense makes sense if one is working upon foundationalist principles of 
justification. As described earlier, foundationalism argues that all knowledge 
relies upon a foundation of core noninferential knowledge and justified 
belief.241 Rawls, however, is providing a coherentist form of justification. 
Coherentism denies the existence of certain foundational beliefs, nor does it 
privilege certain beliefs over others, but instead argues that justification lies in 
a relationship between beliefs. This differentiation in approaches is key to 
understanding Rawls, for if one approaches Rawls’ theory of justification from 
a foundationalist perspective, it would seem like he is not providing any 
justification at all. 
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Rawls’ argument for a coherentist view, is unsurprisingly similar to 
other coherentist arguments. He begins by denying that any foundational 
belief can be used to develop morality. “There is no set of conditions or first 
principles that can be plausibly claimed to be necessary or definitive of 
morality and thereby especially suited to carry the burden of justification.”242 
The next step for Rawls is to provide a positive account of justification 
so as to not fall into moral skepticism. This is where Rawls’ develops his 
coherentist view of justification, namely RE. It is also for this reason that 
Rawls’ comments about justification are reiterated at the end of his book. The 
reason it is reiterated is that, given he is arguing for a coherentist justification, 
it is logical that his theory can only be justified if one is able understand his 
theory as a comprehensive coherent whole. 
Rawls states that RE begins with taking into consideration one’s 
judgments (or intuitions) about specific cases, the principles that constitute 
them, and the more abstract theoretical moral considerations that would bear 
on the previous two.243 These three are obviously amended and revived, in a 
Socratic way, such that they reach an equilibrium. 
Autonomy as Content 
Any justification that depends on coherence must take into 
consideration the number of pieces that are to be made coherent. This entails 
that there is a limit to the number of pieces that one can try to make coherent. 
Rawls’ raises the same concern: 
For even if the idea of all possible descriptions and of all philosophically relevant 
arguments is well-defined (which is questionable), we cannot examine each of them. The 
most we can do is to study the conceptions of justice known to us through the tradition of 
moral philosophy and any further ones that occur to us, and then to consider these.244 
Thus Rawls needs to limit the number of contending philosophies 
which he is trying to balance. Given that he is working within the Western 
liberal tradition, he begins his analysis from the current historical starting 
point. 
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Nevertheless, in comparing justice as fairness with these conceptions, the list used is not 
simply ad hoc: it includes representative theories from the tradition of moral philosophy 
which comprises the historical consensus about what so far seem to be the more 
reasonable and practicable moral conceptions.245 
For anyone trying to understand the role of autonomy in Rawls’ 
philosophy this presents a problem. Since Rawls’ is already working within a 
liberal tradition, many of the debates about autonomy will not be brought to 
the forefront – in such a way that Rawls’ would require a defense of autonomy 
- for they will have been agreed upon terms within that tradition. Thus, for 
Rawls’ the issue of autonomy would not be a central issue of concern. for 
nearly all conceptions of liberalism value autonomy, and have already brought 
the concept of autonomy into some form of equilibrium within their thought. 
Their simply isn’t much needed adjustment for Rawls’ to make things fit. 
However, this does not mean that Rawls’ is silent on the issue of 
autonomy. As we will show below, Rawls conception of justice is based upon 
a procedure. This procedure itself is what calls in the need for autonomy in 
Rawls’ theory of justice. 
Autonomy as Process 
Rawls’ method for reaching reflective equilibrium is based upon 
Kantian constructivism. Although there is a debate as to whether or not Kant 
had a theory of constructivism, it is something that Rawls’ himself attributes to 
Kant.246 Constructivism states that the morally correct action is one in which 
different agents would agree to if they were to engage in a hypothetical 
rational process.247 The original position is therefore the hypothetical process 
through which reflective equilibrium is to be reached.248 The original position 
is a hypothetical scenario in which participants formulate principles of social 
and political justice behind a “veil of ignorance” where we have no knowledge 
of who we are within society. This is done to ensure impartiality in our 
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reasoning, such that we don’t imbalance society in favor of one group, for we 
might belong to a weaker group. 
As Samuel Freeman states “In large part, constructivism defines what 
Rawls means by “fit together” our considered moral convictions in reflective 
equilibrium.”249 Rawls gives more focus to constructivism in Political 
Liberalism and he considers it one of the points of A Theory of Justice that 
were not adequately elaborated. In Political Liberalism he writes about 
constructivism that: 
It says that once, if ever, reflective equilibrium is attained, the principles of political justice 
(content) may be represented as the outcome of a certain procedure of construction 
(structure). In this procedure, as modeled by the original position, rational agents as 
representatives of citizens and subject to reasonable conditions, select the public 
principles of justice to regulate the basic structure of society.250 
The role that autonomy plays here should be rather clear. Morality is 
not something found or discovered, it is rather constructed through a rational 
process. Rational processes cannot be done outside of the individual. “… the 
principles of practical reason originate… in our moral consciousness as 
informed by practical reason.”251 Or as he said in Theory of justice: “The 
original position may be viewed, then, as procedural interpretation of Kant’s 
conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative.”252 
This ability of individuals to derive morality is the basis for Rawls’ entire 
justification as to why individuals should be considered to be free and equal: 
“…the capacity for moral personality is a sufficient condition for being entitled 
to equal justice.”253 Rawls’ conception of freedom is thus centered around the 
necessity of being moral agents. According to Rawls’ the correct way to 
discover the essential liberties is “to consider which liberties are essential 
social conditions for the adequate development and full exercise of the two 
powers of moral personality over a complete life.”254 
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It is therefore, the entire process of justification that demands 
autonomy. Reflective equilibrium requires constructivism which in turn 
requires autonomy. In Rawls’ terminology, these three moral values and 
concepts “fit.” As does his concept of liberty, which is to give the freedom 
necessary for the autonomous agent to develop a sense of social justice, and 
abide by the hypothetical social contract. When Rawls’ switches from 
comprehensive moral doctrine in A Theory of Justice to a political conception 
in Political Liberalism all that changes is merely the scope of the autonomous 
agent from what he labels a “constitutive autonomy” to “doctrinal 
autonomy.”255 By “doctrinal autonomy” Rawls means simply the political 
conception of the person as citizen. 
The Implications of Autonomy 
Rawls’ move to political conception of the person is not a minor 
change. Here, I will try to compare the concept of autonomy in Rawls’ two 
major works A Theory of Justice, and Political Liberalism. After this 
comparison I will show how his two conceptions of autonomy will be beneficial 
for understanding the role of autonomy in Islamic thought. Yet, to begin, it is 
necessary to clarify some of the terminology that Rawls’ uses, and which I 
shall continue to use in my writings. That is Rawls’ distinction between the 
concept of a comprehensive doctrine and political conception. Rawls’ makes 
this distinction clear early on in Political Liberalism. A doctrine can be 
considered comprehensive “when it includes conception of what is of value in 
human life, and ideals of friendship and of familial and associational 
relationships, and much else to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life 
as a whole.”256 A political doctrine on the other hand is “… a module, an 
essential constituent part, that fits into and can be supported by various 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in the society regulated by 
it.”257 
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A Comprehensive Kantian Autonomy 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls’ endeavors to move the liberal tradition 
from the dominant utilitarian framework to one based on social contract. This 
new framework is highly Kantian.258 In Chapter 40 under the title “The Kantian 
Interpretation of Justice as Fairness”, Rawls’ writes: 
For the most part I have considered the content of the principle of equal liberty and the 
meaning of the priority of the rights that it defines. It seems appropriate at this point to note 
that there is a Kantian interpretation of the conception of justice from which this principle 
derives. This interpretation is based upon Kant’s notion of autonomy.259 
To be more specific, the concept of autonomy that is under discussion 
by Rawls’ is moral autonomy. Rawls’ defines his Kantian notion of autonomy 
as such: 
Kant held, I believe, that a person is acting autonomously when the principles of his action 
are chosen by him as the most adequate possible expression of his nature as a free and 
equal rational being. The principles he acts upon [in that case] are not adopted because of 
his social position or natural endowments, or in view of the particular kind of society in 
which he lives or the specific things that he happens to want….260 
Rawls’ understanding of autonomy is arguably similar to what Kant 
himself states. Kant writes that “autonomy of the will is that property of it by 
which it is a law to itself independently of any property of objects of 
volition…”261 
Political Conception of the Person 
Rawls’ motivation for moving away from a comprehensive conception 
of autonomy to a political conception is that in a pluralistic society it would not 
be possible have a consensus on a comprehensive notion of autonomy.262 
This might entail in the long run, that certain oppressive forces be used in 
order to keep the dominant liberal philosophy in power. He calls this the fact 
of oppression: “a continuing shared understanding on one comprehensive 
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religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained only by the 
oppressive use of state power.”263 Rawls’ then continues to develop a political 
version of his comprehensive of justice as fairness, one in which justice is a 
modular concept that can be incorporated in different comprehensive 
accounts through an overlapping consensus. This in turn requires a rethinking 
of certain core fundamentals. The first of which is his conception of autonomy. 
Autonomy in Political Liberalism is no longer thought about in 
comprehensive terms, it is rather confined to conception of the political 
conception of the person. This political conception of the person is called a 
citizen. A citizen may hold any comprehensive belief that they wish, but when 
it comes to the realm of politics, and social justice, they must commit 
themselves to the original position. Therefore, there is only a thin layer of 
autonomy that is confined only to the political citizen. 
Rawls conception of a citizen becomes more clear when we analyze 
how the citizen is supposed to develop a well organized society. As we stated 
above, Rawls’ makes use of constructivism for his development of justice as 
fairness. In Political Liberalism,constructivism is no longer applied to develop 
comprehensive moral theories, but instead is confined to the sphere of the 
political. Yet, Rawls’ believes that not everything is constructed, and that “we 
must have some material… from which to begin.” This is namely his theory of 
the original position. The concepts of the political right and justice are, 
however, constructed. The concept of justice is then constructed as such: 
The procedure itself is simply laid out using as starting points the basic conceptions of 
society and person, the principles of practical reason, and the public role of a political 
conception of justice.264 
The conception of justice is then carried out in dialogue with other 
citizens in hopes of reaching an overlapping consensus. The requirement of 
the arguments put forward by citizens is that they be reasonable, and not 
necessarily rational. For example, arguments put forward by a person of faith 
must be translated into a way that a citizen outside of that will understand. 
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Yet the entire procedure of political constructivism depends upon the 
first principle of justice that “each person has an equal claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties…”265 Thus, when Rawls’ 
speaks about society as a fair system of cooperation he has in mind a 
particular conception of the citizen as being free and equal. “Since we start 
within the tradition of democratic thought we also think of citizens as free and 
equal persons.”266 Rawls’ conception of “free persons” is also political. He 
regards the freedom of citizens to have three attributes. The three attributes 
are that citizens have a conception of the good, that they are self-
authenticating sources of valid claims, and that they are responsible for their 
valid ends.267 The concept of free and equal citizens is vital to Rawls’ theory 
of justice for he is building upon a notion of the social contract, and more 
importantly it is vital to Rawls’ concern with stability. It is vital that citizens are 
free and equal so that they may accept and comply with the well ordered 
society which has been derived from this original position, and that this 
conception of society will be stable over time. 
Two Concepts of Autonomy and Islam 
Of what significance is Rawls’ shift from comprehensive to political 
autonomy to Islamic thought? The most significant impact of Rawls’ shift is to 
show the comprehensiveness of the Kantian notion of autonomy. There are 
numerous Muslim intellectuals that are trying to establish a liberal Islamic 
political doctrine, and many of these intellectuals try to present liberal doctrine 
as something that is already present within the Islamic tradition. 
What Rawls’ analysis of autonomy as a comprehensive doctrine makes 
apparent, is that the incorporation of autonomy into Islamic doctrine would 
require a commitment that would have wider theological implications. Yet, few 
Islamic intellectuals attempt to conceive of a liberal political philosophy that is 
strictly political and not comprehensive. One reason for this is that many of 
these modernist intellectuals are writing in reaction to Islamist thinkers. 
Islamist thinkers conceive of politics and religion as one entrenched 
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comprehensive doctrine. While Rawls does consider his theory to be political 
and not metaphysical, and modular instead of comprehensive, how can one 
argue for a political conception of justice against someone who grounds their 
political theory in a metaphysical framework? 
Rawls already concedes that it is possible to say that his argument that 
no metaphysical thesis is required for his concept of justice as fairness is 
already a metaphysical thesis.268 This is made clearer when one tries to argue 
for the political concept of justice as fairness to someone that already holds a 
metaphysical understanding of politics. For example, an Islamist would need a 
metaphysical argument to detach the political concept of the person from his 
comprehensive ideology. This is well articulated by Lucas Swaine, as he 
attempts to persuade theocrats into abiding by liberal institutions. He writes: 
“…the arguments liberals have given to theocrats on crucial points of political 
and legal justification remain philosophically unsatisfactory.”269 
Rawls’ Political Liberalism should be philosophically unsatisfactory for 
theocrats simply because he is not addressing them. Rawls makes very few 
arguments as to why one should adhere by the first principle of justice, free 
and equal citizens, even if that first principle is political and not metaphysical. 
Many pro-democracy movements might find A Theory of Justice to be more 
satisfactory because it is a comprehensive doctrine that offers an alternative 
to another comprehensive doctrine. Rawls is simply starting from the fact of 
reasonable pluralism and democratic institutions that he was situated in, and 
developed his theories form that starting point. Many Muslim intellectuals are 
starting from a different starting point. For example, the reformists 
underdiscussion are starting from an overall Islamist paradigm that already 
considered political theory to be a part of a different non-liberal 
comprehensive doctrine. The term Post-Islamist accurately captures this 
paradigm.270 Thus the move from a comprehensive Islamic doctrine, to a 
modular political conception, will be different than Rawls’ move from a 
comprehensive liberal doctrine to a modular political conception. 
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Thus one is left in a bit of a conundrum. Yes, political liberalism does 
offer more stability because its conception of autonomy is political and not 
metaphysical. But on the other hand it does not offer one a valid reason as to 
relinquish one’s previous comprehensive doctrine. It simply does not suffice to 
state, as Dreben Burton does,271 that any non-liberal theory is simply 
irrational. Micheal Sandel also raises the same concern, although in a 
different light: 
…granting the importance of securing social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect, 
what is to guarantee that this interest is always so important as to outweigh any competing 
interest that could arise from within a comprehensive moral or religious view?272 
It could be argued that political liberalism might be relinquishing the 
power it needs to bring about a liberal society. Given that political liberalism is 
modular, it still requires an argument for one to attach this modular concept to 
one’s overall comprehensive doctrine. Working from within Rawls’ political 
liberalism, Lucas Swaine actually does take this next step and offers an 
argument for why theocrats should abide by liberal intuitions. 
In Rawls defense, however, he was not unaware that his political 
philosophy would not in of itself, convince theocrats. He himself asks the 
same question in one of his final papers “The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited” and wonders how it is possible to get people of faith, or even 
adherents of non-religious secular doctrines to endorse a constitutional 
regime even though it be to their determent. He writes: 
Here the answer lies in the religious or nonreligious doctrine’s understanding and 
accepting that, except by endorsing a reasonable constitutional democracy, there is no 
other way fairly to ensure the liberty of its adherents consistent with the equal liberties of 
other reasonable free and equal citizens.273 
The way that one comes to this understanding, however, is 
metaphysical. This is evident by the fact that Rawls cites Abdullahi Ahmed 
An-Na'im - a Sudanese scholar that currently lives in the United States and 
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has authored many books on Islam, secularism, and human rights - as an 
intellectual that was able to reconcile a comprehensive doctrine – in this case 
Islam – with constitutional democracy.274 In his article “The Idea of Public 
Reason Revisited” Rawls states that “ In endorsing a constitutional democratic 
regime, a religious doctrine may say that such are the limits God sets to our 
liberty; a nonreligious doctrine will express itself otherwise.”275 It should be 
clear that An-Naim’s work is metaphysical. 
Overall, Rawls adds an important analysis to the concept of autonomy 
and that is to show the comprehensiveness of autonomy. He makes it clear 
that autonomy would require a commitment, not just in the political sphere but 
in theology as well. Moreover, his concept of citizen makes clear that given 
the position that Muslim intellectuals are starting from, that is a 
comprehensive Islamist paradigm, a political conception of the person still 
requires a metaphysical thesis. 
MacIntyre’s Critique of Liberalism 
MacIntyre’s critique of the enlightenment project, and liberalism as an 
extension of that project is that it is ahistorical, and does not take into 
consideration one’s intellectual tradition. MacIntyre believes that rationality is 
defined by one’s tradition and that one cannot evaluate ideas without taking 
into consideration that tradition. Modern moral philosophy, therefore, cannot 
solve ethical issues and merely becomes a form of emotivism. In this section I 
will set out to analyze MacIntyre critique of liberal individualism, and how his 
concept of tradition can be applied as method to better understand autonomy 
and faith in a Shi’i context. 
Critique of Liberal Rationality 
The liberal conception of the self is tied to the Enlightenment 
conception of rationality. The concept of the disengaged individual that can 
analyze phenomenon objectively is what gives autonomy its importance in the 
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natural and social sciences. Charles Guignon writes about the dual use of this 
method rationality to develop autonomy. Charles Taylor, in his historical 
analysis of the roots of the modern self, states that Descartes turn to 
disengaged reason was one fundamental turning points to the modern 
understanding of identity and autonomy. As Descartes writes: 
I was convinced that I must once and for all seriously undertake to rid myself of all the 
opinions which I had formerly accepted, and commence to build anew from the foundation, 
if I wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure in the sciences.276 
Later on he writes: 
Archimedes, in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe out of its place and transport 
it elsewhere, demanded only that one point should be fixed and immoveable; in the same 
way I shall have the right to conceive high hopes if I am happy enough to discover one 
thing only which is certain and indubitable.277 
Objectivity, and the overthrow of external authority, was required in 
order to provide a foundational basis for knowledge. A method, or as Talyor 
says a procedure, was therefore necessary to establish the Archimedes 
points and detail how knowledge can be built, or else one would fall into 
relativism. In following Bernstein, the dilemma between objectivity and 
relativism will be labeled as “Cartesian Anxiety.”278 
This concept of objectivity and autonomy is also seen in contemporary 
philosophers such as John Rawls. As stated in the previously autonomy is a 
necessary component for Rawls for it grounds his theory of moral and later 
political constructivism. While Rawls is not a foundationalist, as expressed by 
his theory of reflective equilibrium, objectivity and consequently the method of 
constructivism through the original position, are the foundations of his theory 
of justice. And it his method that call for the necessity of autonomy. 
Thus if this concept of rationality is changed, the concept of autonomy 
also changes. This is what takes place in the works of Alasdair MacIntyre. 
While their have been many criticism of the Cartesian paradigm especially in 
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the natural sciences, from which he draws support, MacIntyre’s approach is 
provocative for he endeavors to formulate how new perspectives in rationality 
will affect moral philosophy, and specifically liberal individualism. 
The Myth of Enlightened Rationalism 
One of MacIntyre’s critique of the liberal individualism is that it rests 
upon a concept of rationality which is itself a concept that has been developed 
through a tradition. This view of rationality believes that there is a single 
procedure that everyone could use as means of justification: 
It was a central aspiration of the Enlightenment… to provide for debate in the public realm 
standards, and methods of rational justification by which alternative courses of action in 
every sphere of life could be adjudged just or unjust, rational or irrational, enlightened or 
unenlightened. So it was hoped, reason would displace authority and tradition.279 
Yet no rational principles were able to be decided upon. Neither by the 
Enlightenment thinkers nor those that came after them. Thus, “the legacy of 
the Enlightenment has been the provision of an ideal of rational justification 
that which it has proved impossible to attain.”280 MacIntyre views liberalism as 
being the “strongest claimant” of this understanding of rationality, and that it 
“fails in this respect… provides the strongest reason that we can actually have 
for asserting that there is no such neutral ground…”281 
MacIntyre criticism is two fold. The first is that the Enlightenment 
project of a universal application of rationality has failed to deliver standards 
that even Enlightenment thinkers would agree upon. This is rather clear given 
the number of disagreements amongst those who have undertaken this 
project. Second, the different moral philosophies that have developed are 
incommensurable, and it is this point which will be elaborated. It should be 
noted that MacIntyre is not alone in making this claim, and that some of the 
most prominent philosophers have presented similar arguments, namely 
Kuhn, and Rorty.282 Later on it will be shown that MacIntyre makes use of 
                                                        
279Alasdair C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1988), 6.  
280Ibid., 6.  
281Ibid., 346.  
282Richard J. Bernstein, The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of 
Modernity/postmodernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 15–31.  
Kuhn’s study in order to develop a third way between the Enlightenment 
concept of objective rationality and relativism. 
On the issue of incommensurablity MacIntyre writes: 
What I earlier picked out as the distinctively modem standpoint was of course that which 
envisages moral debate in terms of a confrontation between incompatible and 
incommensurable moral premises and moral commitment as the expression of a 
criterionless choice between such premises, a type of choice for which no rational 
justification can be given.283 
In order to illustrate his point, MacIntyre turns to Kierkegaard’s book 
Enten-Eller (Either-Or). In Enten-Eller Kierkegaard writes about two distinctly 
different approaches to life. A is the aesthetic life, and B is the ethical life. For 
MacIntyre Enten-Eller shows the “deep internal inconsistency… between its 
concept of radical choice and its concept of the ethical… How I must feel at 
any given moment is irrelevant to the question of how I must live.”284 
In order to understand Kierkegaard’s dilemma it is vital to understand 
Kant. Kant “in almost every way sets the philosophical scene for 
Kierkegaard.”285 MacIntyre states Kant’s moral philosophy as having two 
simple theses: “if the rules of morality are rational, they must be the same for 
all rational beings… if the rules of morality are binding on all rational beings, 
then the contingent ability of such beings to carry them out must be 
unimportant.”286 Thus for Kant a rational justification of morality depends upon 
finding a rational test. Kant rejects the notion that this test depends upon 
whether or not it will eventually lead to happiness. Thus we begin to see a 
separation in Kant’s moral philosophy. “The sphere in which happiness is to 
be pursued is sharply distinguished from the sphere of morality…”287 
Yet Kant’s attempt to formulate a decisive test for morality was a 
failure. MacIntyre goes through a critique of how Kant falls short of his goals, 
though it is not necessary to restate them here. There are many critiques of 
Kant’s moral philosophy, from Schopenhauer to MacIntyre. Yet, it was Kant’s 
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failure “that provided Kierkegaard with his starting-point: the act of choice had 
to be called in to do the work that reason could not do.”288 
It might be appropriate to state that Rawls agrees with MacIntyre on 
this point that the Enlightenment failed to deliver on its promise of universally 
accept moral philosophy. Rawls’ transition from a comprehensive to a political 
doctrine of liberalism was due to the fact that he no longer considered his 
comprehensive moral doctrine in A Theory of Justice to be feasible, because 
a modern democratic society is characterized by “a pluralism of incompatible 
yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines.” Rawls realized that a strict 
adherence to rationality would not gather people to form a stable society. 
Thus he abandons rationality for reasonableness, and hence Rawls statement 
that an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines are 
required. In distinguishing reasonableness from rational Rawls writes that: 
Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals say, 
they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of 
cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others 
will likewise do so.289 
Rationality is then: 
… a distinct idea from the reasonable and applies to a single, unified agent (either an 
agent or corporate person) with the powers of judgment and deliberation in seeking ends 
and interests peculiarly its own.290 
These two concepts are completely separate from each other, such 
that “there is no thought deriving the reasonable from the rational.”291 While 
Rawls recognizes the problem, he choses to forgo the problem of 
inncommensurablity in moral philosophy, and rather find a viable solution for it 
in political philosophy. MacIntyre on the other hand, tries to solve the issue of 
inncommensurablity in moral philosophy. This leads MacIntyre to ask if there 
is a mode of understanding rationality which the Enlightenment thinkers could 
not grasp: 
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Is there some mode of understanding which could find no place in the Enlightenment’s 
vision of the world by means of which the conceptual and theoretical resources can be 
provided for reuniting conviction concerning such matters as justice on the one hand and 
rational enquiry and justification on the other?292 
MacIntyre argues that the way forward is to understand rationality in 
terms of tradition: “What the Enlightenment made us for the most part blind to 
and what we now need to recover is, so I shall argue, a conception of rational 
enquiry as embodied in a tradition…”293 This quite similar to Gadamer’s 
position: 
The overcoming of all prejudices, this global demand of the Enlightenment, will itself prove 
to be a prejudice, and removing it opens the way to an appropriate understanding of the 
finitude which dominates not only our humanity but also our historical consciousness.294 
The real force of morals… is based on tradition. They are freely taken over but by no 
means created by a free insight or grounded on reasons. This is precisely what we call 
tradition: the ground of their validity. And in fact it is to romanticism that we owe this 
correction of the Enlightenment: that tradition has a justification that lies beyond rational 
grounding and in large measure determines our institutions and attitudes.295 
How Tradition Affects Rationality 
MacIntyre believes that rationality is both tradition-constituted and 
tradition-constitutive. Rationality is affected by and affects tradition. On how 
tradition affects rationality, MacIntyre writes that: 
…rationality itself, whether theoretical or practical, is a concept with a history: indeed since 
there are a diversity of traditions of enquiry, with histories, there are, so it will turn out, 
rationalities rather than rationality, just as it will also turn out that there are justices rather 
than justice.296 
Yet at the same time, tradition is affected by rationality. Rationality 
helps to progress tradition whenever it is presented with an epistemic problem 
by deciding the most coherent answer.In an interview with Giovanna 
Borradori, MacIntyre clarifies his position as such: 
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To understand some particular philosophical position requires being able to locate it within 
a tradition, always in relation to its successors… So the best theory, that to which we owe 
our rational allegiance, in moral philosophy as elsewhere, is always the best theory to be 
developed so far within the particular tradition in which we find ourselves at work.297 
MacIntyre loosely correlates this theory to coherentism.298 “So 
correspondence or the lack of it becomes a feature of a developing complex 
conception of truth.”299 It should be noted tha MacIntyre is interested in a 
tradition that affects rationality. “Not all traditions… have embodied rational 
enquiry as a constitutive part of themselves…” Thus the type of traditions that 
MacIntyre is speaking about, are traditions that have a concept of rationality 
within them. 
In order to understand how to overcome incommensurablity MacIntyre 
turns to the philosopher who basically coined the term; Thomas Kuhn. In “The 
Relationship of Philosophy to its Past” MacIntyre argues that philosophers of 
science have generally given two kinds of reactions to Kuhn’s theory of 
incommensuablity. They have ether rejected it in total, or accepted in full with 
drastic consequences. MacIntyre argues for a third path. 
What I am arguing then is that one incommensurable body of scientific theory can speak 
to another across time, not only as providing a better set of solutions to its central 
problems… but as providing an historical explanation of why certain of the key 
experiences of its adherents in wrestling with their own problems were what they were.300 
Elsewhere, he writes: 
“But there is no way of identifying, characterizing, or classifying that particular datum in a 
way relevant to the purposes of theoretical enquiry except in terms of some prior 
theoretical or doctrinal commitment.”301 
However, as Bernstein points out, Kuhn himself was looking for a third 
possibility, one between objectivity and relativism, and MacIntyre’s 
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assessment of Kuhn could be based on a misunderstanding. Yet, irregardless 
of that misunderstanding, Bernstein considers MacIntyre’s approach for third 
path to mirror Kuhn’s own struggles. He quotes MacIntyre as writing: 
Objective rationality is therefore to be found not in rule-following, but in rule-transcending, 
in knowing how and when to put rules and principles to work and when not to. Consider 
how practical reasoning of this kind is taught, whether it is the practical reasoning of 
generals, of judges in a common law tradition, of surgeons or of natural scientists. 
Because there is no set of rules specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for large 
areas of such practices, the skills of practical reasoning are communicated only partly by 
precepts but much more by case-histories and precedents. Moreover the precepts cannot 
be understood except in terms of their application in the case-histories; and the 
development of the precepts cannot be understood except in terms of the history of both 
precepts and case-histories. The teaching of method is nothing other than the teaching of 
a certain kind of history.302 
The above quotation was, however, edited out of the final draft of 
MacIntyre’s paper “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the 
Philosophy of Science”. Yet, the same essence has been carried over: “It is 
only when theories are located in history, when we view the demands for 
justification in highly particular contexts of a historical kind, that we are freed 
from either dogmatism or capitulation to skepticism.”303 MacIntyre called his 
view point, dramatic narrative. 
MacIntyre and Rawls 
MacIntyre does not offer a point by point critique of Rawls, but rather 
critiques the rationality upon which Rawls has built his theory. There is a good 
debate between MacIntyre and Stephen Mulhall about how MacIntyre’s 
critiques apply to Rawls. Mulhall argues that MacIntyre’s critiques of Rawls’ 
position rests on a misinterpretation, and that MacIntyre’s views are 
compatible with a liberal framework.304 Yet, MacIntyre replies that Mulhall 
completely misunderstood his thought, because Mulhall failed to take into 
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consideration how MacIntyre’s central thesis, that liberalism consists of 
incommensurably theories. MacIntyre argues that “liberalism has become the 
kind of social and cultural tradition in which incoherence may be and, in the 
case of liberalism, is at home.”305 MacIntyre’s reply to Mulhall has a broader 
impact, for Mulhall’s intent in his widely cited book, Liberals and 
Communitarians, is to show that Rawls’ formulation of political liberalism takes 
into consideration communitarian critiques. For MacIntyre, the image of 
rationality that liberalism rested on is no longer viable. If that is no longer 
viable, the method of justice as fairness presented by Rawls is no longer 
viable, nor liberal individualism. What is required now is an individual situated 
in a tradition that itself is part of an unfolding narrative. 
We enter upon a stage which we did not design and we find ourselves part of an action 
that was not of our making. Each of us being a main character in his own drama plays 
subordinate parts in the dramas of others and each drama constrains the others.306 
Liberalism and the Socially Embedded Self 
Here I will discuss two liberal thinkers that have incorporated a model 
of a socially embedded self. The first is Appiah and his development of 
collective identities. The other Kymlicka and his theories of societal culture 
and multiculturalism. 
Appiah and Collective Identities 
While MacIntyre’s reintroduction of Aristotelian virtue ethics has given 
new life to this field, his works on the narrative view of the self have benefited 
from the parallel works of another communitarian thinker, Charles Taylor. My 
aim here is not to show the similarities or differences between Taylor and 
MacIntyre, though they are more similar then they are different, and are 
usually classified together. I would like to show how this narrative view of the 
self has impacted liberal thought, and how current liberal philosophy tries to 
incorporate this model of the self. My case study here is Kwame Appiah’s 
Ethics of Identity, who openly relies on MacIntyre and Taylor’s conception of 
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the narrative self.307 Some have remarked that Appiah’s book is “the best 
account of the ethics of a liberal society that we possess.”308 
In a discussion of what constitutes autonomy Appiah begins by a 
critique of the self-chosen individuality that is found in popular culture. The 
type of individuality were my plan in life is seen as an expression of my 
individuality, and it therefore gains currency because it was chosen by me.309 
He criticises this notion of autonomy because it is at the same time arbitrary 
and unsociable. It is arbitrary because the fact that this life was chosen by me 
does not mean that it is the best life that I could have lived. It is unsociable 
because social institutions designed to reflect the value of sociability, are seen 
as a constraint on our individuality. 
In development of this debate, Appiah maps out two philosophical 
approaches to the issue. One is the romantic version as autonomy as 
authenticity and the other is the existentialist conception of autonomy as 
choice. He rejects the romantic notion of authenticity because it fails to 
capture any notion of self-creation, and he rejects the existentialist notion 
because identity needs to make sense, and it can only make sense if it refers 
to things other than one’s self. 
It is here that Appiah begins to develop upon Charles Talyor’s and 
MacIntyre’s understanding of autonomy as a narrative. He quotes Talyor as 
saying: 
I can define my identity only against the background of things that matter. But to bracket 
out history, nature, society, the demands of solidarity, everything but what I find in myself 
would be to eliminate all candidates for what matters.310 
And it is at this juncture that Appiah develops his notion of a collective 
identity. He places the formation of identity within the narrative view of the 
self, as something that is chosen through society. “In constructing an identity, 
one draws, among other things, on the kinds of person available in one’s 
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society.”311 The different identities which are available through society are 
labeled as collective identities. “Collective identities… provide what we might 
call scripts: narratives that people can use in shaping their projects and in 
telling their life stories.”312 Finally, our identities are born through a weaving of 
our personal identity and the collective identities. 
It is not just that, say, gender identities give shape to one’s life; it is 
also that ethnic and national identities fit a personal narrative into a larger 
narrative. For modern people, the narrative form entails seeing one’s life as 
having a certain arc, as making sense through a life story that expresses who 
one is through one’s own project of self-making. That narrative arc is yet 
another way in which an individual’s life depends deeply on something 
socially created and transmitted.313 
Appiah has thus been able to incorporate the narrative view of the self 
into a new formulation of liberalism. It is a liberalism that takes 
multiculturalism and collective identities seriously, and moves away from 
disengaged individualism. It has given a new balance between community 
and individuality. 
Kymlicka’s Model of the Self 
Kymlicka develops his version of multiculturalism upon a commitment 
to autonomy, and bases the validity of multiculturalism on how well 
multiculturalism defends autonomy. “Liberals can only endorse minority rights 
in so far as they are consistent with respect for the freedom or autonomy of 
individuals.”314 Kymlicka is able to link autonomy to multiculturalism in what he 
argues to be the necessity of culture, especially ‘societal culture’ in fostering 
autonomy. Kymlicka argues that societal culture is a precondition for the 
development of autonomy.315 In this section I shall explore how Kymlicka 
presents his argument for autonomy and societal culture, as well as some of 
the criticisms. 
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The Centrality of Autonomy 
Kymlicka’s argument for autonomy is based on two broad arguments. 
These points are similar to Rawls’ argument that autonomy is necessary for 
the development of morality. The first is that in order to lead a good life, 
individuals must endorse their life plans from the inside. In following Dworkin 
he labels this the “endorsement constraint.” Kymlicka writes that “paternalistic 
restrictions on liberty often simply do not work - lives do not go better by being 
led from the outside, in accordance with values the person does not 
endorse.”316 This however is an empirical claim, for which Kymlicka offers no 
evidence. There is, nonetheless, ample evidence for this claim in the research 
undertaken by psychologists. I have discussed these findings earlier. 
Kymlicka’s second argument for autonomy is that autonomy gives us 
the ability to rationally revise our life plans. The argument is that our life plans 
are of primary importance to us, and in deciding upon these life plans we may 
err. We require autonomy in order to assess the value of our life plans and 
revise them if we see that they are no longer of worthy of our commitment.317 
Kymlicka writes that “The second precondition is that we be free to question 
those beliefs, to examine them in light of whatever information, examples, and 
arguments our culture can provide.”318 Kymlicka makes a similar argument for 
rational revisability in his critique of communitarians. He argues that 
communitarians consider an individuals and their ends to be too embedded, 
which in turn makes the communities values overly authoritative and does not 
allow for rational revisability.319 I shall return to this point below. 
There is nothing new in Kymlicka’s defense of autonomy. He himself is 
rather comfortable by referring to other liberal intellectuals such as Dworkin 
and Rawls on this issue. Where Kymlicka does differ though, is on his 
emphasis on culture. Rather, the way he emphasises culture is original, and 
as he himself argues other liberals have emphasised culture to a limited 
extent. 
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The Argument for Culture 
In Multicultural Citizenship one of Kymlicka’s central arguments is that 
“freedom is intimately linked with and dependent on culture.”320 Although it is 
not not any culture, but what he names as “societal culture” that is of concern. 
Societal culture is “a culture which provides its members with meaningful 
ways of life across the full range of human activities… encompassing both 
public and private spheres”321 Elsewhere he has defined societal culture as: 
a territorially-concentrated culture, centred on a shared language which is used in a wide 
range of societal institutions, in both public and private life (schools, media, law, economy, 
government, etc.). I call it a societal culture to emphasize that it involves a common 
language and social institutions, rather than common religious beliefs, family customs, or 
personal lifestyles.322 
Kymlicka follows Ernest Gellner (d. 1995), an influential philosopher 
and social anthropologist, in arguing that these types of cultures did not 
always exist, but were brought about by the necessities of modernity. In 
Nations and Nationalism, Gellner argues that nations and nationalism are 
products of modernity and that they are determined by social and economical 
development.323 Kymlicka builds on this understanding of nationalism, and 
states that ‘societal culture’ grew out of the modern nation states efforts of 
nation-building, were modern states tried to develop a sense of solidarity 
amongst varying cultures. Modernity brought about the spreading of a 
common culture via the various social, political, and economic institutions. 
This occurred in order to meet the needs of the modern economy for a mobile 
and educated work force, and the high level of solidarity needed for the 
modern democratic states.324 The reason that this solidarity is important is 
because the modern state requires a common identity and common 
membership so that individuals will “make sacrifices for each other, and this 
common identity is assumed to require (or at least be facilitated by) a 
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common language and history.”325 Although many liberals write as if there is 
only one culture in the country, there is rather one dominant culture with 
multiple subcultures. 
Kymlicka’s argument as to why societal culture is important to 
autonomy is structured around how individuals make a choice. Individuals 
make choices regarding social practices based upon their beliefs of the value 
of a social practice. Yet, to have a belief about a social practice one must first 
understand the meaning that has been attached to it by the societal culture. 
Thus societal culture is the medium through which an individual can value 
different choices. “Put simply, freedom involves making choices amongst 
various options, and our societal culture not only provides these options, but 
also makes them meaningful to us.”326 Kymlicka directly quotes Ronald 
Dworkin as saying that culture “provides the spectacles through which we 
identify experiences as valuable.”327 Kymlicka then builds on this premise, to 
show why minorities require access to their own culture, and not just the 
culture of the majority population. Given that Kymlicka is mostly interested in 
national minorities and not immigrants, the crux of his argument is that access 
to culture is something that most people are expected to want, and keeping 
away them away from that culture will be detrimental328. 
In Multiculutural Citizenship, Kymlicka does not give an argument as to 
why it is true that in order “to have a belief about the value of a practice is, in 
the first instance, a matter of understanding the meanings attached to it by our 
culture.”329 One reason is that could have been building upon the works of 
Dworkin, which he so numerously cites within this passage. Yet, this small 
statement is of great importance because it deals with rationality and 
objectivity. Since René Descartes (d. 1650) – the famous mathematician, 
scientist, and philosopher - there has been a lot of value given to the rational 
model of “disengaged reason;”330 one stands at a distance from the object of 
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observation and tries to analyze that object without any inherent bias, cultural 
or otherwise. This lead Descartes to search for Archimedean points. But 
Kymlicka is suggesting that individuals do not make decisions in a 
hypothetical state of disengagement, but rather they make decisions by 
working through their cultural biases. I find this to be rather similar to the 
arguments that Gadamer has put forward in his philosophical hermeneutics, 
or Taylor’s arguments about the horizons of significance. The question then 
remains as to how Kymlicka differentiates himself from communitarian 
thinkers such as Taylor. 
Kymlicka vs the Communitarians 
In his book Contemporary Political Philosophy Kymlicka engages in a 
long discussion with communitarians. He is mostly in discussion with two 
communitarians in particular: Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor. In regards, 
to Sandel, Kymlicka mostly refutes Sandel’s arguments about how the 
individual is embedded with her ends. Kymlicka argues that even though the 
individual is embedded with her ends, she can still imagine herself with 
different ends. He considers Sandel’s conception of the embedded self as 
being insusceptible to revision. I do not think that Sandel’s construction of the 
embedded self is as authoritative as Kymlicka has made it out to be. 
In regards to Taylor, Kymlicka argues that Taylor’s arguments do 
present a real challenge to liberals. Specifically, Taylor’s argument - as 
worded by Kymlicka - that “people will not respect the claims of others unless 
they are bound by shared conceptions of the good, unless they can identify 
with a politics of the common good.”331 Kymlicka considers Rawls and 
Dworkin to be sociologically naive in assuming that that people’s political will 
is sufficient for unity. For Kymlicka, political unity is necessary but not 
sufficient. Yet this presents a problem for Kymlicka’s liberalism, for he needs a 
concept of social unity that is thicker than simple liberal principles but at the 
same time does not the same is not a thick conception of the good life. It is 
here that Kymlicka dwells on theories of nationalism. 
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Analysis of the Argument of Greater Choice 
There are however, two criticisms to Kymlicka’s analysis of culture as 
choice that I believe are applicable here, both of which come from Gerald 
Dworkin. The first is the mere fact of having choices does not have intrinsic 
value. Although Dworkin wrote his book in the late 80’s, recent scholarship 
has given much weight to Dworkin’s argument. Renata Salecl in a recent book 
by titled The Tyranny of Choice argues that choice itself adds to our 
anxieties.332 Psychologist Barry Schwartz builds upon the many studies 
conducted in modern psychology and argues strongly in The Paradox of 
Choice that sometimes having less choice gives greater benefit.333 Recent 
psychological research conducted by Sheena Iyengar and Mark Lepper show 
that too much choice is even demotivating in their article “When choice is 
demotivating.”334 Although some of the research has been contested by other 
Psychologists,335 the mean effect between a lot and a little choice was 
effectively zero. Meaning more choice was not worse, but neither was it 
better. Clearly, we can see how it would be a daunting task it we where to 
analyze and choose from all of the 5,000 different cultures that Kymlicka 
approximates are currently available. 
Dworkin, however, builds upon this criticism to reach the conclusion 
that while choice itself dose not have intrinsic value, it is the fact that we are 
recognized as agents capable of making choices that has value.336 This is 
more in line with Taylor’s arguments for multiculturalism that he labels the 
politics of recognition.337 
The second point that Dworkin makes is that “choices are not valued 
for what they produce nor for what they are in themselves, but as constitutive 
of a certain ideal of a good life. What makes a life ours is that it is shaped by 
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our choice… therefore choice is valued as necessary part of a larger 
complex.”338 
Moving Past Benign Neglect 
Kymlicka argues that one of the main assumptions of the liberal state is 
that operates on the premise of ‘benign neglect.’ This is the model of 
liberalism inherited from the liberal states approach to religion. Thus religion is 
“something which people should be free to pursue in their private life, but 
which is not the concern of the state (so long as they respect the rights of 
others).”339 This concept of benign neglect is expected to apply to culture as 
well, such that a liberal state will not establish an official religion, it should not 
establish an official culture over other cultures. 
Kymlicka differentiates between benign neglect and liberal neutrality. 
So while liberal neutrality states that the state should not rank values based 
upon the conception of the good life, it does nonetheless promote certain 
values or attributes over others. The classic example is that while the state 
will not say English is more valuable than French, the state will promote 
English as the official language.340 Liberal neutrality simply rules out the 
arguments that the state may use in favor of a certain policy, but it does not 
rule out the possibility of having an official state policy. 
In regards to religion, liberal neutrality states that the state cannot 
promote a national religion because it is a true religion, but it would be 
permissible if the state were to see a national religion as promoting a 
harmonious society.341 Benign neglect, however, requires that the state make 
no comment about a national religion, to avoid any policy that would benefit 
one religion over the other. 
Kymlicka argues that the model of benign neglect works with religion, it 
does not work with cultural policies. This is simply because a state cannot 
choose to neglect issues of culture. It is possible for a state to forgo an official 
religion, but it is not possible for a state to to forgo an official language. As he 
writes: 
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The idea of responding to cultural differences with ‘benign neglect’ makes no sense. 
Government decisions on languages, internal boundaries, public holidays, and state 
symbols unavoidably involve recognizing, accommodating, and supporting the needs and 
identities of particular cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others.342 
Modood’s Criticism of Benign Neglect 
It is precisely at this point that Tariq Modood finds fault with Kymlicka. 
Modood argues while Kymlicka correctly states that benign neglect is not an 
appropriate model to use for cultural policies, he argues that benign neglect is 
not an appropriate model to use with religion in the first place. 
One of the arguments as to why benign neglect is applicable to religion 
is that religion is categorically different than other cultural issues such as 
language. First, religion is optional, while other issues such as language are 
not. A state can function without a religion, but a state cannot function without 
an official language. Second, it is possible to learn multiple languages but it is 
not possible to be a member of multiple religions. 
But Modood counters these arguments by stating that there is no 
reason to treat religion as categorically different. There are attributes of 
societal culture that are optional but Kymlicka still advocates for there 
adherence. Moreover, it is possible to have a multi-religious state and 
Modood regards Germany and India as being quasi-multi-religious. In 
addition, the case of exclusivity would not make religion different from other 
issues such as gender. An individual can only have one sex but it does not 
mean that a state must be gender blind in its policies.343. 
Liberal Nationalism 
The fact that Kymlicka gives importance to culture also means that he 
must come up with a plan for societal culture. This leads Kymlicka to liberal 
nationalism. “According to liberal nationalism, it is a legitimate function of the 
state to protect and promote the national cultures and languages of the 
nations within its borders.”344 In Politics in the Vernacular Kymlicka goes 
through a list of how liberal nationalism differs from normal nationalism. 
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Moreover, he considers liberal nationalism, and liberal multiculturalism, to be 
subsets of liberal culturalism. Liberal culturalism is: 
…the view that liberal-democratic states should not only uphold the familiar set of common 
civil and political rights of citizenship which are protected in all liberal democracies; they 
must also adopt various group-specific rights or policies which are intended to recognize 
and accommodate the distinctive identities and needs of ethnocultural groups.345 
Moreover, Kymlicka argues that the development of culture is 
dependent on public institutions: 
Sustaining a societal culture in the modern world is not a matter of having yearly ethnic 
festivals, or having a few classes taught in one’s mother-tongue as a child. It is a matter of 
creating and sustaining a set of public institutions which enables a minority group to 
participate in the modern world through the use of its own language.346 
In short, Kymlicka argues that autonomy is dependent on societal 
culture, and societal culture is in turn dependent on public institutions. 
Therefore, government is justified in building public institutions with the 
purpose of developing a national liberal culture. This is what Kymlicka also 
labels as nation-building. But matters are complicated when Kymlicka’s 
approach is applied to religion. If public institutions can be used to develop 
culture, can, and should, they be used to also develop a national religion? 
This is a problem I believe that is approached by Tariq Modood. 
To add to the complexity, Kymlicka makes a sharp distinction between 
immigrant and national minorities. The main distinction is that national 
minorities have resisted integration and have tried to maintain their own 
societal culture, while immigrants have left their previous culture and accept 
that they now have to integrate into the existing culture. So while national 
minorities will try to develop political institutions to develop their societal 
cultures, immigrants will try to negotiate better terms of integration347. 
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The Limits of Freedom 
For Kymlicka, however, liberty is not unbounded and limitless concept, 
especially when it comes to culture. Although he fears that his views might 
“sound like a rather ‘communitarian’ view of the self” he argues that: 
The freedom which liberals demand for individuals is not primarily the freedom to go 
beyond one’s language and history, but rather the freedom to move around within one’s 
societal culture, to distance oneself from particular cultural roles, to choose which features 
of the culture are most worth developing, and which are without value.348 
Kymlicka differentiates his view from communitarians by stating that 
communitarians, namely Sandel, see the individual and her ends as being 
identical, such that it is not possible for one to revise those ends. Where as 
Kymlicka argues that while the individual is attached strongly to her ends, and 
a revision might be very difficult, it is nonetheless still possible. 
Politics of Identity vs Choice 
While Kymlicka’s theories have been analyzed from many sides, one of 
the most interesting critiques comes from within the sphere of multiculturalism 
itself by Tariq Modood. Modood criticizes Kymlicka for sidelining immigrants 
and religion. Modood thus focuses on religious immigrants, specifically 
immigrant Muslim populations in Europe. 
Modood argues that the reason Kymlicka has developed a “liberal bias” 
is that he begins with, and is only concerned with, the concept of autonomy. 
The root of the problem is the idea of the ‘context of choice’. It emerges as a central idea, 
as though it were a question in need of an answer, only because we begin with the liberal 
assumption that we are searching for individual autonomy. And the ‘answer’ or endpoint to 
this search - societal culture- is as we have seen an inadequate basis for founding a 
theory of post-immigration multiculturalism.349 
Modood argues that a better starting point is the politics of recognition, 
and here Modood cites Young, Parekh, and Taylor. A significant point of 
difference is that while Modood does build his version of multiculturalism upon 
the works of Parekh and Taylor, Modood is trying to ground multiculturalism in 
a strict political version, where as Taylor and Parekh have broader 
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philosophical basis350 Here I will focus on solely the works of Charles Taylor, 
for he his work on the self and modern identity, secularism, and 
multiculutralism are the most relevant to the discussion at hand. 
Taylor succinctly describes his endeavour of developing a politics of 
difference. 
The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the 
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real 
distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or 
demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.351 
Moreover, Taylor describes the formation of identity is essentially a 
dialogue. It is created between the individual and significant others. 
This crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally dialogical character. We become full 
human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, 
through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression.352 
Thus for Taylor, and as well for Modood, culture and identity are of 
importance simply because of it’s centrality to the individual. 
Multiculturalism and Secularism 
Modood makes a rather keen observation. The integration of Muslims 
into liberal democracies differs from other types of integration, such race or 
sexual orientation, because it religious. That religiousness therefor entails a 
rethinking of secularism. 
Marginalized and other religious groups, most notably Muslims, are now utilizing the same 
kind of argument and making a claim that religious identity, just like gay identity, and just 
like certain forms of racial identity, should not just be privatized or tolerated, but should be 
part of the public space.353 
While this inclusion runs against certain interpretations of secularism, it is not inconsistent 
with what secularism means in practice in Europe. We should let this evolving, moderate 
secularism and the spirit of compromise it represents be our guide.354 
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The Public Sphere as a Standard of Civilisation 
The arguments that have been discussed above about the individual 
being embedded in a tradition or culture require a space in which deliberation 
and dialogue is being conducted. The notion of a public sphere helps identify 
the places and means by which this deliberation is taking form. The term, 
public sphere, was popularized by Habermas, and by it he meant the area of 
public life where people come together to openly discuss issues which affect 
politics. The term has gained currency in political philosophy and has been 
defined as the “discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate 
to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common 
judgment.”355 
Habermas argued that the public sphere in Europe became understood 
in secular terms, yet in his recent works he has been advocating the inclusion 
religion in the public sphere.356 Habermas believes that Rawls’ approach to 
justice, which requires religious citizens to put aside their religious identities, 
is not practical and it is unnecessarily burdensome.357 He argues for the 
inclusion of religion in the public sphere, and notably that religion must be 
translated to rational concepts when it is being presented to the public. This is 
because religion is a private affair, and it is difficult for those who are outside 
of that religious framework to understand those private religious 
experiences.358 The transfer ideas and organization of society is thus 
dependent on rationality. 
There are a few points that require clarification regards to the public 
sphere. The first is that while certain aspects of modernity are cultural, and it 
is possible to have multiple modernities, there are certain aspects of it that are 
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acultural. For example, it not would be possible to imagine a modern society 
without that does not incorporate a notion of modern science and modern 
technology. Similarly, it is not possible to imagine a modern nation without a 
concept of a public sphere in which the people deliberate over various issues. 
The attempt of many authoritarian states to control the public sphere and 
mass media is a testament to this fact. Moreover, the development of 
democracy as a new standard of civilization essential requires that all states 
adhere to democratic norms. 
Second, modernity has brought about drastic changes to the public 
sphere in terms of technology and mass media.359 This also means that it will 
be a new concept to tackle in terms of Islamic law. While Islamic law has 
discussed issues that are somewhat related to the issue of the public sphere, 
such as kutub al-dhāleh or heretical books,360 the public sphere has 
undergone novel changes, as described by Charles Taylor: 
Modernity involves the coming to be of new kinds of public space, which cannot be 
accounted for in terms of changes in explicit views, either of factual belief or of normative 
principle. Rather the transition involves to some extent the definition of new possible 
spaces hitherto outside the repertory of our forebears, and beyond the limits of their social 
imaginary.361 
Third, while the public sphere in the West did arise from a secular 
sphere, the public sphere in Iran arose from a religious sphere. During both 
the constitutional revolution and the Islamic revolution the clergy were 
spearheading the movement for a broader engagement in the public sphere. 
Masoud Kamali argues the most important institution within the Iranian public 
sphere has been the manbar, pulpit.362 The locales of many of these public 
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interactions were religious establishments, such as mosques and 
hussaynīeh’s. Ayatollah Khomeini himself is a rather exemplary example of 
this trend.363 
The final point is that the public sphere works outside the confines of 
authority. This includes both political and religious authority. Hence, one will 
find many articles and books written by high ranking scholars for the 
conception in the public sphere. Their is an understanding that the promotion 
of their Islamic ideals will not happen because of their authority, but because 
they were able to convince people through a deliberation in the public sphere. 
The concept of the public sphere, however, goes beyond merely being 
a ideal of social interaction. Arguably, deliberation in the public sphere is a 
process that justifies beliefs and actions. Such that, if a belief or course of 
action does not go through some sort of deliberation in the public sphere it will 
be seen as illegitimate. Part of this goes to a concept which has been 
discussed in international relations theory, namely the concept of the standard 
of civilization. 
The concept of the ‘standard of civilization’ (SOC) comes from the 19th 
century norms of international behavior and rules of law which the European 
powers required other states to meet if they were to join the new international 
society. For the new international society, individualism has became a new 
‘standard of civilization.’ 
By the middle of the nineteenth century…legitimate statehood and rightful state action 
were henceforth increasingly tied to the augmentation of individuals’ purposes and 
potentialities. As a consequence, the authoritative norm of procedural justice was 
supplanted by a new principle that prescribed the legislative codification of formal, 
reciprocally binding rules of conduct. The ascendence of these new constitutional values 
marks the birth of modern international society, and the rise of this new “standard of 
civilization” provided the crucial catalyst for the development of the fundamental 
institutions of contractual international law and multilateralism.364 
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The seminal work on this topic is Gong’s The Standard of Civilization. 
He describes how imperialism brought with it certain standards by which they 
would mark other countries as civilized. Fidler in The Return of the Standard 
of Civilization argues that SOC has come back to international law, now in the 
face of liberal-democracy.365 Tom Franck argues the same thing in “The 
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance.”366 Susan Marks has a more 
contemporary critique on Franck in “What Has Become of the Emerging Right 
to Democratic Governance?”367 Jack Donnelly argues along the same lines in 
“Human Rights as a New Standard of Civilization.” Christian Reus-Smith 
describes the history of this standard in The Moral Purpose of the State”.368 
Kingsbury, in “Sovereignty and Inequality” argues that we should respect 
sovereignty and not try to impose our liberal values on other states.369 Brett 
Bowden in The Empire of Civilization reiterates some of these positions.370 
The big picture is usually carried out in some constructivist form. In 
order for nations to be accepted into the international society they must 
consist of some basic standards. During the 18th- 19th century that consisted 
of some sort of hobbesian standard of sovereignty. States were required to 
have the basic infrastructure necessary to conduct trade and international 
diplomacy with the European international society. It resulted in what Fidler 
calls the “Westphalian civilization”: “The standard did not require non-western 
countries to be fully western; it merely required them to be Westphalian in 
their ability to interact in the international system and international society.371” 
But the SOC has made a return, one that is deeper and penetrates to 
the core of civilization. It is more interested in establishing liberalism and the 
its radical proponents see “the liberal west as the vanguard of a transformed 
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global legal order” that contains a “new standard of civilization” promulgated 
“to promote the advancement of the backward.”372 
An example of the power of this ‘standard of civilization’ are the current 
debates within Iran about the upcoming elections. With a new round of 
presidential elections due this summary, and in light of the turmoil of the 2008 
elections, several dissident voices such as former President Hashemi-
Rafsanjani, declared that the elections must be “free.”373 This was in 
reference to the vetting of reformist presidential candidates undertaken by the 
Guardian Council. This brought about a severe backlash from the Supreme 
Leader who stated that “since when have the elections not been free?” and 
that these type of statements only help the arrogant powers.374 It can only be 
a help to the “arrogant powers” if restricted elections are seen as de-
legitimizing the current government. A restricted election does not meet the 
‘standard of civilization.’ 
There is, however, a shift in understanding of the public sphere. There 
is more emphasise within International Relations on intersubjectivity and the 
discursive nature of the public sphere. This most clearly defined in Reus-
Smit’s the Moral Purpose of the State. Reus-Smit sets out to analyze 
fundamental institutions and discover why these institutions will differ among 
societies. His analysis is dependent upon Habermas’ communicative action 
theory. 
Following Hedley Bull, Reus-Smit argues that states have two 
fundamental problems of cooperation; collaboration and coordination.375 
States have to collaborate to achieve common interests and they have to 
coordinate collective action in the pursuit of outcomes. In order to meet these 
problems states develop fundamental institutions. These fundamental 
institutions are “the elementary rules of practice that states formulate to solve 
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the coordination and collaboration problems associated with coexistence 
under anarchy.”376 
These fundamental institutions are, however, based on constitutive 
metavalues, which he labels as constitutional structures.377 Reus-Smit argues 
that constructivists have so far based too little attention on these 
metavalues.378 He defines constitutional structures as such: 
Constitutional structures are coherent ensembles of intersubjective beliefs, principles, and 
norms that perform two functions in ordering international societies: they define what 
constitutes a legitimate actor, entitled to all the rights and privileges of statehood; and they 
define the basic parameters of rightful state action.379 
These constitutional structures, therefore, define the state and delimit 
legitimate state action. One of the three main core components of these 
constitutional values is the belief of the moral purpose of the state. Reus-Smit 
writes that: 
Hegemonic beliefs about the moral purpose of the state represent the core of this 
normative complex, providing the justificatory foundations for the principle of sovereignty 
and the prevailing norm of pure procedural justice.380 
In short, the moral purpose of the state defines what constitutes a 
legitimate state and legitimate state action. Reus-Smit then begins an analysis 
of four different time periods through out western history that have described 
different moral purposes for the existence of the state. The last era is the era 
of the modern international society. 
…That is, in each of these three cases the moral purpose of the state was linked to the 
preservation or cultivation of a particular type of collective life: for the ancient Greeks it 
was the cultivation of bios politikos, for the Renaissance Italians it was the pursuit of civic 
glory, and for the Europeans of the absolutist period it was the maintenance of a divinely 
ordained social order.…The moral purpose of the modern state lies in the augmentation of 
individuals’ purposes and potentialities, in the cultivation of a social, economic and political 
order that enables individuals to engage in the self-directed pursuit of their “interests.”381 
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As is evident from Reus-Smit’s analysis, there is a strong link between 
the moral purpose of the state and its fundamental institutions. Thus as the 
moral purpose of the state changed within society so did the fundamental 
institutions. Yet Reus-Smit takes his analysis further, for the these moral 
purposes themselves do not live in a vacuum. Reus-Smit therefore grounds 
his theory of moral purposes in Habermas’ theory of communicative action.382 
He argues that by using Habermas’ communicative action theory, he is able to 
embed his principle of sovereignty within a “wider complex of 
metavalues…”383 
Without going into the particulars of Habermas’ theory, Reus-Smit uses 
communicative action theory to show that when a state formulates, maintains, 
or redefines the fundamental institutional rules they are in essence debating 
about how a legitimate state should act. This debate does not occur in a 
isolation but “rather takes place within the context of preexisting values that 
define legitimate agency and action.”384 There is therefore a discursive 
element to state action, a giving and taking of reasons, which occur within 
preexisting values. 
Thomas McCarthy in the introduction to the authoritative transition of 
Habermas’ The Theory of Communicative Action states that one of 
Habermas’ main concerns was “to develop a concept of rationality that is no 
longer tied to, and limited by, the subjectivistic and individualistic premises of 
modern philosophy and social theory.”385 The ramifications of Habermas’ 
rethinking of rationality has been a rethinking of the public sphere and state 
legitimacy. 
Conclusion 
This chapter shows how the concept of a social-embedded 
understanding of autonomy has taken place within liberal thought. From 
Rawls to Reus-Smit there has been a greater emphasis the embeddedness of 
the individual. Kwame Appiah’s moral and political philosophy shows the 
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extent that communitarian understandings of the self have influenced liberal 
philosophy. 
The individualistic understanding of autonomy within Shi’i thought is at 
times in contrast with the very sources of inspiration from which this 
understanding of the self is said to originate from. As shown in the previous 
chapter, the individualism put forward by Shabestari contradict Gadamer’s 
understanding of autonomy and the self, and is in direct conflict with modern 
liberal conceptions of the self. Moreover, Shabestari’s individualism puts to 
risk the very understanding of the public sphere as an intersubjective 
deliberation. It denies the very discursive means by which political action is 
justified. 
The individualism that has been put forward by reformists such as 
Shabestari has dominated the debates taking place within Shi’i thought. Given 
the movement away from individualistic understandings of the self, it is fruitful 
to begin a new discussion on how this socially embedded understanding of 
autonomy will fit in reflective equilibrium within Shi’i thought. 
This chapter sets the background for the proceeding two arguments, by 
showing that a socially embedded understanding of the self does not deny 
autonomy. However, there are other conceptions within Shi’i thought are used 
to deny autonomy, such as taqlīd the commandment of forbidding wrong. In 
the following section, it is through the use of this socially-embedded self that I 
hope to show it is possible to both perform the obligation of forbidding wrong 
and respect autonomy. The following section will discuss the issue of ijtihād 
and autonomy.  
The Paternalism of ’Amr bi al-Ma`rūf 
Within Shi’ism, state and communal paternalism is at times justified on 
the grounds of al-’amr bi al-ma`rūf wa naḥī `alā munkar, promoting good and 
forbidding wrong.  Examples of this are given below. The concept of 
forbidding wrong provides a moral purpose for the community by stating that 
the moral purpose of the community is to increase faith and righteous deeds. 
By moral purpose I mean a paradigm which establishes the norms of 
behaviour and justifies social interaction. This moral purpose of forbidding 
wrong can be shown through the traditional sources as well as the writings of 
Shi’i scholars in both the formative and contemporary eras. 
A great deal of analysis has already been written on the pivotal role 
that forbidding wrong plays in Shi’i thought, both in the Islamic literature and 
Western academia.386 Thus the first half of the section will quickly overview 
some of the more important features of this concept. It will discuss the 
importance of forbidding wrong, it’s roots in the traditional literature, and finally 
comment about the extensive coverage this concept has gained in Islamic 
law. 
The emphasis of this chapter will be to highlight the importance of one 
of the conditions of forbidding wrong, and that is the condition of efficacy. One 
of the well established conditions of forbidding wrong is that the person who is 
forbidding wrong must know that their action will have an effect. If there is no 
effect than the person has no responsibility. 
This condition has, however, generally been taken very loosely. There 
are no constraints on the condition, such that the person who is going to 
forbid wrong must be able to prove that their action is going to have a positive 
effect. Instead all efforts were made to make this condition pass with the least 
amount of resistance. 
I will propose that in fact many of the actions that are taken under the 
guise of forbidding wrong that violate a person’s autonomy do not meet the 
                                                        
386 Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic 
Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Willem Floor, 
“The Office of Muhtasib in Iran”, Iranian Studies 18, no. 1 (1985): 53–74. 
Ḥusayn al-Nūrī al-Hamadānī, al-’Amr bi al-Ma‘rūf wa Naḥī ‘alā Munkar, 
http://www.noorihamedani.com/files/51d7d83500a04.pdf; Muḥsin Kharāzī, 
Al-’Amr bi Al-Ma‘rūf wa Naḥī ‘alā Munkar (Qum: Mu’asasah al-Nashr al-
Islāmī, 2013); Ḥaydar Ḥuballāh, Fiqh al-‘Amr bi al-M‘arūf wa al-Nahī ‘an al-
Munkar (Dār al-Fiqh al-Islāmī al-Mu‘āsir, 2011); Zuhreh Akbarī and Zahra 
Kāshānīhā, “Ravish-hāye Ṣaḥīḥ Amr bih Ma`rūf va Nahī az Munkar dar 
Ta`līm va Tarbīyat Farzandān”, Payvand (2012): 16–19; ‘Abd al-Ḥusayn 
Radh’ī Rād, Amr bih Ma‘rūf dar Tarāzūyi ‘Aql (Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb, 2008); 
‘Abd al-Ḥusayn Ridhā’ī Rād, Amr bih Ma‘rūf dar Tarāzūyi Tārīkh (Qum: 
Būstān-i Kitāb, 2010). 
condition of efficacy. Evidence for this will be provided in detail in the following 
chapter. 
Importance of Forbidding Wrong 
As explained above, the phrase al-amr bi al-ma`rūf wa al-nahy `an al-
munkar translates to “commanding right and forbidding wrong.” Following 
Michael Cook’s example, I will refer to it simply as forbidding wrong. Each 
Muslim is required to encourage others to do righteous deeds, and stop 
others from doing wrong deeds. Within traditional Shi’i thought, forbidding 
wrong is not merely one of the al-wajibāt or obligatory actions, it is considered 
as one of the most important obligatory acts. Ayatollah Wahid Khorasani 
begins the section on the rulings of forbidding wrong in his risāl-e `amalīyah 
by stating that “one of the most important obligatory acts upon a mukalif is 
commanding the good and forbidding wrong.”387 
There are many different types of actions that could be considered as 
forbidding wrong. The majority of these actions consist of verbal 
condemnation or appraisal.388 Giving sermons in mosques, creating 
documentaries on television, writing articles in newspapers, setting up youth 
meetings in parks would all fall under the umbrella of forbidding wrong.389 
A rather interesting example are the reactions to the introduction of 
mobile video conferencing that was brought into operation by Iran’s newest 
mobile phone network operator Rightel. The technology allows customers to 
see each over the video network provided by mobile internet services. This 
caused an uproar in conservative circles and several prominent marāja` have 
issued rulings stating that this technology is harmful for Iranian society. there 
is a website dedicated to this issue named Sarāb-e Rightel or “The Rightel 
Mirage.”390 Referring to the fact that the social and technological progress that 
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is promised by Rightel is nothing but a mirage. The imagery of a mirage is 
common for issues relating to worldly and mundane things. The real things, or 
real gains, are gains that are seen in the hereafter. The website aggregates 
articles and criticisms that have appeared on other media outlets. On the front 
page of the website lists a number of prominent marāja‘ and scholars and that 
have spoken out against the company. This includes Ayatollah Makārim 
Shīrāzī, Ayatollah Ja`far Subḥānī, and Ayatollah Shubayrī Zanzānī. Various 
articles on the website specific refer to the issue of forbidding wrong, and that 
the critics have a right for their demands based on this issue.391 
The phrase al-amr bi al-ma`rūf wa al-nahy `an al-munkar finds its 
origins in the Quran. It appears, in various forms, eight times in the Quran.392 
For example verse 3:104 states that: “Be a community that calls for what is 
good, urges what is right, and forbids what is wrong: those who do this are the 
successful ones.” 
While there are many verses of the Quran that discuss the importance 
of commanding good, there are also many ḥadīth that discuss its merits. 
Arguably, the hadīth emphasis commanding good with greater clarity than the 
Quranic verses. Many of these hadīth have become staples of various 
speeches and sermons. There is a widely quoted hadīth attributed to Imam 
Ridha: “When compared to commanding good and forbidding wrong, all good 
actions, even jihād in the name of God, are like a drop in the ocean.”393. 
Ayatollah Wahid Khorasani explains the centrality of the concept of 
forbidding wrong to Islamic practice: 
Enjoining good and forbidding wrong is the path of the prophets of Allah. It is through this 
religious obligation that the rest of the obligations and commandments are carried out. It 
paves the way for legal earnings, and guarantees the safety, life, dignity and property of 
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the general public. It restores the rights of those who are entitled to them, and purifies the 
earth from the filth of evil and sin, and revives it with goodness and righteousness.394 
Forbidding wrong also has a long history in Islamic law, and also 
covered in the modern books of law written for the lay public. This is true for 
not only the Shi’i school of thought but others as well. First of all it is 
considered to be wājib al-kifāyī meaning that if there are an adequate number 
of individuals undertaking this task, then it is no longer obligatory on the 
remaining people.395 Otherwise, it remains obligatory such that if it is not 
undertaken each individual will be considered a sinner. Ayatolloh Wahid 
Khorasani explains it as such: 
2068. Enjoining good and forbidding wrong, given the conditions that will be elaborated, is 
an obligation which is kifā`iyy, meaning that if a sufficient number of people carry out this 
responsibility, the remaining will be excused from it. If they fail to do so, all will have 
sinned.396 
The specifics about forbidding wrong will differ from scholar to scholar, 
and across different eras, but there is a universal consensus that it is an 
obligatory action. The concept of forbidding wrong has thus found its way into 
the actions of the state. Article 8 of the constitution of Iran states that: 
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, al-’amr bi al-ma`rūf wa al-nahy `an al-munkar is a universal 
and reciprocal duty of each individual, of the government with respect to the people, and 
of the people with respect to the government. This is in accordance with the Quranic 
verse, “The believers, men and women, are guardians of one another; they enjoin the 
good and forbid the wrong.” 
Mehrangiz Kar considers the concept of forbidding wrong as one of the 
two essential justifications that the state uses to justify its invasion into the 
private sphere.397 She lists a variety of different types of state interference 
under this rubric, such as the hijāb, choice of spouse, illicit sexual relations, 
and homosexuality. She also lists the corporal punishments for a variety of the 
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above stated actions,  and although the conditions and details of these 
punishments are generally discussed under the rubric of ḥudūd and not 
forbidding wrong, the enforcement of hudūd punishments is at times 
discussed under the topic of forbidding wrong.398  
She also writes that “The obligation of enjoining the good and 
forbidding the wrong is an uncompromising Islamic principle.”399 This, 
however, is not the case in terms of traditional Islamic law. There are many 
conditions that must be fulfilled before forbidding wrong even becomes 
mandatory, as it will be shown below. One of these conditions is the condition 
efficacy. As I will argue, the condition of efficacy is exactly what allows for 
compromise; controlling means of forbidding wrong will not pass the condition 
of efficacy, but autonomy supportive means will. 
The Condition of Efficacy 
One of the conditions in forbidding wrong is the condition of efficacy. 
The condition of efficacy has been around since the earliest classical 
scholars. Ḥaydar Ḥubullāh in his masterful study of the concept of forbidding 
wrong cites 20 authors that mentioned the condition of efficacy. This list 
begins from Shaykh al-Mufīd and Shaykh al-Ṭusī and continues till Ayatollah 
al-Khoei and Ayatollah al-Sistani.400 Interestingly, the debates about 
forbidding wrong were initially held in books of kalām. This is probably due to 
the fact this was a part of a series of debates with Mu‘tazilite scholars. 
Mu‘tazilite scholars also had included this condition in their books.401 
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It is standard practice to enumerate the conditions of forbidding wrong. 
There are five conditions that are generally mentioned. Below is a summary of 
Aytollah Khorosani’s variation of these conditions: 
2069. The obligation to enjoin good and forbid wrong is contingent on some conditions: 
1. The person enjoining good and forbidding wrong should have knowledge of what is 
good and what is wrong. 
2. One should entertain the possibility that it will be effective. If however he knows that the 
person who is abstaining from what is right or committing what is wrong, will not pay 
heed to his advice, then it will not be obligatory upon him. 
3. The person committing the sin or abstaining from goodness should not have ceased to 
abstain from goodness or committing of sin. 
4. The person committing the sin or abstaining from goodness should not be excused in 
that case. 
5. If he does not know whether the act of enjoining or prohibiting will be effective, then it 
should not jeopardize—owing to the act of enjoining or prohibiting—the life, honor, or 
wealth of a Muslim.402 
An intellectual history of these conditions, such as those done by 
Micheal Cook and Ḥaydar Ḥubullāh, reveals that these conditions have been 
consistent over time, although there are slight variations. One of the most 
consistent conditions is the condition of efficacy. It is present in the earliest 
classical texts as well as contemporary works. 
One of the earliest forms of this condition can be found in Sharif 
Murtaḍā’s al-Dhakhīrah fī ‘īlm al-Kalām. Sharif Murtaḍa states that the third 
condition of forbidding wrong is that one “must consider it possible that one’s 
admonition will be effective in stopping the forbidden act.”403 Sheikh al-Tusi, 
following suit, also includes the condition with a similar wording.404 
This condition of efficacy is still valid in modern texts. Nearly every 
jurist that has written on forbidding wrong has included this condition. I will 
present just a small sample from contemporary scholars. Ayatollah Wahid 
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Khorasani, as cited above, in his Risālah ‘Amalīyyah writes: “One should 
entertain the possibility that it will be effective. If however he knows that the 
person who is abstaining from what is right or committing what is wrong, will 
not pay heed to his advice, then it will not be obligatory upon him. ”405 
Ayatollah Sistani in his Tawẓīḥ al-Masā’l also states the same 
condition. Sistani, however, adds an extra layer of precaution. He states that 
even if there is no probability of effect it is still obligatory precaution to 
somehow express one’s disapproval. He is one of the few scholars to place 
such a precaution.406 He writes: 
2- A probability of effectiveness on the wrongdoer. Thus, if one knows that their speech or 
admonitions do not have an effect, the popular opinion among jurists is that they have no 
obligation, and commanding right and forbidding wrong is not obligatory. Yet, it is an 
obligatory precaution that one somehow express that they are upset and do not approve 
of the said action to the wrongdoer, even if one knows that it will not have an effect.407 
The official website of the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah 
Khamenei, has an elaborate discussion about what constitutes as a 
probability of effect in forbidding wrong. The website has a series of questions 
which are answered by Ḥujjat al-Islām Falāḥzādeh in accordance to 
Khamenei’s opinions. Falāḥzādeh has gained popularity over the past several 
years by being able to discuss complicated matters of Islamic law in an easy 
to understand manner. The website has a series of questions in regards to a 
variety of different topics that are answered by Falāḥzādeh. The site is unique 
in that it makes the fullest use of a multi-media format. There is a text based 
answer to the question accompanied by a video of Falāḥzādeh answering the 
question in greater detail. One of the questions on the website asks “What is 
meant precisely by the probability of efficacy in commanding right and 
prohibiting wrong?” The reply is as follows: 
The probability of efficacy here means that it is greater than 50%; meaning for example 
that there is 60%, 70% probability that an action will have an effect. One is still not 100% 
sure but neither is one in doubt. 
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However, if one did have doubt and gave 50/50 probability, then commanding right and 
forbidding wrong is not obligatory. Yet, if it does not have any irreligious outcomes 
(mafsadeh) one is allowed to carry on with the action and there is no problem. If the 
outcome was 50/50 and one did not command right and forbid wrong he has not forgone 
an obligatory act and there is no punishment.408 
The website clarifies that there should be at least a good probability 
that an admonition will have effect, and if it does not have a good probability 
then forbidding wrong is no longer obligatory. It is also noteworthy that the 
reply states that it is possible for an admonition to have the reverse effect. 
That is that it might lead to an irreligious action. This is important to keep in 
mind, for the following chapter will show how attempts to control individuals at 
times encourages individuals to rebel. 
This point is clarified elsewhere on the same webpage. The site states 
that if the condition is not met, only the status of obligation is removed from 
the admonition. Other scholars have stated that voiding this condition means 
that one is free to proceed,409 but is not obligated. However, if the admonition 
were to have an irreligious outcome (mafsadeh) then the admonition itself 
becomes sinful (harām).410 
An irreligious outcome, mafsadeh, is technical term that is described in 
the same page. One of the other conditions of forbidding wrong is that it does 
not cause harm. Different books will use different terminologies for this 
condition. Some will use mafsadeh and some will use ḍarar. Khamenai’s 
website describes mafsadeh as such: “mafsadeh means that commanding 
and forbidding does not cause bodily or financial harm, and does not deface a 
person’s reputation.”411 
Thus the concept of forbidding wrong moves across the entire 
classification scale. It is in theory an obligatory act, but depending upon its 
context of application it can become a sinful act. Given that the status of 
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forbidding wrong sways from one end of the spectrum to the other, it would 
seem that it would be quite important to understand whether one’s practice of 
forbidding wrong truly did have a practical effect. One should at least be 
cautious in forbidding wrong so as to not bring about the opposite of what was 
intended. 
One scholar that does deny the condition of efficacy is the traditionalist 
scholar Muḥammad Ṣadiq Rawḥānī. He states that this commandment is for 
the common good. He then argues that the ḥadīth that scholars have used to 
prove this condition are either weak or the text does not clearly support this 
condition.412 
Nonetheless it is clear that this condition has been a part of forbidding 
wrong from the classical era. It is not obligatory to forbid wrong if it has no 
effect, and it is not sinful to forbid wrong if it leads to a mafsidah. 
Ḥaydar Ḥuballah entertains an interesting, yet relevant, question in 
regards to forbidding wrong. The question is in regards to the possibility of 
forbidding wrong having an unintended and opposite effect. Ḥubullāh writes 
that one of the questions asked to Ayatollah Khomeini was in regards to 
cases where forbidding wrong caused the individual to actually increase the 
number of times that they performed the act. Khomeini replied that in this 
case forbidding wrong is not obligatory. Ḥubullāh follows up saying that 
Khomeini’s answer was correct, and that it is rational to assume that the 
purpose of forbidding wrong is decrease the number of sinful acts.413 Thus, if 
it leads to an actual increase in sinful acts, it is rational that one does not 
forbid wrong. Khomeini states, however, that one should try and find different 
ways of forbidding wrong such that it does not lead to such a result. 
This question is relevant for the next chapter. For, as it will be shown, 
there is empirical evidence that certain instances in which trying to control a 
person does lead to an increases the reluctance the individual has to 
internalize beliefs and actions. An attempt to deny a persons autonomy and to 
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try and control their behaviour does at times lead to the opposite effect that 
was intended by forbidding wrong. 
Freedom and Personality 
Modern scholars have written a fair deal about discovering effective 
means of forbidding. 414 One of the trends was to argue for the 
institutionalisation of forbidding wrong. By this I do not mean setting up 
something akin to a moral religious police. Rather, that by looking at the 
structure of society, to find means to sway people toward the good and away 
from the bad by setting up functional institutions. This would be something 
similar to social community projects.415 
Yet there is another approach to forbidding wrong that focuses more on 
autonomy supportive behaviour. This literature generally did not find its way 
into either Cook or Ḥuballah’s books. The reason being that this literature 
does not talk about the concept of forbidding wrong directly, but is concerned 
more with childhood development, tarbīat. Ayatollah Beheshti gave a series of 
speeches with have been published in book form about the importance of 
freedom in raising children. Although it is not specifically talking about the 
concept of forbidding wrong, I doubt any religious thinker would deny that 
there is a relationship between forbidding wrong and tarbīat such that tarbīat 
would be considered one of the most important aspects of forbidding wrong in 
society. Articles have been published on this theme,416 and Beheshti’s 
speeches even comment on some of the verses in the Quran that mention 
forbidding wrong.417 
In the penultimate chapter of a collection of speeches, Beheshti speaks 
about the relationship between freedom and personality. This speech was 
given at conference for teachers in the summer of 1977. He begins his 
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speech by defining the terms character and freedom. After a brief overview of 
the lexical definition of the term shakhsīat, Beheshti states that the equivalent 
of shakhsīat in the Latin languages is persona.418 He then begins to define the 
term personality as it is used in psychology, and to do this he turns to the 
works of Gordon Allport. 
Beheshti states that Allport describes personality as having two main 
characteristics.419 The first is that personalities are dynamic, and the second 
is that personalities try to fit in with their environment. In relation to the first 
point, Beheshti states that it is important to understand that a person is not 
static, and that the way a person was yesterday is not the same as a person 
today. The second point highlights the interaction that one has with one’s 
environment. Beheshti thus defines personality as the “organisation, the 
coordination between psychological and behavioural factors and systems that 
are born out of the attempt to make one’s personality compatible with the 
environment.”420 And by this rather complicated description, he means that 
“each person has their own formula to fit with their environment.”421 
After he expounds a bit on the practicalities of this understanding of 
personality for education, Beheshti defines freedom. Unlike the discussion on 
personality, he does not concern himself with the lexical definition of freedom, 
but jumps straight to explain its terminological definition. It was surprising to 
discover that Beheshti relies on Eric Fromm’s definition of freedom. Eric 
Fromm was associated with Frankfurt School of critical theory. Beheshti 
quotes from Fromm’s book Escape from Freedom, known in the United 
Kingdom as The Fear of Freedom. 
Beheshti relies on passages from Fromm in which Fromm describes 
how humans are not necessarily bound to instinct and environmental 
stimulus. Humans are instead free to form a culture and society of their own 
making. Ultimately, Beheshti concludes that “freedom and free choice is what 
makes our lives and our personalities, human lives and personalities.”422 He 
quotes Fromm again by stating that “[w]hat gives a specific quality to human 
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existence is freedom.”423 In defence of this understanding of freedom and 
personality, and in a sense bringing into a reflective equilibrium with Shi’i 
thought, Beheshti quotes several verses from the Quran. One such verse is 
the prohibition on forcing people to believe in Islam unwillingly: “There is no 
compulsion in religion: true guidance has become distinct from error, so 
whoever rejects false gods and believes in God has grasped the firmest hand-
hold, one that will never break. God is all hearing and all knowing.”424 He 
expounds by this verse by stating that 
Gentlemen! Ladies! God told his Prophet that he has no right to force people into faith; you 
have to show people the path towards faith, create the conditions for people to find faith 
and to be able to freely pursue faith. However, to create these conditions you need to use 
power, but power should be limited to remove the negative barriers and to create a 
condition where one can pick the best choice.425 
Beheshti’s reliance on Fromm to define the concept of freedom is 
interesting. I have yet to see any work an English that has analysed 
Behesthi’s views, let alone his views on freedom, although a good deal of 
effort work has been done in Persian.426 The book under discussion has 
recently been published, but Beheshti is rather well known for his stance 
towards freedom. 
Beheshti’s stance on freedom shows that there is a history of 
incorporating freedom with identity in a modern way that precedes 
Shabestari’s endeavours. Beheshti is making the connection between 
autonomy and faith, and how autonomy supportive contexts are important for 
the internalisation of belief. Although, he does use a different vocabulary - 
freedom instead of autonomy, personality instead of internalisation - there is a 
lot of overlap between his arguments and those which are presented in this 
dissertation. The main difference being the importance of embeddedness 
which is central to this dissertation. 
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Incorporating Autonomy in Forbidding Wrong 
This chapter established that one of the concepts that justifies 
paternalism is the idea of forbidding wrong. The concept of forbidding wrong 
has a long tradition within Shi’i thought with its roots in the Quran. It has 
become a rallying cry for many who wish to enforce Islamic values. Yet, the 
concept of forbidding wrong comes with many conditions for its application, 
one of which is the condition of efficacy. Forbidding wrong is only obligatory of 
if there is a reasonable probability of success. 
In the following chapter I will provide empirical evidence to show that 
autonomy supportive contexts help to promote the internalization of beliefs, 
and that controlling contexts hinder this process. It will build on the condition 
that forbidding wrong must have a positive effect for it to be mandatory. 
Evidence will be provided through the empirical work done in Self-
Determination Theory. In short, they give support to Beheshti’s argument that 
freedom is a necessary part of personality. 
Self-Determination Theory 
The previous chapter established that the commandment of forbidding 
wrong has a condition of efficacy. This chapter will analyse the types of 
motivation that are effective. Specifically, it will be argued that respecting 
autonomy leads to the internalization of religious values and controlling 
environments do not. This chapter will hopefully show why autonomy is an 
important factor for Shi’i thought, and how it is a crucial element in the 
internalization of religious belief. This section will rely heavily on the findings 
of Self-Determination Theory (SDT). SDT is a theory of motivation in 
psychology that considers autonomy, relatedness, and competence to be 
essential features for well-being and the facilitation of internalization. 
Section one will be a short introduction to SDT. It will discuss 
intellectual background that gave rise to SDT and how SDT was able to break 
new ground. The second section will discuss the research results of SDT. 
This includes the empirical findings from research conducted in labs as well 
as survey data. The data will cross multiple aspects of life including parenting, 
education, work and religion. The third section will discuss the importance of 
internalization and external motivation in SDT. Although SDT emphasises the 
importance of autonomy and internal motivation in well being, we are in 
essence social animals. This section describes how SDT views a successful 
internalization of external values. The fourth section will discuss two generally 
misunderstood concepts of autonomy, which SDT tries to clarify, namely 
independence and structure. This will also include a discussion as to why 
SDT is applicable across different cultures. The final section will discuss the 
limits of SDT and its significance to this research 
There are three things which I set out to prove in this chapter. First, 
autonomy is an observable phenomenon that exists and that it is vital for the 
internalization of beliefs. Second, autonomy is different from independence 
and individualism. Third, autonomy is applicable across different cultures. 
Before I jump into the discussion of SDT it is important to state how the 
findings of SDT will relate to the rest of the arguments put forward in 
subsequent chapters. 
SDT and Philosophical Anthropology 
SDT will support the arguments presented in a previous chapter by 
Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre. Both philosophers have argued for a 
narrative understanding of the self. It is a model of the self that sees the self 
as being situated within, and partially formed by, a specific context. The 
arguments put forward by SDT will help to empirically ground Taylor and 
MacIntyre’s claims. There are two main aspects of SDT that will help to do 
this. The first is that while SDT considers autonomy to be important, they 
consider the concept of relatedness to be of equal importance. Second their 
understanding of autonomy is not individualistic. That is that the self is 
independent of others. They consider dependence and autonomy to be 
orthogonal. 
Moreover, SDT and Charles Taylor both critique the previous 
behaviourist model of motivation. Both SDT and Charles Taylor are influenced 
by the phenomenological movement. SDT through the works of Ricoeur and 
Taylor through Merleau-Ponty. This emphasis on a phenomenological 
approach to motivation and autonomy, one that places subjective experience 
at the core of it’s concern, compared to behaviourism, which saw human 
motivation as extrinsic, will play a crucial link in how I reconcile the different 
theories. 
But there is an aspect of SDT which will help to support my claim in 
light of one of Taylor’s comments on modernity. Taylor claims that modernity 
is not acultural, meaning that modernity is not a trait that would be similar 
across a variety of cultures.427 He argues, and rightly so, that modernity is 
instead culturally variable. While I agree with his argument, I do think that that 
there are certain aspects of modernity that are acultural, as I have stated 
elsewhere. One of those aspects is autonomy. The research conducted by 
SDT shows that respect for autonomy is in fact an acultural trait. This helps, in 
turn, to strengthen my argument for the importance of autonomy to faith for it 
is applicable to a variety of different cultures. 
Moreover, the concept of autonomy as discussed by SDT, especially 
the concepts of internalization and structure, will have ramifications later on in 
terms of philosophical anthropology. In later chapters, I will show how the 
relationship SDT proposes between autonomy and internalization is novel. 
Autonomy has been seen to eschew any sense of authority, however, as the 
research will show, autonomy only changes the relationship with authority, but 
it does not negate it. Schools, businesses, and families that have become 
autonomy supportive, have not been met with revolution and wild changes in 
authority, but instead have seen students, employees, and children better 
internalize the values and programs suggest by the figures of authority. 
By using psychology it will help to ground the debate on autonomy in 
an empirical method. One does not have to be a positivist in order to 
understand the benefits of empirical research. This is evident in the recent 
developments in the growth of a new branch of philosophy called 
experimental philosophy. Experimental philosophy tries to answer philosophy 
questions with the use of experimental data such as surveys and the scientific 
methods of cognitive science. Given that I am attempting to bring a variety of 
different theories into wide reflective equilibrium, forgoing any form of 
empirical inquiry would be disastrous to this attempt. 
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Nonetheless, I am not the first person to try to ground the philosophical 
debate on autonomy in the empirical sciences. Jack Crittedeon makes use of 
developmental psychology to move past the liberal/communitarian debate 
about the self and develop what he calls “compound individuality.”428 John 
Christman also takes a similar endeavor in Politics of Persons in trying to 
develop a concept of a social-historical self.429 
Both of these previous authors were trying to achieve similar goals. 
They were using psychology in order to help build their model of the self in 
order to define their stance in philosophical anthropology. Crittedeon, with the 
help of developmental psychology, developed his theory of compound 
individualism. He was trying to develop a model that would lie between 
liberals and communitarians, John Christman as well refers to a variety of 
works in psychological to develop his philosophical anthropology. Neither of 
these works, however, give any reference to SDT even though SDT as a 
theory, was quite popular when they were writing their books. This is not a 
criticism of their research, since it cannot be expected for one to reference all 
works in the social sciences, it just an observation of how this research differs 
from previous research. 
History and Foundations 
Self-determination theory (SDT) is an empirically based approach to 
development and motivation developed by Edward L. Deci and Richard M. 
Ryan. SDT argues that a high degree of motivation and engagement is 
supported by the individual’s autonomy. The theory has its origins in the 
1970s and it has gained traction ever since. One sign of SDT influence is that 
Atkinson & Hilgard’s: Introduction to Psychology, a textbook used by many 
introductory courses, begins by citing research inspired by SDT.430 
The website dedicated to SDT has a truly amazing array of articles, 
both in the breadth of the subjects discussed and in the depth of their 
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analysis.431 Their articles cover many categories such as education, 
environment, health care, organizations and work, politics and even religion. A 
few of these studies have dealt with themes directly related to this research 
such as a study that analyzes “controlling versus autonomy-supportive 
socialization and the consequences to the internalization of religion.”432 
One of the main tenants of the theory is that autonomy is a necessary 
component for the internalization social values. They argue that the 
internalization of social values is a natural act brought about by the need for 
relatedness, but autonomy is required for these values to be more integral. 
However, for a regulation to become more integral to one’s self, 
supports for autonomy are also required. That is, although support for 
relatedness and competence needs may promote the internalization of a 
regulation or value, those supports alone will not be sufficient to foster 
integration. For integration to occur there must be an opportunity for the 
individual to freely process and endorse transmitted values and regulations 
(and to modify or transform them when necessary). Excessive external 
pressures, controls, and evaluations appear to hinder rather than facilitate this 
active, constructive process of giving personal meaning and valence to 
acquired regulations.433 Controlling events are those that are “experienced as 
pressure to think, feel, or behave in specified ways.”434 
One would have thought that given that the concept of autonomy was 
brought into the philosophical limelight in the late 18th century due to Kant’s 
influence, and given his lasting appeal in philosophy, the concept of autonomy 
would have kept it’s prestige in the majority of Western thought. Yet this is not 
true for all fields. While the pragmatic philosopher/psychologist William James 
did consider autonomy to be one of the major concepts in psychology, 
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autonomy lost it’s status in the early 20th century. 20th century psychology 
was dominated by mechanistic theories of human behavior, and specifically 
behaviorism. Mechanistic theories understand the human behavior to be 
passive, and driven by driven by physiological drives and environmental 
stimuli. This is in contrast to organismic theories which consider human 
behavior to be understandable through volition. 
One of the most influential psychological theories and the beginning of 
the 20th century were drive theories. That is that human behavior is 
explainable by certain physiological drives. While Freud (d. 1917) was 
influential in identifying two important drives, sex and aggression,435 it was 
Clark Hull’s Principles of Behavior that became seminal in this theory. Hull 
argued that there were four primary drives: hunger, thirst, sex and the 
avoidance of pain.436 These drives are psychological needs that create 
tension when they are not satisfied. Hull’s theory left no room for internal 
motivation, nor any notion of autonomy. All human behavior was to be 
explained physiologically.437 
As research progressed, however, anomalies where discovered that 
conflicted with drive theory. Certain experiments conducted on animals 
showed that they were willing to forego these drives in exchange for 
behaviors that were inexplicable by the theory. Several studies showed that 
hungry rats were willing to forego food in order explore new territory. Further 
tests showed that the rats would even cross electrified grids just to explore 
these areas. Similar results were found with chimpanzees. Other studies 
showed that chimpanzees where willing to solve a puzzle apparatus for no 
external reward.438 
While proponents of drive theory did try to show how their theory could 
explain these actions, other psychologists where soon convinced that the only 
explanation for these behaviours would be a theory of intrinsic motivation. 
                                                        
435 Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, trans. Joan Riviere, Freud, Sigmund, 1856-1939. 
Works. English. 1989 (New York: Norton, 1989). 
436 Clark Leonard Hull, Principles of Behavior: An Introduction to Behavior Theory, (New 
York: Appleton-Century, 1943), 57-68. 
 
437Ibid., 12.  
438Ibid., 13.  
Robert White in his article Motivation Reconsidered gave a rather scathing 
criticism of the attempt of drive theorists to explain all behaviour through their 
framework, and proposed that a theory of intrinsic motivation, which he called 
effectance motivation was necessary.439 
White’s theory, however, it could not simply be added on to current 
theories, but required a reconceptualization of motivation. The founders of 
SDT see themselves as a part of this reconceptualization of motivation.440 
Behaviorism’s influence has wanned not only in the theories of 
motivation but in psychology in general, which therefore required novel 
theories in psychology. Many psychologists found inspiration in the field of 
philosophy. The founders of SDT credit the formation of their theory to the 
influence of philosophers such as Pfander, Ricour, and Dworkin.441 
SDT assumptions and Foundations 
There are a few core assumptions that underly SDT. These 
assumptions are the foundations which the other parts of the theory will rely 
upon. This consists of two major parts. The first is the assumption that 
everyone has a unified sense of self. The second is that there are natural 
basic needs of relatedness, competence, and autonomy, that must be met in 
order to have a healthy well-being. 
SDT works on the assumption that all individuals have a natural 
tendency to develop a unified sense of self.442 Individuals have a natural drive 
to develop a coherent sense of self that is interconnected with other 
individuals and social groups. A healthy development requires both autonomy 
for development of the unified self, and homonomy for the integration of the 
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self with others.443 Hence, SDT considers the self to be in autonomous agent 
that is either nurtured or impeded by social contexts. 
SDT also describes basic needs for each individual requires. These 
needs are competence, relatedness and autonomy. These needs are argued 
to be required across different cultures, and empirical tests have been 
undergone to support their argument. The importance of these basic needs 
will be reiterated below on the discussion of internalization. It will be shown 
that a successful internalization of external goals and values depends heavily 
on how well these basic needs are met. 
Competence refers to “feeling effective in one’s ongoing interactions 
with the social environment and experiencing opportunities to exercise and 
express one’s capacities.”444 Relatedness is “feeling connected to others, to 
caring for and being cared for by those others, to having a sense of 
belongingness both with other individuals and with one’s community.”445 
Finally, they define Autonomy as “being the perceived origin or source 
of one’s own behaviour.”446 They go on to elaborate on this definition and 
state that: 
When autonomous, individuals experience their behavior as an expression of the will such 
that, even when actions are influenced by outside sources, the actors concur with those 
influences, feeling both initiative and value with regard to them.447 
The founders of SDT are already establishing the grounds for their 
research. First they offer a definition of autonomy that is related to one’s 
’perceived origin.’ This notion of perception will be important when we come to 
discuss how we consider behavior to be controlling. They also discuss the 
importance of being ‘influenced by outside sources.’ This is important when 
they come to describe the topic of internalization and how one comes to view 
external values and projects as one’s own. 
SDT has developed over the years through a series of mini-theories. 
Cognitive evaluation theory describes the social effects on intrinsic motivation. 
Organismic integration theory is in regards to the internalization of values and 
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regulations. Causality orientations theory describes the individual differences 
in people in regards to their social context. Basic needs theory describes the 
relationship between motivation and goals to health and well-being.448 Rather 
than elaborate on each theory individually, I will elaborate on the research 
findings of SDT as they relate to the research question at hand. 
The Findings of SDT 
In this section I will show some of the findings of SDT across different 
practical domains. I will show how autonomy brings about not only a better 
level of performance in education and work, but that it also has a higher level 
of personal satisfaction and mental health. Four broad categories will be 
discussed; family, education, and work. The following section will discuss the 
relationship between autonomy and self-internalization of social values, and it 
is there that I will discuss the research conducted on SDT and religion. 
While these different fields do not deal directly with issues of religion or 
faith, I believe they are still relevant. Foremost, it shows that we can recognize 
a concept of autonomy that exists out in the world. It is something that exists, 
and moreover It is something that can be empirically measured. In addition, 
religion covers a broad scope of one’s basic day to day life, and isn’t restricted 
to specific rituals. Many adhere to religious values because they believe it will 
lead to a better outcomes in these daily areas of life, such as family, 
education, and work. This is similar to what Charles Taylor talks about in the 
religious turn to the mundane. 
!!! find this quote 
While parents might have initial fears of that being autonomy 
supportive would bring about a radical sense of independence in the child, 
research has shown the opposite to be true. Children of autonomy supportive 
parents actually consult their parents more than others. 
Moreover, There are over two decades of empirical work done on the 
benefits of SDT in education. This research shows that autonomy motivated 
students perform better and that students benefit when teachers support their 
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autonomy.449 The research has shown that students benefit across a broad 
spectrum of different skills. This includes higher academic achievement, more 
positive emotionality, greater creativity, higher rates of retention, stronger 
perceptions of control, and a higher sense of self-worth.450 
A study by Aaron Black and Ryan Deci on the effects of autonomy 
support and autonomous motivation in university level showed that a direct 
link between autonomous self-regulation and performance in a university 
course.451 Students were invited to fill a survey of that asked various issues in 
regards to the course. 464 students responded, but analyses was only 
performed on 383 students since given that the GPA of the other students 
was not available. Study found that autonomously motivated students were 
more likely to use a good study strategy as well as a better GPA. It was not 
linked, however, to more study effort. 
A similar type of analysis was conducted by Vansteenkiste et al. that 
again showed a positive correlation between autonomy, performance, and 
mental health.452 The study focused on both the amount of motivation as well 
as the quality of motivation. They found that external controlling motivation led 
to higher test anxiety, procrastination, as well as a positive attitude toward 
cheating. Intrinsically motivated students, however, were “found to display 
better cognitive processing, more determination, more meta-cognitive self-
regulation, and higher achievement”453 The study shows that promoting 
controlled motivation over autonomous motivation is detrimental to learning 
outcomes. The authors of the study conclude “this finding confirms SDT’s 
claim that, although providing a sense of competence (through structure) and 
a sense of connection and concern (through involvement) might increase 
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students’ motivation, students will be highly motivated and will display good 
quality motivation only when teachers are autonomy supportive”454 
SDT has been found that being autonomy supportive leads to better 
performance in a variety of organizational settings. Deci et al. (1989) on a 
study of 23 different managers over an 18 month period found that if the 
managers were autonomy supportive it would have a positive impact on 
employee performance and well being.455 The managers were provided 
training on how to increase worker autonomy by increasing their opportunities 
to take initiative, giving proper positive feedback with minimal controlling 
language, and recognizing and accepting workers’ perspective. After the 
training the employees recorded higher levels of quality of supervision, trust in 
the organization, and job-related satisfaction relative to the control group 
whose managers did not receive training. Other studies have found that 
meeting the basic psychological needs of competence, relatedness, and 
autonomy, has led to ‘more job satisfaction, higher performance evaluations, 
greater persistence, greater acceptance of organizational change, and better 
psychological adjustment.’456 
Internalization and Extrinsic Motivation 
In this section I will discuss how one of the major aspects of SDT deals 
with the issue of extrinsic motivation and internalization. The founders of SDT 
began there research with the negative effects of external motivation on 
internal motivation. They thus established the importance of intrinsic 
motivation, which we discussed above. By itself, however, the usefulness of 
the theory is limited. Extrinsic motivation is still a vital part of social interaction. 
Parents want to motivate their children to lead better lives, teachers want to 
motivate their students learn, and managers want to motivate their employees 
to work more effectively. Here, I will discuss how SDT approaches the issue 
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of extrinsic motivation. But first, I will describe why external motivation 
presents such a dilemma for intrinsic motivation. 
The Negative Effects of External Motivation on Intrinsic 
Motivation 
SDT has done an ample amount of research on the relationship 
between external motivation can affect internal motivation. The focus here will 
be on the research that shows how external motivation can have a negative 
impact on internal motivation even though the external motivation is positive 
reinforcement. The examples given will show how monetary rewards, or even 
positive regard, can be detrimental to intrinsic motivation. It might be 
reasoned that extrinsic motivation can be added on as a layer on top of 
intrinsic motivation. If one enjoys an activity, then they will enjoy it even more 
they are paid, or rewarded, for that activity. As it will be shown, this does not 
hold to be true. This has a significant impact on how the Shi’a might 
implement methods of forbidding evil. 
One of the earliest experiments that was undertaken by Deci was in 
regards to the effects of external motivation on internal motivation.457 This was 
a study on the effects of monetary rewards. The hypothesis was that having 
money as an intrinsic reward will decrease intrinsic motivation. The test 
subjects participated in three 1-hour sessions were they would work on a 
particular type of puzzle called Soma. Earlier testing had shown that these 
type of puzzles were found to be quite interesting for college students, and 
that they were highly intrinsically motivated to solve them. The students were 
split into a control and experimental group. The difference between the two 
groups was that out of the three sessions,the experimental group, would earn 
$1 for each of the four puzzles that they solved in the middle session only. 
Thus they could see how the intrinsically motivated the experimental group 
was before earning any rewards, as well as the effect of the intrinsic 
motivation of rewards, and the subsequent difference with the control group. 
The subjects level of motivation was measured by the number of seconds that 
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they would spend on solving the puzzles during a “free choice period” where 
the experimenter would leave the room for 8 minutes. The subjects were free 
to do whatever they wished during this period. 
In Session three, the session were the monetary reward was 
introduced, the experimental group spent more time solving puzzles than in 
their own previous session, and also in relation to the control group. Then 
when the monetary rewards were removed for session three, there was a 
significant drop in the amount of time that the subjects would spend on solving 
problems. There was a significant negative impact on intrinsic motivation 
when the external motivation was removed. 
The same results were shown by Lepper et al. in “Undermining 
Children’s Intrinsic Interest with Extrinsic Rewards.” Lepper and his 
colleagues asked school children to create a few drawings. These children 
were selected because the showed an initial intrinsic interest in drawing. The 
children were divided into three groups. The first group in the expected-award 
condition, were told that they would receive a ‘good player’ medal for their 
drawings. The second group in the unexpected-reward condition were given a 
reward after they had finished their activity, and the third group neither 
expected, nor were they given, any rewards. A few weeks later the children 
and were asked again to start drawing, but this time without any rewards. The 
results showed that the expected-award group showed significantly lower 
levels of intrinsic motivation, meaning they spent less time drawing, than the 
other groups. Thus when the children undertook a task to reach a goal that 
was extrinsic to the intrinsic joy of drawing it had a negative impact to intrinsic 
motivation rather being an additional layer of motivation. 
This has significant impact on the concept of forbidding evil. The 
concept of forbidding evil is centred around extrinsic motivation. It is an act 
that the community undertakes the increase the faith and righteous deeds of 
individuals who might not already be intrinsically motivated to do these 
actions. Thus, if external motivation, even in a positive manner, can be 
detrimental to motivation, then one must be careful as to how to implement 
this extrinsic motivation. 
This is not to say, however, that all types of extrinsic motivation are 
necessarily negative. The founders of SDT were obviously aware of this 
dilemma of extrinsic, and in the next there approach to this issue will be 
discussed. They generally discuss the issue of external motivation under the 
rubric of internalization. 
One of the topics discussed by SDT is the concept of internalization. 
While there has been a lot of work on internalization and it’s importance in 
socialization.458 SDT’s initial focus on intrinsic motivation and the negative 
effects of controlling behavior led many to assume that all types of extrinsic 
motivation would have a negative impact on intrinsic motivation. SDT, 
however, later began to theorize on extrinsic motivation and argues that not 
all types of extrinsic motivation is controlling, but that there are various 
degrees of EM from self-determined to controlling. 
Types of Internalization 
In this subsection, I will discuss how SDT views internalization to be a 
natural process. That is that individuals are naturally inclined to internalize the 
values and goals of their community. Here I will discuss the different types of 
internalization which SDT has classified. 
Although in the previous section, the negative aspects of external 
motivation were discussed, SDT nonetheless assumes that internalization is a 
natural development, but at the same time it is not an automatic process.459 
SDT discusses their theory of internalization under a mini-theory organismic 
integration theory. This theory states that while we are inclined to internalize 
external values, this internalization does not happen without meeting certain 
requirements of the individual. SDT labels these requirements as basic needs. 
These basic needs are autonomy, competence, and relatedness. The degree 
to which an external regulation is internalized depends on how well these 
needs are fulfilled. These needs are considered to be basic human needs, 
and not culturally dependent. 
SDT defines internalization as the integration of external values with 
personal values. 
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“Internalization refers to the process through which an individual transforms a formerly 
externally prescribed regulation or value into an internal one. In internalization one “takes 
on” the value or regulation as one’s own.”460 
Internalization is partially about creating a social identity. It is about 
moving values and ideals from an external environment and creating 
individuals with identities bound to these values and ideals. 
Internalization poses the important problem not merely of moving the regulation of 
extrinsically motivated behavior inside the person, but of integrating external motivation 
into a unified system of structures and motives so that the extrinsic regulation that is 
internalized will eventually be experienced as self-determined. It is only when the cultural 
values become the child’s values and are smoothly and unconflictfully exercised that 
internalization is complete.461 
Internalization is also seen as being natural. It something that a child 
goes through in a process of development 
Our assertion that the process of internalization is part of the organismic integration 
process implies, of course, that one should see the process occuring naturally (unless the 
environment impedes it), and thus that one would observe more internalized regulation as 
children grow older.462 
In order to show how internalization is a natural process, they refer to a 
study conducted by Chandler and Connell in 1984 in that surveyed childern’s 
responses to chores - such as following a parents orders, cleaning the room, 
doing homework. The study showed that at a younger age children would cite 
external sources as the reason for their actions, while at older ages they 
would cite internal motivations. The founders of SDT argue that this shows 
how internalization is a natural process that starts from an external motivation 
but will move to an internal motivation over time. 
SDT views internalization as a natural process, in which individuals 
transform social norms and values into personal norms and values. If an 
external form is properly internalized it becomes a part of the individual’s 
notion of self, and identity. If the values are failed to be internalized, then they 
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remain external, or be partially internalized. SDT also views internalization to 
be an active process. Internalization an external regulation requires that the 
individual adjust held beliefs and values in order to proper situate the external 
regulation in the self. 
Internalization is not something that gets done to the organism by the environment, it is 
something the organism does actively to accommodate the environment, unless the 
environment overpowers the organism.463 
However, not all types of external regulation are the same. SDT has 
categorized four major types of regulation; external regulation, introjection, 
identification, integration. These different types differ on the locus of the 
regulation, and in how well they incorporate autonomy. The four types of 
external motivation will be presented in the order of the level of internalization. 
External regulation is the classic case were the individual conforms to 
social norms to evade punishment, or to gain a reward. This is the type of 
regulation that was held dominant by the drive theories discussed above, and 
it is precisely this type of regulation that the founders of SDT found to 
undermine intrinsic motivation. 
Introjection is quite similar to external regulation except that the 
rewards and punishments are carried out by the individual. This manifests 
itself in terms of feelings of pride, or shame and guilt. Although the regulations 
are internal, the individual abides by external norms and values without 
incorporating them into their own sense of self. While introjected regulations 
will be maintained for a longer period of time compared to external regulation, 
they are still an unstable type of regulation. 
Identification, is when individuals understand and accept the reasoning 
behind a value, and hence identify with it. They have a deeper level of 
internalization, but it is still not a part of the self. 
Integration is the most complete level of internalization of an extrinsic 
motivation. More than just understanding the reason behind certain values, 
these values become harmonized with other values and one’s identity. What 
started out as an external regulation will have been internalized and 
transformed into self-regulation. 
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Successful Integration and Need Satisfaction 
The question remains as to what is it that makes successful integration. 
Here I will discuss the aspects of external integration that make it successful 
for integration. SDT states that integration will be successful if it meets the 
basic human needs of relatedness, competence, and autonomy. 
As stated earlier SDT views internalization to be a natural tendency. 
This is in part supported by research conducted in the field such as Chandler 
and Cornell’s qualitative research on 121 5–13 year old students. They found 
that many goals which were seen to be extrinsic in the earlier years were 
found to have been internalized in the later years, and ultimately there was a 
highly level of positive association between the importance attached to to 
doing disliked behaviour and internalized motivation.464 
SDT argues that the relative success of integration is dependent on 
how well it meets basic needs. 
The degree to which people are able to actively synthesize cultural demands, values, and 
regulations and to incorporate them into the self is in large part a function of the degree to 
which fulfillment of the basic psychological needs is supported as they engage in the 
relevant behaviors.465 
That is to say that integration will be successful only if these three 
basic needs are met. It doesn’t mean that these are the only needs but that 
these needs are the minimum psychological requirements for successful 
integration. And integration is considered successful if an individual identifies 
with a previously external regulation as a part of his integrated sense of self. 
There are many different examinations that have been done to prove 
the necessity of these three needs, but we will only focus on a few. !!! 
How to be autonomy supportive 
The key element of a successful internalization, however, is autonomy 
support. If the social context supports self-determination and autonomy then 
the external regulation will be integrated into one’s understanding of the self, 
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or else it will merely be introjected. The term “autonomy supportive”, however, 
can be quite vague if someone is trying to implement a certain campaign or 
program. SDT has defined more concrete requirements of what an autonomy 
supportive social context constitutes. These three actions are providing a 
meaningful rational, acknowledging the behaviour’s prospective, and 
conveying choice rather than control.466 
SDT views internalization as an proactive process, therefore providing 
a meaningful rationale will help one to understand the importance of a given 
value or action, and it allows one to see how best to incorporate it. The nature 
of an external motivation is that it is imposed from outside of one’s sense of 
self. It is probable that it will cause internal conflict with goals and values that 
we already hold. Acknowledging this conflict this conflict extends respect to 
the individuals autonomy and sense of self, and also states that they have a 
right to choose The final factor are if the external regulations are conveyed in 
a controlling manner or one that “minimizes pressure and conveys choice.”467 
Thus it is more effective to present external regulations in a manner were one 
feels like there is a sense of choice, rather than a mere set of commands. 
There are have been experiments done that support each of these 
three requirements, and studies done that show the effectiveness of these 
studies together. In one study in particular, Deci et al. set out to see the 
effectiveness of the implementation of the three requirements, and hence 
‘autonomy-support’ in general.468 The study was designed in way that each of 
three requirements were tested independently. Thus, the experimenters could 
see the effectiveness of each of the three requirements as well as the 
effectiveness of all three, or a variation of the three together. The results 
showed that by combining at least two of the requirements together, resulted 
in higher level of internalization than when just one or none of the 
requirements were implemented. The study cleared showed that: 
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Controlling contexts can promote internalization, but there will be on average less 
internalization than in the self-determination-supporting contexts and the internalization will 
more likely be conflicted (i.e., introjected).469 
The same techniques were applied to a business organization. The 
observation period lasted 18 months were certain managers were given 
specific training on how to be autonomy supportive by implementing the 
requirements discussed above After the training the employees under the 
supervision of these managers reported higher levels of satisfaction, trust, 
and performance.470 
A few experiments have been done on the three requirements. For 
example Reeve et al. have conducted an experiment on the effectiveness of 
an “externally provided rationale when communicated in an autonomy-
supportive way.”471 There research found that providing a rationale in an 
autonomy-supportive manner, led to the internalization of external regulation, 
as well as to a higher level of effort in the given tasks. The rationale, however, 
must be autonomy-supportive. That is, it must state why this task is beneficial 
to the individual and not mere why this task is important to the examiners. 
While the details in this section discuss concerns of the practical 
implementations of an autonomy supportive environment, it does however, 
shed light on what it means to be autonomy supportive. This will in a while 
help us to understand how we can be autonomy supportive in terms of Shi’i 
faith, and the type of actions that it would require. This will be most clearly 
visible in the final chapter were the different conceptions discussed will be 
brought together to form a coherent understanding of the relationship between 
autonomy and faith. 
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Internalization increases autonomy 
Internalization, then, is asserted to be a constructive process aimed at allowing one to be 
more competently self-determining in the social world, even though the goals of the 
specific behaviors are extrinsic.472 
External motivation fact vs perception 
One problem of external motivation is how we label certain actions 
controlling. It turns out that what is important is not that external motivation be 
factually controlling, but that it is perceived as being controlling. 
According to cognitive evaluation theory, however, the impact of an event on motivational 
processes is determined, not by the objective characteristics of the event, but rather by its 
psychological meaning for the individual.473 
Similarly, whether an event will be interpreted as informational, controlling, or amotivating 
is an issue of the relative salience of these aspects to the perceiver, and is affected by his 
or her sensitives, background, agendas, as well as by the actual configuration of the 
event.474 
Other researchers in the field have also researched similar 
conclusions. Cameron Wilde and Micheal Enzle in their research on social 
contagion and motivation also state how the perception of social control is 
based on subjective interpretation. 
In particular, the locus of undermining effects appears to lie not in the objective facts of 
social control or choice but rather in one’s subjective interpretation of the context of activity 
engagement.475 
Several experiments were conducting to test for the subjective 
interpretation of control. In one experiment,476 the subjects were split into two 
groups, both of which were about to receive piano lessons. The first group 
was told that the instructor was intrinsically motivated and were told the 
instructor had volunteered. The second group was told that the instructor was 
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extrinsically motivated, and was paid $25 for the lesson. Both instructors, 
however, we trained in a neutral teaching style that was neither autonomy 
supportive, nor controlling, and followed a standardized lesson plan. 
The effect of this information on subjects was quite interesting. Both 
groups displayed the same amount of practice time during their free-play 
session, however, the subjects that were told that the instructor was 
intrinsically motivated had a higher level of enjoyment, were more positive 
toward the lesson, and reported that they were more interested in learning 
piano lessons. They also engaged in more creative and exploratory piano 
playing during their free-time. The perception of the students of the teachers 
motivation affected their own quality motivation. Several other studies have 
been undertaken and the results have been replicated.477 
This is important because it shows how perception is an important 
factor in deciding what is and what is not controlling. It is possible for one 
action to be seen as controlling in one context and not in another. Similarly, 
one action can be seen as controlling for one culture but not the other. This 
can help to explain some of the variation that we will see Asian cultures. While 
individualist cultures will view certain behavior as controlling while collectivist 
cultures will not view that behavior as controlling. 
This makes the implementation of autonomy supportive behavior more 
difficult, given that it is not possible to give a series of standard actions and 
expect an autonomy supportive environment to appear. Rather, cultural and 
even subcultural contexts must be taken into consideration. This will be quite 
relevant when we discuss Iran and Shi’i faith. Given that we will be discussing 
a different cultural setting, it is important to see what behavior is seen as 
autonomy supportive and what is not. 
However, subjective nature of regulation does not render it useless. 
There are clearly certain actions which would be labeled as controlling across 
all cultures - such as the threat of physical violence. On the same line, some 
actions will be seen as autonomy supportive across all cultures as well. There 
are a few behaviors in-between that will be understood differently. 
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This can also help to answer why autonomy is seen to be more 
important today than in pre-modern societies. In pre-modern societies relying 
upon authority and their expertise was the norm. Today there might be a 
different understanding as to what would be considered controlling behaviour. 
This was discussed briefly in the previous chapter under the discussion of the 
changing methods of forbidding good and the introduction of dawa. 
The What of Motivational Goals 
SDT has done research on not only why individuals are motivated 
toward certain goals but also on the effect the actual goals themselves on 
motivation. The nature of the goal itself can have positive or adverse effects 
on motivation, and research has shown that trying to reach an extrinsic goal is 
detrimental to motivation a manner similar to certain types of external 
motivation. Extrinsic goals refers to goals that are not attained through the 
activity itself, such as fame and wealth. Various studies have shown that the 
pursuit of goals such as financial success have led to lower mental health, 
and general a positive correlation between the importance one places on 
material outcomes and poor well-being. Different studies were conducted on 
the level of well-being for subjects who attained these extrinsic goals, and the 
results showed that even the attainment of these goals provided little, if any, 
benefit.478 
On the surface, it might appear that the pursuit of extrinsic goals will 
not present a problem for religion. After all, one pursues religion in order to 
reach God or a better position in the after life. At least in theory. There are 
clearly extrinsic goals one can reach through the use and abuse of religion. 
While some are clearly illegitimate, such as the use of religion for material 
wealth, others might seem benign. 
Internalization and Faith 
Although my research is concerned about faith, there have been 
numerous studies undertaken by SDT on the topic of integration, including the 
topic of the integration of religious values. The research done faith overlaps 
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with the research on internalization. On the importance of internalization to 
religion, Ryan et al. write that “religions must be internalized by cultural 
members both to survive and to provide any functional value to adherents.”479 
Ryan et al. write that there are two ways that internalization happens. 
Introjection is the acceptance of values based on social pressures, and 
identification is the autonomous adoption of beliefs. Ryan, Rigby and King 
have done a study on the effect of both types on the internalization of religious 
values on mental health. Their study concludes that when internalization is 
done through identification it leads to better mental health. Although mental 
health is not at the core of argument it is at least related. It shows that 
internalization is better done through identification and autonomy than through 
pure social pressure. It should be noted that the authors of the article still 
admit that correlation does not imply causation in this study.480 There are, 
however, numerous other studies that show the same outcome. 
This line of research was further carried out by Neyrinck et al. who 
examined 186 Belgian Christians. They’re study showed that autonomous 
internalization led to greater increase in prayer, and stronger adherence to 
Christian beliefs, but it was also associated with a symbolic interpretation of 
religious belief, and unrelated to church adherence. In general that had a 
stronger sense of belief and performed religious rituals more frequently.481 
Autonomy vs Independence and Structure 
There are two concepts which are generally misunderstood when it 
comes to the discussion of SDT. The first is that any affirmation of autonomy 
is also an affirmation of independence. This is to the point were some 
consider these words to be synonymous. SDT makes a clear demarcation 
between autonomy and independence, and argues that it is possible to be 
autonomous and dependent. The second misunderstanding is about 
structure. Some assume that structure is equivalent to external regulation, 
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and if we are to promote internal motivation then we must provide a 
structureless environment for individuals. Again SDT states that structure and 
autonomy are not exclusionary, and rather that a correctly structured program 
can actually increase the degree of autonomy. 
Independence 
Autonomy and Independence 
The original founders of the Self-Determination theory themselves state 
that they were influenced by the philosophical discussions on autonomy. They 
name the post-Husserlian phenomenological movement, namely Ricouer, and 
the analytic approach, namely Frankfurt and Dworkin, as the two philosophical 
trends that influenced the field. 
One aspect to note, is how the psychologists in SDT are sensitive to 
the differentiation of autonomy and independence. Given that they are trying 
to develop empirical investigations into the concept of autonomy it is quite 
vital for them to pinpoint what it is that they are trying to investigate. The 
founders of SDT use the philosophical literature as the starting point to 
differentiate between between autonomy and independence. Thus for the 
theorists of SDT autonomy is not 
defined by the absence of external influences but rather by one’s assent to such 
influences or inputs. Autonomy is thus not equivalent to independence.484 
Elsewhere they have written 
We know of no real-world circumstances in which people’s behavior is totally independent 
of external influences, but, even if they were, that is not the critical issue in whether the 
people’s behavior is autonomous. Autonomy concerns the extent to which people 
authentically or genuinely concur with the forces that do influence their behavior.485 
This factor of independence will be come important later on. It 
becomes important when we examine cross cultural context. 
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SDT and Cross Cultural Context 
Concepts such as autonomy have been labelled as being culturally 
continent, and many thinkers, such as Geertz, has called the Western 
conception of the self as “a rather peculiar idea within the context of the 
world’s cultures.”486 Different scholar’s have given similar comments, where 
they mention how non-Western cultures are more communitarian and they’re 
thinking is more “duty-based” rather than “rights-based”, and that they give 
greater value to authority and social harmony and the group.487 
To compound the problem for SDT, one of the criticisms levied against 
empirical psychology in the west is that their test subjects are consist mainly 
of subjects that live in a Western cultural setting. If many of these empirical 
tests were to be conducted in different cultural settings, they would yield 
different results. This has been shown to be the case and many of these 
findings were presented in a paper named There is a line of criticism to this 
research, however, one which has gained more popularity since the 
publication of “The weirdest people in the world?”488 
In this article Henrich et al. argue that behavioural scientists limit their 
research to only Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democractic 
(WEIRD) societies. They argue that this specific sample is not representative 
of the entire human species, and in fact, they are among the least 
representative population. They were able to support their argument by taking 
a comparative look across the different branches in behavioural science, and 
examining the results of experiments conducted on WEIRD and non-WEIRD 
subjects. 
One of the arguments put forward by Henrich et al. was that 
individualism is a Western trait and that non-Western peoples see themselves 
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as interdependent selves. “Westerners tend to have more independent, and 
less interdependent, self-concepts than those of other populations.”489 The 
study goes on to state that Americans in particular are very individualistic. 
“Americans stand out relative to other Westerners on phenomena that are 
associated with independent self- concepts and individualism.”490 
These concerns have been expressed by philosophers as well. Joanne 
Baldine builds upon the communitarian critics by stating how Asian societies 
do in fact develop a concept of the self that is not individualistic. Her research 
was undertaken to dispel this common assumption that individualism is either 
a pre-requisite or by product of technological progress.491 Many experts on 
Japanese culture, such as Masakazu Yamazaki and Richard Parker, have 
noted the dominance of a communitarian values within Japan.492 Francis Hsu, 
in his cross cultural study of Asian and Western cultures, argues that 
individualism is purely a western construct.493 
One of the studies that Henrich et al. reference is a study conducted by 
Iyengara and Lepper.494 This is one of the studies done specifically to see if 
SDT and their theory of internal motivation was valid across different cultures, 
which they answer in the negative. This study is of specific interest because it 
deals specifically with SDT, while the other studies referenced by Henrich 
dealt with different aspects and theories of individualism and autonomy. 
Moreover, this study has been critiqued and analyzed by the founders of SDT 
themselves, and serves as an important point in which to further this query. 
Nonetheless, because of these criticisms levied against SDT and the 
notions of autonomy and individualism in general, a significant amount of 
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research has gone into the cross cultural validity of SDT. A variety of different 
types of research of have been conducted that show the three concepts of 
autonomy, competence, and relatedness are relevant to different cultures. 
Yet, before we can examine why SDT is applicable to different cultures it is 
important to clarify a few points. The first is to examine how non-WIERD 
cultures view the self, and the second is to examine how the proponents of 
SDT claim that their theory is applicable to different cultures. 
Asian Communitarianism 
The theme between individualism and autonomy grows into an more 
important issue as cross cultural studies of the validity of SDT begin to be 
published. The most cited paper that tries to disprove SDT is a study carried 
out by Iyengar and Lepper in which they analyze the concept of autonomy in 
Asian-American children.495 They argue that Asians do not value autonomy 
the same way that Western students do, and that Asian-American students 
were quite happy when decisions were made on their behalf. 
Iyengar and Lepper compared Anglo American and Asian American 
students. They split them into three groups. The researchers had the subjects 
work on an anagrams task. The first group was allowed to decide which task 
they wanted, the second group had the tasks assigned to them by an 
unfamiliar experimenter, and the third group were told that their mothers had 
picked the tasks for them. The results showed that both groups had the lowest 
level of motivation when the task was picked by an unfamiliar experimenter, 
but the Asian American subjects had a high levels of motivation when their 
mothers had picked the task while Anglo American students had the same low 
level of motivation. The researchers concluded that the results appear to the 
Western assumption that autonomy increases internal motivation, and that 
Asian Americans might value group autonomy more than personal autonomy. 
The founders of SDT replied to this criticism by referring to some of the 
same arguments which have been made above, namely that different studies 
have shown the cross cultural validity of SDT and that there is a difference 
between independence and autonomy. They argued that for Iyengar and 
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Lepper’s conclusions to be true they would “would have to assume that their 
participants do not autonomously follow their mothers’ choices.”496 This 
relates to the issue that was discussed above in regarding cultural 
perceptions of controlling behaviour. Iyengar and Lepper understood a 
parent’s decision making to equate with controlling behaviour based on their 
own cultural understanding of parent-child relationships, while the Asian-
American students did not share these perceptions. 
There is also good evidence that intrinsic motivation plays a major role 
in various cultures. DeVoe and Iyengar, Iyengar being one the same 
academics cited against SDT above, conducted research about manager 
perceptions of motivation and appraisal of performance. This was a cross 
cultural study spanning North American, Asian, and Latin American countries. 
Their study showed that while managers attribute different types of 
motivational factors for employees, the employees themselves “consistently 
reported themselves as being more motivated by intrinsic than extrinsic 
incentives.”497 
SDT Results on Different Cultures 
Iyengar and Lepper were not the only ones to have conducted a study 
on the validity of SDT’s theories in different cultures. There are numerous 
other studies that provide evidence that for the cross-cultural effectiveness of 
SDT.498 As stated above, a few of these studies have cited by the founders of 
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SDT in defence of the criticisms levied by Iyengar and Lepper. The studies 
conducted in different Asian countries such as Japan, China, and South 
Korea, as well as Russia, Turkey and numerous other countries. Each of 
these studies shows the importance of autonomy to well-being and self-
internalization. While these studies to provide evidence for the importance of 
autonomy in different cultures, I would like to focus, however, on a different 
branch of psychology. The reason being that if a different set of psychologists 
have reached similar conclusions than that would provide more evidence for 
the argument at hand. The branch of psychology that will be analysed is 
Social Domain Theory. 
Social Domain Theory and Asian Cultures 
In regards to the concept of autonomy in particular, there has also 
been similar findings in different branches of the behavioral sciences that 
corroborate with SDT.499 Within developmental psychology there is an 
evolving branch of study known as social domain theory. Social domain 
theory examines different issues or “domains” that are conceived by a child. 
One of these domains is “personal issues” meaning specific domains that 
children believe that they must be the sole authority. The research shows 
children at a young age consider certain actions to belong in the domain of 
personal issues. This includes actions such as deciding who to befriend, style 
of clothes, and recreational pursuits. Moreover the research shows that 
children across a variety of cultures have a notion of this personal space, 
although there is cultural variation. This research has been conducted in even 
“collectivist” cultures such as Hong Kong, Korea, and Japan.500 
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Certain issues which are generally considered to be western concepts, 
such as freedom of religion, were found to be endorsed by a variety of 
different cultures, including even children in China. A notable study was 
conducted on urban and rural adolescents in China in which they were 
required to respond to written scenarios in which the self-determination of 
children was in conflict with the interests of authorities. This included issues 
such as freedom of speech, privacy and religion. These rights were chosen 
particularly because they are claimed to be culturally relative and applicable 
only to Western cultures and not to collectivist cultures. The results, however, 
showed a different story. Chinese adolescents, especially older adolescents, 
assert their rights to self-determination even when it went against the interests 
of authorities. The researchers concluded that: 
These results are important for several reasons. Firstly, they show that the increasing 
concern over autonomy exhibited during adolescence, as reflected in support for various 
self-determination rights, extends to an Asian culture such as China. Furthermore, this 
pattern is not restricted to comparatively modern, urban environments within China, but 
also may be found in more traditional, Chinese rural settings. In addition, the present study 
further demonstrates that the age-related increases in support for children’s autonomy in a 
collectivist society such as China extend beyond more concrete personal issues to include 
rights such as freedom of speech and religion, often associated with western ideological or 
cultural systems.501 
A later study corroborates the previous finding and showed that 
adolescents in China thought that social decision making was suitable for 
issues pertaining to social convention and prudential issues but not for 
personal issues.502 China was chosen as the subject of research because the 
researchers felt that prior research was only conducted in Western-style 
democratic political systems, and that this would taint the findings of the 
research. This research found that Chinese adolescents from both rural and 
                                                                                                                                                              
no. 4 (November 2009): 962–77; J. M. Kim, ‘Korean Children’s Concepts of Adult and 
Peer Authority and Moral Reasoning’, Developmental Psychology 34, no. 5 (September 
1998): 947–55. 
501 Ibid., 706. 
502Charles C. Helwig et al., “Urban and Rural Chinese Adolescents’ Judgments and 
Reasoning About Personal and Group Jurisdiction,” Child Development 82, no. 2 (March 
1, 2011): 706.  
urban backgrounds found it immoral to impose group decisions on personal 
issues. The authors conclude that: 
Chinese adolescents’ conceptions of personal autonomy in the present study thus were 
fully consistent with philosophical characterizations of freedoms as rights held by 
individuals that generate obligations of noninterference on the part of others, including 
groups (Dworkin, 1977; Gewirth, 1978; Lahat et al., 2009). They are also consistent with 
social domain theory’s proposition that individuals in diverse social settings develop 
concerns with personal autonomy and rights that place constraints on the types of social 
organization judged to be legitimate (Turiel, 2002).503 
These studies, however, do not conclude that Western and Asian 
cultures are exactly similar when it comes to their conception of the personal 
issues. To the contrary, they are quite elaborate on how the understanding of 
autonomy and the limits of personal issues differ from culture to culture. In the 
second study mentioned above, there research showed that Chinese 
adolescents were more willing to majority rule could override certain personal 
prudential issues relating to which differed with research regarding English 
adolescents.504 However, the main difference was contextual variation and 
that there was no straight rule stating that Chinese adolescents favored 
prudential concerns over individual autonomy, or that Western adolescents 
had reverse priorities. Both cultures value individual autonomy but how 
balance autonomy with community values is based on cultural variation. 
These type of studies will become more important in the third section of 
this thesis under the discussion of political philosophy. Nonetheless, this 
series of studies show that there is an understanding and an appreciation for 
autonomy in non-Western peoples. This is negates the theories put forward 
earlier that autonomy is solely a construct of WEIRD cultures and that non-
WEIRD cultures have a different interdependent selves, and it research that is 
conducted outside of the SDT framework, which only strengthens the 
arguments that SDT has put forward. 
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Structure 
Part of the reason SDT values structure is because structure is related 
to competence. Given the three basic needs that SDT put forward – 
autonomy, competence, and relatedness – structure is related to competence, 
and is seen to be independent from autonomy support. 
“Keeping within the SDT definition of structure as the organization of 
the environment to promote competence”505 
One study in particular examined the correlation between autonomy 
and support in a classroom setting. Across 133 classrooms, 1,584 students in 
Grades 9-11 reported their subjective engagement with course material. The 
study showed that autonomy support and structure are positively correlated. 
This is in contrast to certain theories that assume autonomy and structure are 
antagonistic. Structure has been defined as “Structure refers to the amount 
and clarity of information that teachers provide to students about expectations 
and ways of effectively achieving desired educational outcomes”506 
What the founders of SDT consider to be structure consist of three 
parts. First the teachers presents directions that are clear, understandable, 
explicit and detailed. Second, they provide students with a program of action 
that will guide the students throughout their activity. And finally, the teachers 
provides feedback on how students can master their activities.507 
The study collected data from student self reports in regards to 
engagement, and the collective behavior engagement of students as 
assessed by raters who did not know the purpose of the study, but were 
trained with classroom observational skills, rated the teacher’s autonomy 
support, structure, and the children’s level of engagement. 
The study concludes that autonomy support and structure are 
positively correlated. The most engaged students where those that were given 
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a clear structure, and their autonomy was respected. The study concludes 
that 
elements of structure might guide students’ behavioral engagement, but these elements 
(e.g., communications, goals, feedback) need to be offered in autonomy-supportive ways 
if they are to support both overt behavioral displays of engagement and private subjective 
experiences of engagement.508 
This relationship between autonomy and structure again shows that 
autonomy is not antagonistic to structure and authority, but that the 
relationship is different. If figures in authority can provide a clear structure that 
allows individuals to gain competence, and this structure is provided in an 
autonomy supportive way, it increases the level of engagement. This is quite 
different to what some might consider to be the ideal of autonomy, where 
autonomy would destroy all types of structure. This could also explain the 
adoption of an autonomy supportive management style many businesses. 
Businesses are organised around a certain structure that facilitates it’s daily 
activities. Businesses can now present this structure in an autonomy 
supportive fashion, and increase overall employee engagement. Although, not 
all types of organizational systems are autonomy support, which would also 
explain the recent shift to more autonomy supportive styles of organization 
such as team based hierarchies. 
Criticisms of Autonomy From Other Sciences 
There are various criticisms towards autonomy from different empirical 
sciences. Many of these criticisms however, tend to not only negate 
autonomy, but also the concept of free-will. As discussed earlier, the method 
of reflective equilibrium states that there are certain beliefs that are 
foundational and less susceptible to change than others. Free-will has a long 
standing tradition, and is part of one the fundamental aspects of Shi’i 
thought.509 It relates back to probably one of the earliest theological debates 
in Islamic thought, and it has become one of the core beliefs which 
differentiates Shi’ism as theologically from other schools of thought. 
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Hence, it would be rather difficult to incorporate a concept of the self 
that completely negates free-will. The type of equilibrium that would need to 
be established is one that will change Shi’i belief towards not only the self but 
also about the core tenants of all of the five beliefs in the usul al-dīn. This 
does not mean that the criticisms are invalid simply because they conflict with 
core Shi’i beliefs. It only means that a discussion of these criticisms in 
meaningful sense that will dedicate the amount time necessary to do them 
justice is out of the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to 
examine these criticisms briefly because they do help to develop a sense of 
the materialistic background theories in which religion must find it’s place. 
They consist of as part of the disenchantment process which was discussed 
earlier, and in essence replace religious, and at times enchanted, notions of 
the self, with a type that can be seen to be merely mechanistic. In addition, 
many of these criticisms have been taken up by the proponents of SDT, and 
there responses help to clarify the SDT takes on autonomy. 
Radical Behaviorism 
Skinner (1971), who argued that the concept of autonomy reflects an 
ignorance of the actual factors that control behavior. Specifically he stated, “If 
we do not know why a person acts as he does, we attribute his behavior to 
him”510 
Skinner summarizes his opinion as such: 
The position can be stated as follows: what is felt or introspectively observed is not some 
nonphysical world of consciousness, mind, or mental life but the observer’s own body. 
This does not mean, as I shall show later, that introspection is a kind of psychological 
research, nor does it mean (and this is the heart of the argument) that what are felt or 
introspectively observed are the causes of the behavior. An organism behaves as it does 
because of its current structure, but most of this is out of reach of introspection. At the 
moment we must content ourselves, as the methodological behaviorist insists, with a 
person’s genetic and environment histories. What are introspectively observed are certain 
collateral products of those histories.511 
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Reductionistic Neuroscience 
Certain practitioners from the field of neuroscience have also entered 
the debate. Steven Pinker argues that human behavior is influenced by 
evolutionary psychological development. With the use of then recent 
discoveries in neuroscience, Pinker argues against unified sense of self. 
…each of us feels that there is a single ‘I’ in control. But that is an illusion that the brain 
works hard to produce… The brain does have supervisory systems in the prefrontal lobes 
and anterior cingulate cortex, which can push the buttons of behavior and override habits 
and urges. But these systems are gadgets with specific quirks and limitation; they are not 
implementations of the rational free agent traditionally identified with the soul or the self.512 
The Implications for Forbidding Wrong and the 
Limits of SDT 
There are several implications that SDT will have on the study of 
autonomy and faith in Shi’ism. The first, is that the most effective type of 
motivation is internal motivation. Individuals are the most motivate towards 
tasks that they themselves have come to believe to be beneficial in doing. 
Moreover, it is possible to have individuals internalize values in a controlling 
environment, but these values will only be introjected. This means that people 
will listen, but that will only last as long as there is external pressure. 
People will internalize values more effectively in an autonomy 
supportive environment. This means one in which they are given a rationale 
for the extrinsic regulation, their emotions are acknowledged, and they are 
given choice. These external regulations will be integrated into the self, and 
form a part of the identity of the individual. This will form into my final analysis 
in the concluding chapter. 
There are also implications for what it means to be ‘authentic.’ If an 
external regulation has been internalized as a part of the self, acting upon this 
regulation will be ‘authentic’ even though it was initially an external motivation. 
This will have an impact by what we consider to be authentic, given that the 
term would seem to only describe actions that were conducted solely due to 
internal motivation. The fact that there is a difference between independence 
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and autonomy is a nuance that is ignored by reformist thinkers like 
Shabestari. 
The research results of SDT, however, have major implications for 
forbidding wrong. Empirical research can shed light on which actions meet the 
condition of efficacy. SDT shows that autonomy supportive contexts meet the 
condition of efficacy and controlling environments do not. If forbidding wrong 
is obligatory, and supporting autonomy helps to forbid wrong, it would 
therefore seem to make this approach obligatory as well. On the other hand, 
controlling contexts are demotivating and harmful, which would invalidate this 
approach to forbidding wrong. 
There are certain limits to the research done by SDT, which are more 
of reflection of the empirical research method. The first major limitation is that 
SDT does not give us a sense of history. Hence, we’re unable to compare the 
concept of autonomy today with a pre-modern conception autonomy through 
the lens of SDT. Given that SDT accepts cultural variation in the formation of 
autonomy, and in the understanding of what types of external regulation is 
considered controlling, we can assume that there is a discrepancy in the way 
that autonomy would be formed in pre-modern societies. This research, 
however, is best left to different methods of inquiry, and as such there has 
been good research done in this field. 
However, this limitation has importance for our study of Shi’ism. 
Shi’ism is a discursive tradition, and looks to it’s past to help understand it’s 
future.513 Scholars work within this tradition to try to bring forward as much of 
the pre-modern religious paradigm as possible. As described earlier within 
Shi’ism there is an understanding amongst scholars, such as expressed by 
Khomeini and even Shabestari, that much of the social world has changed, 
and this requires a change in our religious approach to social action.514 
It is not to say that pre-modern peoples did not have autonomy and 
modern peoples do have autonomy. It’s possible to get this understanding 
from Kant’s essay “What is Enlightenment” and Schneewind’s “The Invention 
of Autonomy.” It is rather that we are more autonomous now, and see a wider 
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variety of external regulation as controlling than we did in pre-modern 
societies. This would in turn change the way that we gain faith and internalize 
religious belief. It also changes the way that we approach forbidding evil. 
Hence, understanding the difference in the level of autonomy pre-modern and 
modern societies, or in other words understanding the history of autonomy 
and it’s historical variations, can help us to understand how the internalization 
of faith has changed, and how we can best support the internalization of faith 
in the modern era. This intellectual history of autonomy has been in part 
undertaken by certain philosophers such as Charles Taylor. 
Another limit of SDT, is that their experiments were only conducted on 
a smaller scale. The largest areas of research were conducted on work 
environments over a lengthy period. However, part of the way that I will be 
applying this research is at a macro level. I will be applying the theories of 
SDT to the public sphere in trying to understand how faith is internalized at 
the national level. While the scope of my application is different, I do not see 
any reason as to why the findings of SDT would not hold to be true. If an 
autonomy supportive environment is conducive to the internalization of 
external regulation, this should hold true for both the micro and macro levels. 
It should also be noted that SDT is comprehensive. By that I mean it is 
a doctrine that requires certain thick assessments in terms of philosophical 
anthropology. This is also makes the theory harder to accept for those who do 
not already accept certain philosophical underpinnings. Certain aspects I have 
already spoken about before in terms of the social imaginary. There is already 
a mechanistic view towards science, and one that sees itself as being 
universally applicable. SDT carries with it those connotations as well. But in 
addition, it has an extra phenomenological perspective as well. That is that it 
takes experience seriously, and tries to see the how the individual 
experiences the world. 
This point I believe is what gives SDT insight into to key points that we 
mentioned above. Namely that independence is not similar to autonomy, and 
that behaviour is considered controlled from the vantage point of the subject 
not the observer. This slightly echoes Ricoeur’s notion that the self only 
comes to light with in action with others in the world, although I do not believe 
SDT would push the line that the self is not transparent to itself. 
SDT empirically shows that individuals do have autonomy and that is a 
necessary part of the internalization of social values. There have even been 
empirical studies done on the effect of autonomy and the internalization of 
religious values. The studies have shown that in situations where autonomy 
has not been respected, there has also been a lower level of acceptance of 
these values. Through multiple laboratory studies, interviews and 
questionnaires, they shown that the more support there is for autonomy, the 
greater the level of internalization of values. Moreover, they have also shown 
how structure and autonomy support are two positively correlated concepts. 
These have also been replicated in different cultures as well, which negate 
the criticism that autonomy is only a Western concept. 
The relationship between autonomy and internalization will have larger 
ramifications for the relationship between faith and autonomy. If autonomy 
can be seen to facilitate internalization, rather than purely rejecting any 
concept that has developed externally to the individual, it presents a different 
relationship between autonomy and faith as is currently debated in 
contemporary Iranian Shi’i discourse. I will also argue that it adds a different 
dimension to the debates on autonomy in philosophical anthropology as well. 
Discursive Tradition 
In the second part of the dissertation, I discussed how autonomy is vital 
for the internalization of tradition. Although this does provide grounding for 
more autonomy supportive settings within Shi’ism it does not capture the full 
dynamism of what it means to be autonomous. Underpinning the entire 
debate in the previous section is that autonomous agents are proactive. They 
are not simply subjects to some grand mastered plan. This is evident in SDT’s 
concept of internalization, where autonomous agents choose to incorporate 
external projects and values as a part of their own selves. 
Yet, there is a connotation in the term autonomous that implies more 
than just internalization. The very definition of autonomy states that an 
autonomous agent have “the capacity to be one’s own person”515 and to “to 
live one’s life according to reasons and motives that are taken as one’s 
own.”516 The program of internalization set forward in SDT seems to, in a 
sense, turn the concept of autonomy on its head. It put forwards a plan to 
externally motivate agents by using the very mechanisms that would seem to 
deny external control. It walks a fine line between persuasion and coercion. 
Thus the question remains, how can autonomous agents be proactive 
within the Shi’i tradition. If we were to truly consider an agent as autonomous, 
and as more than than just agents that internalize the dominant social values, 
they should be able to active participants in defining what it means to be Shi’i. 
They must be active agents in the formulation of tradition. 
In this section, I shall present two arguments as to how autonomous 
agents participate in the formulation of tradition. Both of these arguments 
develop upon Talal Asad’s notion of discursive tradition. The first argument is 
more proscriptive in that it highlights how agents should be given greater 
participation in the formation of tradition. The second argument is more 
descriptive, in that it highlights how agents already are active participants. 
The crux of the first argument is that the process of ijtihād understands 
truth to be the judgment reached after a period of inquiry. Any epistemology 
that understands truth as an end to inquiry is committed to a social 
epistemology that incorporates experts because they provide an epistemic 
gain. Autonomous agents have interactional, and unaccredited expertise. This 
unaccredited expertise is the local expertise gained through experience with 
issues that they face daily, whether it’s as workers in labor unions or wives in 
marriages. Shi’i ijtihād is therefore committed to incorporating the opinions of 
these unaccredited experts because the provide an epistemic gain. Their 
inclusion brings the al-ḥukm al-ẓahrī (apparent ruling) closer to the al-ḥukm al-
wāqi‘ī (real ruling). 
The way the chapters have been laid out shall follow this line of 
argument. I will begin by arguing for the premise that Shi’i uṣūl understands 
truth to be the end of inquiry. This will focus on the difference between al-
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ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī and al-ḥukm al-ḍahirī within Shi’i uṣūl. The following chapter 
will discuss why a commitment to truth as an end of inquiry is committed to a 
particular social epistemology. The next chapter will discus the unaccredited 
expertise of autonomous agents. The final chapter will focus on the interaction 
of this type of expertise and actual cases that show how this concept of social 
epistemology has unfolded. The final chapter will focus heavily on cases 
within Iran. 
One note about terminology, in this section I shall use the term muqalid 
to denote autonomous individuals. This is done mostly to highlight the 
relationship between experts and non-experts or mujtahid and muqalid, rather 
than focusing on certain internal capabilities of the self. This I think reflects the 
core concern of Shi’i uṣūl with attaining the truth in legal rulings, and saves 
the reader from the tedious use of the phrase ‘autonomous individuals.’ 
What is tradition? 
Within the field of Islamic studies Tala Asad’s understanding of tradition 
as discursive has gained a lot of support.517 This understanding of tradition 
overlaps with the understanding of autonomy which a discussed in part one. 
As it will be shown, Asad builds on the concept of tradition put forward by 
Alisdar MacIntyre, and that the understanding of the self I have tried to defend 
overlaps with MacIntyre’s narrative view of the self. Both of MacIntyre’s 
stances develop from his understanding of discursive tradition. 
The analysis shall begin by taking a closer look at the concept of 
tradition, specifically as it has been presented by Talal Asad and Alisdar 
MacIntyre. Talal Asad’s work is of significance to the discussion at hand 
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because I agree that the internalization of religion, as well as the formation of 
religion itself as being discursive. The later has been a topic of great 
discussion since it has been put forward by Talal Asad and has been seminal 
in understanding tradition as a discursive function. I will start with a short 
description of Asad’s approach then analyze how this concept of tradition 
relates to autonomy. There are two main concepts of Asad’s thought that I will 
focus on. First is the concept of tradition as discourse, and the second is the 
concept of orthodoxy as a relationship of power. Finally, I will analyse how 
Asad’s concept of tradition relates to autonomy. 
Tradition as discourse 
In his seminal paper, “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam” Asad puts 
forward a new way of studying Islam as an anthropologist. He disagrees with 
previous attempts that consider Islam to be constructed by strictly social 
settings, where the make-up of one’s social structure affects the contents of 
religion. He argues that this taking too broad an approach to Islam, and 
instead we should focus on the concept of the discursive tradition. He argues 
that: 
If one wants to write an anthropology of Islam one should begin, as Muslims do, from the 
concept of a discursive tradition that includes and relates itself to the founding texts of the 
Qur’an and the Hadith. Islam is neither a distinctive social structure nor a heterogeneous 
collection of beliefs, artifacts, customs, and morals. It is a tradition.518 
Asad’s call to begin study Islam as discursive tradition has more to it 
than the words suggest, and he elaborates on the concept further along in the 
paper. This concept of discursive tradition builds upon MacIntyre’s concept of 
tradition in the sense that it is foremost embedded in a context, and 
specifically a historical context. Moreover, it is a discourse that has developed 
amongst a community of inquirers. 
A tradition consists essentially of discourses that seek to instruct practitioners regarding 
the correct form and purpose of a given practice that, precisely because it is established, 
has a history…An Islamic discursive tradition is simply a tradition of Muslim discourse that 
                                                        
518Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam, 14.  
addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future, with reference to a particular 
Islamic practice in the present.519 
Asad is arguing that we should not look at tradition as something 
reactionary to modernity, as a ‘fiction of the present.’520 Instead it is discourse 
embedded in society with a particular history. It is this discourse that is 
authoritative and gives authority to practices and which are subsequently 
taught. 
Since tradition is embedded in a historical context it is in reference to 
this historical narrative that present Islamic practice is formulated. Thus 
Muslims are involved in what Asad calls a discursive coherence, the act of 
defining present practice in a historical narrative. This discursive coherence 
not only provides the background for justifying current practices but it also 
limits the scope of the narrative. Even authoritative figures would be pressed 
to stay within it’s limits. 
It is too often forgotten that the process of determining orthodoxy in conditions of change 
and contest includes attempt at achieving discursive coherence, at representing the 
present within an authoritative narrative that includes positive evaluations of past events 
and persons. Because such authority is a collaborative achievement between narrator and 
audience, the former cannot speak in total freedom: there are conceptual and institutional 
conditions that must be attended to if discourses are to be persuasive. That is why 
attempts by social scientist at rendering such discourses as instances of local leaders 
manipulating religious symbols to legitimize their social power should be viewed 
skeptically…521 
MacIntyre makes a similar argument. Tradition is a reflective process of 
rationalization, one which incorporates a concept of change. He argues that 
traditions “when vital, embody continuities of conflict.”522 MacIntyre describes 
tradition as being: 
an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part 
about the goods which constitute that tradition. Within a tradition the pursuit of goods 
extends through generations, sometimes through many generations. Hence the 
individual’s search for his or her good is generally and characteristically conducted within a 
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context defined by those traditions of which the individual’s life is a part, and this is true 
both of those goods which are internal to practices and of the goods of a single life.523 
Asad is quite clear in is debt to MacIntyre’s conception of tradition.524 
They both view tradition as the historical culmination of a reflective process of 
rationality. MacIntyre pushes the concept of tradition further arguing that all 
types of rational inquiry are embedded in a tradition. Nonetheless, for both 
Asad and MacIntyre critique and dialogue is a natural part of the tradition. It is 
discursive in the sense that concepts are challenged and revaluated, and it is 
through this dialogue that concepts are internalized. 
Gadamer has a similar conception of tradition. In his philosophical 
hermeneutics he argues for both tradition and authority. Gadamer considers 
tradition to be a vivid rational debate amongst the community of inquirers. 
The fact is that in tradition there is always an element of freedom and of history itself. Even 
the most genuine and pure tradition does not persist because of the inertia of what once 
existed. It needs to be affirmed, embraced, cultivated. It is, essentially, preservation, and it 
is active in all historical change. But preservation is an act of reason, though an 
inconspicuous one. For this reason, only innovation and planning appear to be the result 
of reason. But this is an illusion. Even where life changes violently, as in ages of 
revolution, far more of the old is preserved in the supposed transformation of everything 
than anyone knows, and it combines with the new to create a new value. At any rate, 
preservation is as much a freely chosen action as are revolution and renewal. That is why 
both the Enlightenment’s critique of tradition and the romantic rehabilitation of it lag behind 
their true historical being.525 
Tradition is not constant, but instead evolves in a process of continual 
re-examination. Gadamer views tradition with an understanding of fallibalism. 
That although we have come to accept certain facts as true, we can come to 
re-examine these facts later on. The intellectual thinkers that developed this 
tradition also gain a sense of authority. This authority is gained through a 
rational understanding that someone else’s judgement is superior to mine. 
Admittedly, it is primarily persons that have authority; but the authority of persons is 
ultimately based not on the subjection and abdication of reason but on an act of 
acknowledgment and knowledge—the knowledge, namely, that the other is superior to 
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oneself in judgment and insight and that for this reason his judgment takes precedence—
i.e., it has priority over one’s own. This is connected with the fact that authority cannot 
actually be bestowed but is earned, and must be earned if someone is to lay claim to it.526 
Tradition and autonomy 
What is of importance in Asad’s understanding of tradition, and a fact 
that also overlaps with the following chapter on SDT, is his stance on the role 
of reason and deliberation. He does not view reason and argument as 
symptoms of “the tradition in crisis.” They are instead a part of the practice of 
the internalisation of religion. “Reason and argument are necessarily involved 
in traditional practice whenever people have to be taught about the point and 
proper performance of that practice, and whenever the teaching meets with 
doubt, indifference, or lack of understanding.”527 
Although Asad does not use the same terminology as SDT, he does 
give the same weight to the appeal to autonomy for the internalization of 
tradition. His emphasis that it is through reason and argument that people are 
taught about the proper performance and in order to over come doubt, are 
similar to the SDT’s appeal to autonomy supportive contexts that provide a 
rationale as well as a sense of choice. 
Asad therefore considers reason and argument to be the central focus 
of resistance. For it is here that one may “discover a central modality of 
power, and of the resistances it encounters”528 Asad believes that the 
evidence of an argument and the appeal to reason is itself a sign that there is 
already a resistance to the internalisation of tradition: “for the process of 
arguing, of using the force of reason, at once presupposes and responds to 
the fact of resistance.”529. He ultimately considers power and resistance as 
being “intrinsic to the development and exercise of any traditional practice.”530 
Asad argues for a discursive understanding of tradition because of the 
discursive nature of the self. He considers reason and deliberation to be an 
important part of tradition because that is how people come to internalize 
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beliefs. The need for reason and argument is an appeal to autonomy. The 
need to “win someone over”531 is to have them internalize beliefs and values. 
Asad builds upon this concept of discursive tradition to develop his 
theory on orthodoxy. For Asad, orthodoxy is not simply a formal body of 
opinion that has been published by an authoritative assembly. Orthodoxy is, 
rather, a relationship. 
…orthodoxy is not a mere body of opinion but a distinctive relationship - a relationship of 
power. Wherever Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust or reject 
practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones, there is the 
domain of orthodoxy. 
Asad’s understanding of religion is therefore partially informed by his 
understanding of the self. He sees the individual as autonomous and involved 
in a discourse with society, which at times can even constrain his autonomy. 
Yet, if Asad were to understand the self in a different manner, say as an 
existentialist, his understanding of religion would also change. Religion would 
no longer be a process of reason and argument but one of experience. This 
exactly the line of argument that many religious existentialists make. As I 
argued in a previous chapter, Shabestari redefines autonomy by offering a 
different understanding of faith. He considers faith to be a direct experience 
and a direct experience is only possible by the individual. Thus he severs the 
social influences the individual has with society by making the very process of 
faith formation a purely individualistic endeavor. 
More than just focusing on internalisation, Asad also views this 
approach to internalisation as resistance. As an action in which the agent 
might not to do. It is at this focus point that the struggle for resistance and 
power can be seen. If deliberation is the focal point of resistance and 
internalisation, then it should also be the point of orthodoxy as well. 
This highlights what it means for a tradition to be discursive. To say 
Islam is a discursive tradition is not to say that there is a type of tradition that 
is not discursive. It is to highlight an aspect of tradition that has been lost in 
regards to tradition that is once again being rediscovered. Part of what I have 
been arguing in this dissertation that discursiveness is a fundamental human 
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trait. As Robert Brandom argues about his approach to intentionality that “[w]e 
are makers and takers of reasons, seekers and speakers of truth. The 
propositional focus of the approach marks this understanding of intelligible 
contents as discursive.”532 
The relationships I therefore discuss between mujtahid and muqalid 
are based on this idea of giving and receiving reasons. I argue that within Shi’i 
thought there as been an over emphasis on the epistemological basis of the 
individual. The traditionalists and the Islamists center their epistemology 
around the expert either the mujtahid or the Wilayat al-Faqih, and the 
reformists base their epistemology on the individual. All sides limit the 
implication of what it means to be discursive. I will discuss the impact of this 
discursive process in two ways, in relation to the internalization of knowledge 
and to the formation of tradition. It is, in Brandom’s terminology, an attempt at 
the recognition of the discursive capabilities of all participants. It is an attempt 
to broaden the community of inquirers to be more inclusive such that the 
exchange of reasons can lead to the settlement and belief in the truth. 
I do not attempt, however, to ground this discursive practice in 
Brandom’s pragmatic linguistics or Gadamer’s hermeneutics. The concept of 
ijitihād itself already allows for this discursive practice of giving and taking 
reasons, as it will be shown, and this can serve as a basis for establishment 
of autonomy. I wish merely to extend this foundation of ijtihād to be more 
inclusive of autonomous agents. To recognize that the act of giving and taking 
reasons is fundamental to the internalization of belief and that the 
contributions of laypersons adds to the very formation of tradition. I will ground 
autonomy then in the concepts of `amr bi al-marūf and al-ḥukm al-dhāhirī. 
Truth and Daily Life 
There are two ways in which I would like to build upon Asad’s notion of 
a discursive tradition. The first is that this discursive tradition is not only 
important for struggles of power and orthodoxy, but is also important for 
establishing truth. The second is that, beyond deliberation and rationality, 
through the performance of Islam and Islamic rituals the layperson develops 
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an unaccredited expertise about religious issues. This unaccredited expertise 
can have an epistemic gain in regards to the process of ijtiḥād. 
In regards to this relationship between truth and discourse, the 
following chapters will argue that deliberation is important for discovering 
truth. Asad is correct in saying that power is an important part of the 
discourse, but part of the reason that people have discourse is to establish the 
truth. As it will be argued in the next chapter, truth is not established by the 
deliberations of a lone individual. Truth is, instead, established through the 
dialogue and discourse of the community of inquirers. Although traditional 
Shi’i uṣūl makes a strong demarcation between mujtahid and muqalid I will 
argue that the muqalid has a level expertise must be considered in the pursuit 
of truth. 
The second concept, is that through the practice of religion people 
develop a habitus and a distinction about religion. This clearly builds upon 
concepts put forward by Bourdieu but also by Bayat’s theory of 
nonmovements. Rational deliberation is not the only sphere in which people 
can contest narratives, but it is also possible through daily practice. They can 
embody a variety of different narratives. These movements, however, go both 
ways. That is that they push for change within the tradition and at times they 
push to keep the status quo. 
A Pragmatic Ijtihād 
In this chapter I will discuss the concept of truth within Shi’i 
jurisprudence, and establish that in matters of jurisprudence truth is a belief at 
the end of inquiry. This will be done through an analysis of the difference 
between al-ḥukm al-ẓahirī, the apparent ruling, and al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī, the real 
ruling. Truth is not considered to be a belief that corresponds to reality, but is 
truth is conclusion reached after a state of inquiry. This is rather similar to a 
concept of inquiry put forward Pragmatists philosophers. This will establish 
the foundations for the latter chapters that will argue that any conception of 
truth as a state of inquiry necessitates a social epistemology that depends on 
a community of inquirers. 
This chapter will also establish the relationship between truth in 
jurisprudence and moral cultivation. The concept of commanding right states 
that individuals must strive to perform the good, but the concept of ijtihād, as it 
will be discussed, is how that good comes to be known. This chapter will 
therefore show how the mujtahid can be seen as a guide that is sharing in the 
moral responsibility of the muqallid. This provides a basis for expanding the 
notion of inquirers, and understanding the necessity of discourse in ijtihād. 
The scope and limits of taqlīd are defined in a later chapter. 
Terminology 
There is a long standing classification of rulings within Shi’i 
jurisprudence that divides rulings into al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī and al-ḥukm al-
ẓāhirī.533 There are two ways that the definitions are used. In one sense they 
are used to differentiate between cases that have no direct evidence for a 
ruling. Thus the al-ḥukm al-ẓahirī would be related to issues dealing with the 
procedural principles, uṣūl al-‘amalīyyah. The procedural principles are cases 
in which the “[g]eneral principles which the jurist resorts to only when 
[derivation] of a [ruling] with a [substantiating argument] is impossible.”534 
In the other usage of the terms, and the usage which is relevant to our 
debate, the al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī is considered to be the ruling that has been 
placed originally by God.535 Thus it is sometimes referred to as the ruling that 
has been written in the lawḥ al-maḥfuẓ, the preserved tablet.536 The lawḥ al-
maḥfuẓ is where God’s decisions are written.537 The al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī is also 
                                                        
533 The earliest I have been able to trace the use of this term is to Allamah al-Ḥillī. I have 
not found it in the works of earlier scholars such as Shaykh al-Mufīd or Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, 
see Ḥassan ibn Yusūf al-Ḥillī, Niḥāyah Al-Uṣūl Ilā ‘Ilm Al-Uṣūl, ed. Ibrāhīm Bahādurī, 5 
vols (Qum: Mu’asasah al-Imām al-Ṣādiq, 2007), 4: 14; Muḥammad Ridha Kaẓimī 
Gulvardī and Muḥammad Shafīq Asakī, “Kayfīyat Ta‘sīr ‘ilm va Jahl dar ’Aḥkām Vāqi‘ī va 
Ṭāhrī az Dīdqāh Imamiyyah va ‘Āmah”, Pajūhish-hayi Fiqh va Ḥuqūq-i Islāmī  31 (2013): 
119–46; ‘Abd al-Jabār al-Rafā‘ī, Muḥāḍrāt fī Uṣūl Al-Fiqh, 2 vols (Qum: Dār al-Kutub al-
Islāmī, 2003) 1:36; Jawād Tabrīzī, Durūs fī Masā’il ‘Ilm al-Uṣūl, 5 vols (Qum: Dār al-
Ṣadīqah al-Shahīdah, 2003);  
534Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, Lessons in Islamic Jurisprudence, trans. Roy P. Mottahedeh 
(Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 187.  
535Muḥammad Ṣanqūr ‘Alī, Al-Mu‘jam Al-Uṣūlī, vol. 2 (Manshūrāt Naqsh, 2005), 52, 
http://books.rafed.net/view.php?type=c_fbook&b_id=1049.  
536Faḍil LankarānīMuḥamad Jawād, “KhāriJ-I Usūl: Usūl-I `Amalīyeh, Baḥs-E Barā’t, 
Jalaseh-I Se,” accessed July 7, 2014, http://www.fazellankarani.ir/persian/lesson/2985/.  
537A.J. Wensinck, “Lawḥ,” ed. P. Bearman et al., Enyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition 
(Brill Online, 2012), http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-
referred to as nafs al-’amr, the real ruling itself.538 The ruling exists 
independent of the believer. For example, prayer is obligatory whether or not 
a believer knows it is obligatory. Yet, if one is certain about a ruling, meaning 
that they have qaṭ`, then that ruling is generally considered to a part of the al-
ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī. 
In contrast to this, the al-ḥukm al-ẓahirī is are rulings that have any 
element of doubt, shak.539 If one is certain about a ruling then that ruling is 
considered part of the al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī. If one has doubt about a ruling then 
that ruling is considered as a al-ḥukm al-ẓāhirī.540 
Doubt, or shakk, here follows the strict understanding used within ’uṣūl. 
A standard usage of doubt might only include beliefs that are given a near 
50/50 probability, and would exclude beliefs that have a 99% probability. 
Within Uṣūlī terminology doubt refers to beliefs that are not 100% certain. 541 
Thus any belief that has even a minute chance of being wrong is considered 
doubtful.  
This means that nearly all rulings that are derived in ijtiḥād fall within 
the scope of al-ḥukm al-ẓahirī.543 For the Uṣūlīs jurisprudence is based 
opinion (ẓann) and these opinions are based on a jurists understanding of 
what ruling is most likely true.544 Rulings are decided not because they are 
known to be true but because they are argued to be most probably true 
because they have probative force (ḥujiyyah).545 Any ruling based on a 
probability falls into the category of al-ḥukm al-ẓahirī. Thus rulings that would 
be considered as part of the al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī are the most clear cut and basic 
rulings. Examples would include the prohibition of eating pork, or drinking 
wine, or the obligation of prayer. No one would say, it is argued, that there is 
any doubt in regards to the judicial rulings in these matters.546 
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The al-ḥukm al-ẓāhrī is therefore similar to Kant’s critique that we 
cannot know the Ding an sich, the thing in of itself. Although Kant’s critique is 
epistemological, that our a priori concepts organize our experiences, and the 
uṣūlī critique is not, they both emphasise that our understanding of reality is 
mediated. The uṣūlī states that our understanding of religion is mediated 
through the sources we have available and that we may not be able to reach 
reality as it is. Muẓaffar begins the discussion on ḥujjiyah, probative force, by 
discussing that the reason certain things have ḥujjiyah is not because they 
help us discover reality, but only because God will forgive us on the day of 
judgment or mu`dharīyah.547 
Part of the reason that rulings which have the epistemological status of 
qat`, certainty, as part of the al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī is due to the understanding of 
qaṭ` itself. Qat` is considered in Shi’i ’uṣūl to have kāshifīyyah, unveiling or 
discovery. It is something akin to correspondence in Western epistemology.548 
When someone has qaṭ` they have discovered something about the world. 
They have discovered something about reality. Thus when one has qaṭ` in 
regards to a jurisprudential ruling they have discovered what is written in the 
lawḥ al-maḥfuẓ. Thus there is no difference between stating that the al-ḥukm 
al-wāqi‘ī is what is written in the lawḥ al-maḥfuẓ or by stating that it is a ruling 
based on qat`, because once one has qaṭ` then one knows what is written in 
the lawḥ al-maḥfuẓ. 
Moreover, there is no need for a mujtahid if the muqallid can reach the 
al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī. Ayatollah Khū’ī writes that “If [the muqallid] attains qati` in a 
ruling then he should act upon it and there is no need to resort to a 
mujtahid”549 
Yet, the al-ḥukm al-ẓāhirī are the specific domain of the mujtahid. 
There are multiple reasons given as to why this is so, one of which relies on 
the ability of the mujtahid to be able to do a proper inquiry, ijtihād. This 
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argument states that the al-ḥukm al-ẓāhirī is dependent upon imārāt and uṣūl 
al-`amalīyah both of which require faḥṣ or inquiry. The mujtahid is the one that 
is fit to undertake this inquiry and not the layperson. This topic of ijtihād, and 
how it relates to the Akhbarī/Uṣulī debate will be discussed later on. 
Contempary scholarship on Shi’i jurisprudence has also 
discussed this distinction between law as God intended, and the law as 
derived by the opnions of the jurst, although they do not discuss the 
concept of al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī directly. In an analysis of the debate between 
Bihbahānī and Baḥrānī in regards to the Akhbārī-’Uṣūlī stance on 
jurisprudence, Robert Gleave discusses the uṣūlī approach to truth in law. He 
writes: 
For Bihbahānī, as for Baḥrānī, there are two tiers to the law: the law in reality and the law 
as perceived. Bihbahānī, however, restricts the latter to the mujtahid’s perception. As 
moral agents, charged by God to perform a duty (taklīf), we can only work within the 
second sphere of the law. The mujtahid searches the texts for an indicator (dalīl); this 
indicator is a clue as to what God’s (or the Prophet’s or the Imam’s) ruling was on a 
particular matter.550 
What becomes important then, is the procedure not necessarily the outcome. 
It is then this procedure that makes the ruling authoritative. It is not the rulings 
correspondence to reality that gives its probative force. Gleave writes that 
there “is a procedural certainty that a ruling based on a legal indicator found 
by a mujtahid is authoritative, even though the opinion may not accord with 
reality”551 His analysis is based precisely on Biḥbaḥānī’s differentiation 
between al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī and al-ḥukm al-ẓāhirī, although Gleave does not go 
into the details of this debate. Gleave’s analysis is based on Biḥbaḥānī’s 
statement that a muqallid is obligated to act on the “apparent rulings (al-
ẓāhiriyyah) and not the actual rulings (al-wāqa‘iyyah).” 552 Biḥbaḥānī then 
continues to clarify what he means by apparent and actual rulings, and this 
description corresponds to what has been discussed above: “What is meant 
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by apparent duties are the apparent [opinions] reached by the mujtahid that it 
is the real ruling of God.”553  
It is specifically doubt, the difference between the al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī and 
the al-ḥukm al-ẓāhirī that both the Akhbārīs and the ’Uṣūlī’s were trying to 
reconcile. Because of this difference Gleave writes that the jurists perception 
“must always be recognised as less than certain, and it is that one must deal 
with trough legal theory.”554 
Roy Mottahedeh also comment about the awareness of the subjective 
agent in Shi’i legal reasoning. In his introduction to the translation of Ṣadr’s 
Lesson’s in Islamic Jurisprudence, Mottahedeh has a short discussion about 
the role of reason and convention. He writes the “humane aspect of almost all 
Islamic law is that it takes into consideration the subjective state of the legal 
agent when assessing accountability.”555 He continues by highlighting how the 
issue of the subjective agent has become more important within Shi’i 
jurisprudence: “The increased interest in the subjective state of the legal 
agent is apparent from many passages in this book, and results from two and 
a half centuries of such discussion in ’Uṣūlī legal circles.”556 
The role of inquiry within the Uṣūlī is to establish an opinion, the al-
ḥukm al-ẓāhirī. Bihbahānī’s argument as to why ijtihād is necessary is based 
on the fact that a ruling requires inquiry. He argues that “rulings are not 
apparent (badīhī) and there is no other recourse except for inquiry and 
research on the ways to gain knowledge of jurisprudence”557 It’s through 
inquiry and the appropriate use of ḍan that one reaches a ruling. 
This type of pragmatic truth has several effects within Shi’i 
jurisprudence, especially the type of relationship between the al-ḥukm al-
wāqi‘ī and the al-ḥukm al-ẓāhirī. Many issues have to deal with errors. What if 
one were to act upon a al-ḥukm al-ẓāhirī and later discover the al-ḥukm al-
wāqi‘ī, would they have to repeat their obligatory rituals or are those rituals 
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already valid. 558 Would one’s hajj be valid if they performed it based on one 
set of rulings but later discovered that these rulings were incorrect?559 This 
issue becomes more debated when we approach it from a different angle. If 
one were to have the intention of committing a sin, and later discovers that 
that action was sinful, will they be punished for being sinful?560 Even more 
interesting are debates that have to do with rewards. There are a series of 
hadīths, titled as man balagh, that state that if one were to come to believe 
that a certain action has a reward, and performs that action, even if that 
reward had no bases in the al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī God would still give the same 
reward to that person.561 This final example shows the extent of ramifications 
of the debate about al-ḥukm al-ẓāhrī and al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī. 
Fallibalism 
One of the interesting points about this concept of al-ḥukm al-ẓāhrī is 
how it leads to similar conclusions developed by pragmatists who believe in a 
similar notion of truth. One example is in regards to the concept of fallibalism. 
For both the uṣūlī and pragmatic conceptions of belief, a belief is valid after a 
proper state of inquiry and stays valid until one discovers an opposing 
argument. These rulings are never considered to be corresponding to reality, 
but are valid for action. They can at any point in the future be up for debate. 
Moreover, inquiry is generally done in a piecemeal fashion. Just 
because the rulings are merely apparent rulings and do not necessarily 
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correspond to reality one does not disregard them in total and begin by 
searching for foundational principles from which to build. Instead the proper 
method of inquiry is to begin by examining each belief or ruling in a piecemeal 
fashion. Even though certain number of rulings, beliefs, principles within ’uṣūl 
or fiqh maybe be wrong, one begins with the assumption that they are right 
until there is evidence to the contrary. 
This is one of the differences between Soroush’s approach to Islamic 
law. Soroush also puts forward a paradigm that separates belief in reality and 
our understanding of religion, ḥaqīqat and fahm-i ḥaqīqat. We have a 
multiplicity of understandings of religion partially due to multiplicity layers of 
reality. There is no direct contact contact with religion and all belief is tainted 
by our prejudices. These multitude of beliefs are incommensurable. Up to 
here, it would be possible to find common ground between the pragmatic 
approach and Soroush. Yet, Soroush goes one step further and argues Since 
none of our beliefs necessarily all beliefs have the same epistemic validity. 
There is no authoritative understanding, fahm-i ḥākim and each person is 
individually responsible for their understanding of religion.562 
What then becomes the debate between the conservatives and 
Soroush is in regards to this relativism. Ayatullah ‘Abdullāh Jawadī Āmulī, an 
Islamist philosopher and jurist in Qum, in his critique of of Soroush, in regards 
to the differing understandings of religion, writes that these changes are a part 
of the refinement, takāmul, of religion. That as time progress we discover 
more about the world which in turns helps to reexamine our position in 
religious principles. This type of inquiry is the duty of scholars. He states that 
he is not concerned about changes in religious thought but that he is 
concerned about denying concepts which are considered to be essential 
ḍarūrī and fundamental, thābit, aspects of religion which are disregarded in 
the name of relativism.563 
The New Pragmatists are also against this concept of relativism 
presented by Soroush. The shear number of literature that New Pragmatists 
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have written against Rorty’s relativism is a testament to this.564 In fact, they 
argue that the best way to promote democracy is by grounding it in the 
pragmatic concept of truth, which was discussed in the previous chapter. 
They argue that relativist conceptions of truth open the door to people like 
Schumpter. Which would for Soroush, be a worse political predicament then 
the one he is arguing against. 
Nonetheless, pragmatists argue that inquiry, and more so the inquiry of 
the community, establishes certain fallible truths. These truths are used to 
build further knowledge but can be over turned in future inquiry. They are 
objective not in the sense that correspond to reality but because they gone 
trough a process of inquiry. 
Ijtihād and Valid Inquiry 
A justified ruling is a ruling that has been reached after an ideal state of 
inquiry. This is actually the definition of ijtihād. Ijtihād comes from the root j-h-
d which means to strive, labour, and toil.566 Ijtihād is literally to “exert 
unsparingly his power, or ability.”567 In terms of performing ijtihād in the 
formation of opinions (ijtihād r’ayahu) it means “He took pains, or put himself 
to trouble or fatigue, to form a right judgment or opinion.”568 This 
understanding is echoed within Shi’i legal theory. Al-‘Allamah al-Ḥillī (d. 
726/1325) was one of the first to incorporate the theory of ijtihād within his 
legal writings.569 Ḥillī defines ijtihād as “The use of all of one’s ability in 
forming an opinion (ẓann) on rulings of the sharia.”570 Biḥbahanī sates that the 
only opinion that is valid is the “the opinion (ẓann) of the mujtahid after he has 
expended his effort in attaining what is the strongest [opinion], what is most 
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likely to be right, and what is the most apparent (al-aẓahr) to him that it is the 
ruling of God the Most High.”571 
Biḥbahanī’s statement clarifies the connection between the al-ḥukm al-
ẓāhirī, as discussed earlier, and the concept of ijtihād. Ijtihād is not the task of 
reaching the law as God intended, it is the task expending one’s efforts to the 
fullest in order to reach the strongest opinion. Gleave, in explaining al-
Bihbahānī’s understanding of ijtihād, summarizes this concept succinctly:  
For Bihbahānī, ijtihād involves a suitably qualified jurist (mujtahid) searching through all 
the possible interpretations of the texts, and deriving the ruling or assessment (ḥukm) 
most likely, in his opinion, to be the ruling of God in the case under discussion. He cannot 
decree that his ruling is the Lawgiver’s ruling: he can only say that his assessment is, after 
an extensive and comprehensive search (termed “the exhaustion of his effort”), his own 
opinion (ẓann).572 
This concept of an ideal state of inquiry is also the bases of the 
concept of taqlīd and the authority of the scholars. The reason a layperson 
must do taqlīd of a mujtahid is based on the argument that only the mujtahid is 
capable of carrying out this ideal state of inquiry. Bihbahānī states clearly that: 
“There is no doubt that the ‘ammī [layperson] cannot know fiqh, by any 
means, except by taqlīd”574 This understanding of taqlīd is echoed by many of 
the contemporary marāja‘.575 Ayatollah Wahid Khorasani defines a mujtahid 
as one “who can deduce his responsibility from the primary sources.”576  
The types of expertise that mujtahid is required to have in order to 
proper conduct ijtihād are called the sharā‘it al-ijtihād, the qualifications or 
conditions of ijtihād.577A jurist must have attained proficiency in a number 
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discipline such as the linguistic sciences, logic, legal theory, exegesis, and 
theology. The layperson, not having met these necessary conditions, cannot 
do ijtihād and must therefore follow the rulings of a person that has met these 
conditions.  
Yet, this strict dichotomy between mujtahid and muqallid would only 
hold if the layperson has nothing of value to add to the process of inquiry. I 
am not arguing that the layperson can do ijtihād as well, but that the inclusion 
of the layperson will provide an epistemic gain. I will argue that by 
understanding a jurist cannot be have sadi to have “exhausted his effort” if he 
does not include the type of opinions and experiences of laypersons. This 
epistemic gain will help the mujtahid to arrive to a ruling that is closer to the al-
ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī. Thus, in the next chapters I will try to argue that the ideal state 
of inquiry is one which considers the layperson as active participants in the 
discourse. The reason is that expertise is relative, and while person may be 
considered lay in one field but have an expertise in other fields. These 
different types of expertise are necessary within this inquiry. 
As it will be shown in the next chapter, this understanding of a ruling is 
similar to the pragmatic understanding of truth. For they too understand truth 
to be a belief attained after an ideal state of inquiry. Although there are 
differences between pragmatism and Shi’i ’uṣūl, this concept of truth overlaps. 
The next chapter will detail the pragmatic concept of truth, but also explain the 
consequences that this understanding of belief entails. For the concept of an 
ideal state of inquiry has been used within Shi’i jurisprudence to establish the 
authority of the scholar, pragmitists have used this state of inquiry to argue for 
the democratic inclusion of others. 
Ethical Cultivation and Shared Moral 
Responsibility 
There is more, however, to this relationship between mujtahid and 
muqallid. As explained earlier, Shi’i thought is based on the concept that 
individuals should strive to become closer to God, part of the principle of 
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forbidding wrong. The rulings laid down are designed such that they serve this 
purpose. This especially clear for the section of rulings that deal with the 
ibādāt or rituals such as the hajj, prayer and fasting. Generally, rulings in this 
category require a nīyah, or an intention, that one is performing these actions 
in order to become closer to God.578 This differs from the mu`āmalāt which 
deal mostly with transactions and intention does not play a part in the 
correctness of the action. A prayer without the intention of reaching God is 
invalid, but a transaction without that intention is still binding. 
Hussein Ali Agrama, professor of Anthropology at the University of 
Chicago, has a valid point when he argues that the purpose of a fatwa, or 
ruling, is for ethical cultivation.579 In his study of the Fatwa Countil in Egypt, 
and the relationship between the mufti and the believers, he concludes that 
the mufti, in the Sunni context, is a guide, and “the fatwa is a practice that 
puts the questioner on a journey of ethical cultivation.”580 He argues that this 
“image of the fatwa as facilitating a journey takes us far from the conventional 
view of it as primarily a doctrinal pronouncement and an instrument of 
doctrinal reform.”581 
Although fiqh takes on a different form when it enters the political 
sphere, it should not distract from one of the fundamental roles that it still 
plays in lives of individuals as shared moral responsibility. As discussed 
above, the authority of the mujtahid lies in their ability to properly conduct a 
formal inquiry into questions regarding moral and jurisprudential issues. In 
times of moral ambiguity or during situations that require difficult moral 
decisions, many people decide to turn to those they consider to have moral 
expertise. This is not done merely to decide what the correct course of action 
should be but become partners in that decision itself, such that they share in 
the moral consequences of the outcome. 
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The authority of the ‘ālim is “that of a guide,”582 and the ulema are ones 
who have the skills to find their way about”583 As Agrama argues about the 
role of the Fatwa Council in Egypt: 
…the Fatwa Council, is not mainly about dispensing points of correct doctrine. Rather, it is 
more about what the mufti is able to say to the questioners based on the information they 
have given him, and within the range and limits of doctrine as well as overall conceptions 
of an ideal Muslim self, so that they can go on with their everyday lives. 
The relationship between the mujtahid and the muqallid in this context 
is that of shared moral responsibility. As Agrama describes, the ‘ālim is 
“understood to share a measure of responsibility for the enactments of the 
people to whom he issues it; a responsibility he will not face in this life but in 
the hereafter.”584 The weight of this responsibility is too much to bear for 
certain scholars and they would choose to not be a part of the Fatwa 
Council.585 
Although Agrama’s field study is about the mufti in a Sunni context, the 
same holds true with the mujtahid within Shi’i thought. The lives of many 
people are afflicted with diffilicult moral problems and some turn to the 
mujtahid for quidance on these issues. The topic of medical ethics, given that 
it deals with moral dillemas such as death and phyiscial harm, can serve as a 
tangible example. The contemporary mujtahids are asked multiple questions 
related to medical ethics, such as aborting a fetus that has been diaqnosed 
with a serious illness during prenatal screening, the issue of brain-death and 
euthanasia, questions about the use of assisted reproductive technologies 
and stem cell reseach.586  
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My own experience in interviewing scholars in Qum reflects this same 
notion of shared moral responsibility. I had a detailed discussion with one of 
the individuals responsible for compiling Ayatollah Wahid Khorasani’s Risālah 
‘Amaliyyah. He discussed the pain staking detail which which Ayatallah 
Khorsani would go through to in order to write Risāl-e. He also mentioned that 
very early on Ayatollah Khorasani tasked them with gathering nearly every 
Risāl-e that had been written before. Every time they thought they had 
gathered enough, Ayatollah Khorasani would tell them to gather more. When 
they asked why they needed to gather so many different books, he replied 
that he wanted to know his partners in hell. Far from seeing himself as putting 
forward the authoritative word of God, he instead considered his opinions to at 
least have a probability of error. More importantly, he considered himself to 
share in the moral responsibility of the muqallidīn as well as previous 
scholars. Thus, similar to the muftis described by Agrama, the mujtahid is 
seen, and see themselves, as being moral responsible for the actions partken 
by their followers based on their rulings. 
Moreover, this concept of shared moral responsibility does not 
contradict one’s autonomy. As stated earlier, autonomy is not equivalent to 
independence. Many people are autonomous but also interdependent. 
Sharing moral responsibility falls within that interdependence. Individuals 
actively choose to consult others in a variety of situations, such of moral 
ambiguity, or at times of hardship. This is clearly represented in medical 
situations. In a study of the relationship between prenatal testing and 
autonomy. Garcia et al. interviewed 59 women who had accepted prenatal 
testing and where on the crux of making a decision. The majority of 
participants stated that they made their decisions freely but “they preferred to 
share the responsibility of taking decisions, and its consequences for other 
family members, with their partner and close persons.”587 They state that their 
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study indicates that “women do not want to shoulder all the responsibility for 
their decisions. Taking decisions in partnership would help women feel more 
comfortable with their final choice.”588 They conclude that “the input from third 
persons should not be evaluated so much as a social pressure.”589 
Although the type of authoritative relationship under discussion was not 
examined by Garcia et al. their study does show that many people tend to 
consult others in making moral decisions, to not only help make decisions but 
share in that responsibility. This also extends to religious authority. Atkin et 
al. examined the extent that religious identity and faith influence a person’s 
decision in Ante-Natal screening. They individuals that were a part of four 
communities within the UK: Christian, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh. They argue 
that religion “offered a framework in which to make sense of and legitimate 
experience”590 However, “[i]t was rarely seen as prescriptive: providing a rigid 
sense of right and wrong, but realized in a broader moral framework.”591 
Conclusion 
This chapter established an important premise for the future chapters. 
It has defined truth in ijtiḥād as the end of inquiry. This is a fallible truth, were 
we assume it is true until proven otherwise. This argument toward truth as a 
long history within Shi’i ’uṣūl especially around discussions of the al-ḥukm al-
ẓahirī. 
The communal aspects of this inquiry have also been highlighted. 
Moral inquiry is a difficult task with great level of responsibility. We naturally 
find comfort in discussing moral problems with others in order to discover the 
truth but also to share the moral responsibility. We rely on others to in order to 
develop a firm stance on moral issues. 
The next chapters will build on these two premises. It will show how the 
concept of truth as the end of inquiry requires that we broaden the scope of 
inquirers to include various participants, for inquiry can only be truly finished if 
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we exhausted all of the epistemic resources available to us. The following 
chapter will examine this line of inquiry through the rubric of pragmatism, 
especially the New Pragmatism that is currently gaining traction. 
The Pragmatic Truth and Epistemic Democracy 
In the previous chapter, I discussed how the Shi’i ’uṣūlī distinction 
between al-ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī and al-ḥukm al-ẓāhirī considers the justified ruling 
to be the ruling that is arrived to after a process of inquiry. In this chapter I will 
argue that this conception of truth as an end of inquiry commits Shi’i ’uṣūl to 
incorporate the views and opinions of people who are not experts in 
jurisprudence because it provides an epistemic gain. In other words, the 
inclusion of non-experts helps to discover the truth. I use the term non-experts 
here to denote those that have no formal expertise in ijtihād while leaving the 
possibility that they are experts in different fields. 
To highlight the relationship between the inclusion of non-experts and 
truth as the end of inquiry, I will refer to the works of the New Pragmatists, 
and Cheryl Misak in particular. Although it is only in matters relating to fiqh 
that traditional ’uṣūlīs truth, or the justified ruling, to be the belief at the end of 
inquiry, some New Pragmatists consider all truth to be such. 
The approach that New Pragmatists have taken to the justification of 
democracy follows the larger trend in epistemic democracy that was 
mentioned in the first chapter. There has been a shift in discussions of 
political philosophy from procedural theories of justice to arguments about the 
justification of democracy. Many of these attempts of justification take 
instrumentalist approaches, meaning that they argue democracy is important 
for reaching a certain end goal. 
Given that the approach to autonomy that has been in discussion is 
instrumentalist it is quite clear that there are overlapping concerns. What I 
would like to discuss here one of the now approaches taken by this approach, 
namely that of Cheryl Misak who builds upon the works of Charles Pierce. 
The reason being that Misak’s pragmatic approach to democracy and truth 
will have a heavy a bearing in the analysis of Shi’i ’uṣūl in the next chapter. 
The structure of the chapter is will consist of a mainly of a short 
comparison between Cartesian and Pragmatic epistemology. The reason is 
that it is difficult to describe Pragmatism without describing the Cartesian 
epistemology to which they were responding. This chapter will thus begin with 
a discussion of Descartes and then discuss Pierce’s response to to Descartes 
epistemology. 
The chapter will, however, begin with a short contextualization of 
Misak’s approach. This will highlight how Misak is part of a growing trend of 
epistemic democrats, and will help to define the ultimate goal for which is 
trying to defend. At the end of the chapter, a few of Misak’s shortcomings will 
be discussed. 
Pragmatism and Epistemic Democracy 
In chapter one, I noted several different instrumentalist approaches to 
democracy, namely Robert Talisse and Lucas Swaine.592 Both of these 
philosophers argue for democracy and the freedom of conscience based on 
the argument that it is only within democratic social contexts that defend the 
freedom of conscience that individuals can gain true belief. 
Misak’s line of argument brings a different purpose for democracy. For 
Misak, democracy is important because it helps us discover the truth. Talisse 
and Swaine present arguments for the internalization of truth, where as Misak 
presents arguments as to why the opinions of the average citizen are 
important for the formation of truth. 
This puts Misak in the under the same umbrella of a growing number of 
epistemic democrats. Epistemic democrats argue that democracy is a justified 
form of argument because it has an epistemic gain, it leads us closer to the 
truth. List and Goodin define epistemic democracy as such: 
“The hallmark of the epistemic approach, in all its forms, is its 
fundamental premise that there exists some procedure-independent fact of 
the matter as to what the best or right outcome is. A pure epistemic approach 
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tells us that our social decision rules ought be chosen so as to track that 
fact.”593 
Some have traced this epistemic argument for democracy back to 
Aristotle,594 who wrote that: 
The many, who are not as individuals excellent men, nevertheless can, when they have 
come together, be better than the few best people, not indivdiually but collectively, just as 
feasts to which many contribute are better than feasts provided at one person’s 
expense.595 
Misak’s argument depends on a certain understanding of truth as the 
end of inquiry. Her understanding of truth is a modified version of Pierce’s 
pragmatism. To reconstruct her argument it is necessary to focus on the 
classical pragmatist Charles Peirce. 
Misak and Peirce’s approach to epistemology is best highlighted in 
relation to the epistemic background in which they developed. It is standard to 
discuss Peirce’s writings in response to Descartes’ foundationalism, and that 
is what we shall do in the following section. I shall focus on Descartes’ 
metaphysical realism and foundationalism and state why Peirce argued for a 
pragmatic understanding of truth. I will then state how Misak differed from 
Peirce and developed an epistemology that could be used as a defense of 
democracy. 
The Background to Pragmatism 
Pierce’s pragmatism is in response to Descartes epistemic skepticism. 
Contrasting Pierce’s methodological approach with Descartes will help to 
clarify Pierce’s methodology and highlight the problems which he hopes to 
solve. We will then discuss how Misak builds upon Pierce’s ideas. 
As a caveat, I am not trying to defend nor refute Descartes’ epistemic 
methodology of global doubt and foundationalism. Arguably, much of Shi’i 
philosophy promotes a foundationalist methodology, and certain sections of 
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classical texts are given to the examination of badīhīyāt or apparent 
foundational truths. Our endeavour here is to show how an epistemic 
methodology that considers truth to be the conclusion of an ideal end of 
inquiry is committed to social epistemology. The sections on Descartes and 
foundationalism are only important as a means of comparison. 
Descartes’ Epistemology 
Descartes’ epistemic enquiries in Meditations on First Philosophy 
became the central topic of concern in modern epistemology. There are two 
primary aspects to Descartes philosophical approach. The first was that the 
primary concern of successful philosophy was answering the main question of 
scepticism. The second is that scepticism can be saved only through a 
foundationalist methodology. 
Descartes begins his inquiry through the epistemological concept of the 
mind-body dualism. He states that the mind is a mental state that is separate 
from the external world. We only have access to these mental facts which 
raises the question as to how we can have knowledge of facts in reality. He 
argued that Descartes reversed the order of knowledge and stated that 
knowledge should be defined by doubt.596 That is knowledge and doubt are 
on the same scale. What comes to be known as knowledge is that which has 
no doubt. 
This led Descartes to make a distinction between conviction and 
knowledge. Conviction was when there might still be some reason that would 
lead us to doubt, whereas knowledge was a reason that could not be 
superseded by any other reason. His famous approach to constructing 
knowledge was to begin by doubting everything and then build knowledge up 
from certain irrefutable Archimedean points. 
Descartes begins his introduction to the Meditations of First Philosophy 
by outlining his methodological doubt. 
Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as 
true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had 
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subsequently based on them. I realized that it was necessary, once in the course of my 
life, to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I 
wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last.597 
Throughout the Meditations of First Philosophy Descartes describes his 
methodology as being similar to an architect. The architect first removes all 
the loose debris to reach a sturdy foundation, and starts building from that 
foundation. He writes: 
Throughout my writings I have made it clear that my method imitates that of the architect. 
When an architect wants to build a house which is 537 stable on ground where there is a 
sandy topsoil over underlying rock, or clay, or some other firm base, he begins by digging 
out a set of trenches from which he removes the sand, and anything resting on or mixed in 
with the sand, so that he can lay his foundations on firm soil. In the same way, I began by 
taking everything that was doubtful and throwing it out, like sand; and then, when I noticed 
that it is impossible to doubt that a doubting or thinking substance exists, I took this as the 
bedrock on which I could lay the foundations of my philosophy.598 
Thus, there are two crucial aspects to Descartes’ epistemology, and it 
is these two concepts that the pragmatists will touch on as well. The first, is 
that the Cartesian methodology requires that one begin by doubting all 
knowledge, a global skepticism. Second, one begins by rebuilding one’s 
knowledge by building on undoubtable reasons; reasons that would not be 
negated by other reasons. 
Pierce’s Response 
The pragmatists approach was started with the American philosopher, 
logician, mathematician, and scientist Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). 
Peirce vocation was as a scientist and for 32 years Peirce worked for the U.S 
Coast and Geodetic Survey. 
Peirce argued for a specific approach to epistemology. He argues that 
true belief is the belief that is arrived to after an ideal state of inquiry. On one 
hand, Pierce wanted to refute the correspondence theories of truth that 
considered truth to exist beyond human inquiry, and on the other hand he 
wanted to still keep the notion of truth and not fall into relativism. Peirce’s 
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concept of truth is that a true belief is a belief that best fits the evidence given 
that we have inquired as far as reasonably possible. 
It is in response to Cartesian doubt Pierce puts forward his pragmatic 
epistemology. His approach does not look after ideal solutions but rather 
focuses on where one is at the moment. Below, I’ll discuss Peirce’s replies to 
the two points listed above about Descartes’ epistemology. The first response 
is that it is not possible for us to doubt all of our beliefs at once. The second 
response is that it is not possible to find basic foundations. 
Anti-Skepticism and Anti-Foundationalism 
In response to the first point, that the process of gaining knowledge is 
done by first doubting all knowledge, Pierce replies that this is not real doubt. 
In the “Fixation of Belief” Pierces describes doubt as “an uneasy and 
dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the 
state of belief; while the latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do not 
wish to avoid, or to change to a belief in anything else.”599 
What Pierce is interested in is real doubt. A real “dissatisfied state” that 
compels us to undertake an inquiry. Without real doubt there is no point to 
struggle for real belief and instead it is idle play. He writes: 
Some philosophers have imagined that to start an inquiry it was only necessary to utter a 
question whether orally or by setting it down upon paper, and have even recommended us 
to begin our studies with questioning everything! But the mere putting of a proposition into 
the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief. There must 
be a real and living doubt, and without this all discussion idle.600 
And specifically about Descartes’ skepticism he writes: 
We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we 
actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be 
dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. 
Hence this initial skepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt…A person 
may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by 
believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on 
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account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not 
doubt in our hearts.601 
Thus Pierce argues that doubt itself must have a justified reason. The 
reason, as it will be shown below, is that Peirce argues that we must begin 
our process of inquiry from where we are. We cannot doubt everything for that 
it is only upon knowledge that we can gain new knowldege. Starting from this 
initial state, we can only doubt a belief if there is a justified reason. Many 
philosophers, such as Hilary Putnam, consider Pierce’s reply to Descartes as 
one of pragmatisms central contributions. 
But one of the central contributions of pragmatism was to deny that doubt is always 
appropriate: the point of Peirce’s celebrated charge that Descartes only thought he 
doubted the existence of the external world is that real doubt…requires a justification; it is 
not only beliefs that need to be justified, but also challenges to belief.602 
In regards to Descartes’ foundationalism, Pierce believes that there are 
no such foundations. One of Pierce’s criticisms is based on the argument that 
foundationalism leads to infinite regress.603 The argument is that we only 
consider a concept to be foundational because of certain valid reasons. If we 
were to inquire further we would realise that even those reasons are based on 
valid reasons, and subsequently those reasons would also be based on other 
reasons. This cycle would continue infinitely. 
Pierce then argues that if these foundational arguments were to exist, 
then they must be intuitive. That is, they appear to us without any argument or 
reason. Yet, these intuitive thoughts must themselves be known to be 
intuitive. But, he argues no thought can appear alone. All thoughts are 
connected together and they only make sense in these relationships. 
…all the cognitive faculties we know of are relative, and consequently their products are 
relations. But a cognition of a relation is determined by previous cognitions. No cognition 
not determined by a previous cognition can be known. It [intuition] does not exist, then, 
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first because it is absolutely incognizable, and second because cognition exists insofar as 
it is known.604 
For Pierce, the Cartesian project is not feasible on both accounts. 
Global skepticism is merely doubt on paper not a real doubt that would lead 
one to inquiry. And a search for foundations leads merely to infinite regress. 
What does Pierce propose instead? Pierce argues for fallibilism, and an 
understanding of truth as the end of an ideal state of inquiry. 
Fallibilism 
In response to the second point, about building from certain 
foundations, Pierce argues that rather than having foundations, we should 
instead start our inquiry from where we find ourselves and reconsider beliefs 
in a piecemeal fashion. “We must begin with all the prejudices which we 
actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy.”605 Thus there is 
no need to consider certain beliefs as foundational, for they may be revised at 
any time. 
But in truth, there is but one state of mind from which you can “set out,” namely the very 
state of mind in which you actually find yourself at the time you do “set out” – a state in 
which you are laden with an immense mass of cognition already formed, of which you 
cannot divest yourself if you would; and who knows whether, if you could, you would not 
have made all knowledge impossible to yourself? Do you call it doubting to write down on 
a piece of paper that you doubt? If so, doubt has nothing to do with serious business.606 
As stated above Pierce is only interested in real doubt. We begin our 
inquiry with whatever beliefs we have at the time. A doubt is only considered 
legitimate if it causes us a “dissatisfied state” towards a belief that we are 
currently holding. We then begin our inquiry from this point to rid ourselves of 
this doubt. While we are inquiring about this particular doubt in question we 
assume that our beliefs, because we do not doubt them, are “absolutely 
true.”607 We can however, in the course of our inquiry come to question these 
other beliefs. 
Misak summarizes this approach as follows 
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So on the pragmatist epistemology, justification requires a fallible background of belief 
which is not in fact in doubt. Only against such a background can a belief be put into doubt 
and a new, better, belief be adopted. All our beliefs are fallible but they come into doubt in 
a piecemeal fashion. Those that inquiry has not thrown into doubt are stable and warrant 
our belief. What this means for epistemologists is that we have no choice but to begin our 
theory about truth and objectivity from where we find ourselves, laden with thoughts about 
what counts as evidence, about what truth and objectivity are, about where agreement is 
difficult to purchase, etc.608 
Correspondence 
While Descartes also argued for a correspondence theory of truth, 
such that the foundationalist methodology would correlate to some existing 
reality, Pierce and the pragmatist instead take a different path. 
Descartes also believed in the correspondence theory of truth: “I have 
never had any doubts about truth, because it seems a notion so 
transcendentally clear that nobody can be ignorant of it…the word ‘truth’, in 
the strict sense, denotes the conformity of thought with its object”609 
Pierce does not deny the correspondence theory of truth in total. He 
rather limits the applicability of such truths to the senses and basic 
empiricism. He regards these types of truths as either “nominal” or 
“transcendental.” 
Richard Bernstein, a leading contemporary pragmatist, echoes a 
similar criticism against correspondence. After giving a simple example of how 
a correspondent theory of truth could work if one where to state that “It is 
raining” they could simply walk outside to check, he writes: 
“Correspondence” or “agreement” works in such straightforward, noncontroversial 
instances, but things get much more confusing and messier when we are dealing with 
more complicated cases of philosophical, scientific, mathematical, or historical assertions. 
Here we can’t simply look and see; rather, we are required to give reasons to support our 
claims about what is objectively true. The very meaning and criteria for determining what 
does and does not correspond to objective reality aren’t at all clear.610 
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Misak echoes a similar statement to Bernstein. She as well believes 
the correspondence theory of truth sets a requirement for truth that makes 
impractical. 
Indeed, the correspondence theorist has trouble saying that we aim at the truth. For on her 
view, we cannot have any access to it, cannot know when we might have it, and cannot 
even know when we are on the right track. In what sense, then, can we aim at it?611 
Pragmatic Truth 
What then is the benchmark of truth for Pierce? Peirce’s pragmatic 
conception of truth relies on two concepts; inquiry and convergence. Although 
truth is measured against the pragmatic maxim truth is not simply whatever 
happens to work at the time. Instead, we can only label something as true 
only if it has gone through a thorough inquiry and others would converge upon 
given an ideal epistemic inquiry. 
The standard reading of Peirce’s concept of truth is that he relies on 
convergence, although a few pragmatic scholars have tried to argue against 
this point. Peirce considers truth to be the final state of inquiry after an ideal 
state of investigation that diverse opinions have converged upon. He writes: 
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to be all who investigate, is what we 
mean by truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.612 
Elsewhere he has written: 
The logical warrant [for accepting a theory as true] is that this method persistently applied 
to the problem must in the long run produce a convergence to the truth, for the truth of a 
theory consists largely in this, that every perceptual deduction from it is verified.613 
The concept of truth for Peirce is a social phenomenon and not solely a 
question of an individual’s epistemic attempts. This theme of social 
epistemology has gained much attention as of late, and some have argued 
that it should be the prime question within the topic of epistemology. There 
are differences between the Classical Pragmatists and the New Pragmatists, 
especially concerning the concept of convergence. Some have argued that 
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the formulation of convergence as stipulated by Peirce is unattainable.614 
Misak has a reformulated version of this argument, one that I think is 
attainable, but still comes under criticism form the likes of Bernstein. 
New Pragmatists, such Robert Talisse and Cheryl Misak, will build 
upon the insights gained from Peirce to develop an epistemic defense of 
democracy. They argue that the our commitment to inquiry and the truth 
requires that we have an open deliberation that considers arguments from a 
variety of viewpoints. While the New Pragmatists are trying to use Peirce’s 
ideas for democracy, Peirce himself was not very found of it. In his old age 
Peirce considered himself an “ultra-conservative” and that he was “an old-
fashioned Christian, a believer in the efficacy of prayer, an opponent of female 
suffrage and of universal male suffrage, in favor of letting business-methods 
develop without the interference of law, a disbeliever in democracy…”615 
Cheryl Misak 
Later philosophers have built upon Peirce’s concept of truth as the end 
of inquiry, although they have diverged in many significant ways. These 
divergences make it difficult to state the thoughts of entire school of 
Pragmatism. Misak, however, builds on Pierce’s Pragmatism to develop a 
social epistemology that will help to analyze the current ’uṣūlī trends. 
She articulates a similar concept of truth as Pierce, but one which 
lightens up on the strict constraint of convergence put forward by Pierce. 
Pragmatists sometimes put this idea in the following unhelpful way: a true belief is one 
which would be agreed upon at the hypothetical end of inquiry. But a better 
characterisation is that a true belief is one that would withstand doubt, were we to inquire 
as far as we fruitfully could on the matter. A true belief is such that, no matter how much 
further we were to investigate and debate, that belief would not be overturned by 
recalcitrant experience and argument.616 
This slight difference broadens the scope of what can be considered as 
truth. Peirce might have set the limit of too far when he stated that the truth 
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might “ultimately agreed to be all who investigate.” Misak considers the 
formulation to better because “the new formulation does not require the 
pragmatist to attempt the doomed task of saying just what is meant by the 
hypothetical end of inquiry, cognitively ideal conditions, or perfect evidence, 
whatever these might be.”617 
If truth is the belief which would best fit with the evidence, were we to have so much by 
way of good evidence that no further evidence would overturn the belief, then a rational 
belief is the belief which best fits with the evidence that we currently have. If truth is what 
would be justified by the principles of inquiry, were inquiry to be pursued as far as it could 
fruitfully go, then a rational belief is one which is justified by the current principles of 
inquiry. There is no gap between what we take, after careful consideration, to be rational 
and what is rational. Although we are never in a position to judge whether a belief is true 
or not, we will often be in a position to judge whether it is the best belief given the current 
state of inquiry.618 
Intellectual History of Misak 
Yet, it is interesting to look at the climate that Misak is writing in. She 
writes at a time where moral philosophy does not argue for any type of 
objectivity but is instead interested in process. Misak herself is aware of the 
climate that she is writing in and dedicates the initial chapters of her book to it. 
She comments on both Rorty and Rawls. While Rorty’s borderline relativism is 
well known, the comments from Rawls are most enlightening, specifically 
given the degree of influence that Rawls has had in moral philosophy. 
Rawls is quite clear in how he trying to establish a political concept of 
justice, one that is not metaphysical and ‘does without the concept of truth.’619 
He spends a great deal of time working out his political constructivism, one 
that takes reasonableness to be the measurement of correctness and not 
truth. 
Political constructivism does not criticize, then, religious, philosophical, or metaphysical 
accounts of the truth of moral judgments and of their validity. Reasonableness is its 
standard of correctness, and given its political aims, it need not go beyond that.620 
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Not only does Rawls believe truth to be irrelevant to political 
constructivism, but it can also be harmful to it. Rawls’ entire argument rests on 
a fact of reasonable pluralism, such that we will not be able to convince others 
of facts that we consider to be true. Thus he argues that comprehensive 
notions of truth make it nearly impossible to develop an overlapping 
consensus. “A zeal for the whole truth tempts us to a broader and deeper 
unity that cannot be justified by public reason.621” 
Misak does paint a more negative picture of Rawls by assuming that 
Rawls considers the inclusion of truth to also include zeal, and a struggle to 
win the world over.622 These claims are rather over the top and she does cite 
them without context. The furthest claim that Rawls takes against truth is that 
we will be able to convince everyone of the facts that we consider to be true. 
Not that any mention of truth in politics necessitates zeal and domination. 
Nontheless, Misak counters this climate by referring back to Carl 
Schmitt, a Weimar legal scholar who sided with the Nazis.While some moral 
relativists, even well known Shi’i relativists such as Soroush, argue that since 
one cannot objectively know what the moral truth is, then one must respect 
and tolerate other view points, Schmitt takes an different turn. In a tone similar 
to Nietszche and Schoupenhauer, he argues that because morality is relative 
then the world is split up into self-identified friends and enemies. And it is the 
power of will and conviction that the strongest will win. He famously argued 
that politics requires an ultimate distinction which would be the foundation for 
all political thought. That political distinction is between friend and enemy.623 
Once this ultimate distinction has been made, it is now up to the 
individual to decide who is friend and foe and to what extent the foe must be 
fought. It is here that Misak quotes Schmitt: 
…each has to decide for himself whether in the concrete situation the otherness of the 
stranger signifies the negation of his own way of life so that he has to be fended off and 
fought in order to preserve the way of life that is existentially important.624 
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Schmitt writes that liberalism will eventually lose out to a series of 
individuals that have the political will to push their agenda forward. Misak 
rephrases the dilemma presented by Schmitt and asks, “If there is no 
objective right or wrong in moral matters, then what prevents one from 
adopting Schmitt’s line rather than the line of tolerance?”625 And it is in light of 
this question that she argues about the importance of objectivity in moral and 
political philosophy. 
Lucas Swaine also makes a similar comment. Although he does not 
refer to Carl Schmitt, as we have quoted earlier Swaine argues that “…the 
arguments liberals have given to theocrats on crucial points of political and 
legal justification remain philosophically unsatisfactory.”626 
Although Misak and Swaine do critique Rawls quite heavily, in his 
defense this is a question that he simply was not interested in. It is not that 
Rawls gave an unsatisfactory answer, but that he gave no real answer to this 
question. As stated earlier, Rawls was focused on procedure. He considered 
fairness and deliberation to be key conditions of legitimacy, not the probability 
of truth. It simply didn’t matter to Rawls if a certain moral or political action 
was truly the correct moral action, what mattered was the way that decision 
was made. 
Moreover, Rawls was not interested in winning over people like 
Schmitt. He considered that his political liberalism start “within the tradition of 
democratic thought”627 and already embedded in it’s social and political 
history. He did not believe that we had to argue for democracy from scratch. 
Thus he is not writing to justify his theory to Totalitarians, he is writing to those 
already engaged in a democratic process. 
Nonetheless, Misak argues that the arguments put forward by Rawls 
and other non-cognitivts “that the advocate of tolerance has nothing to say to 
the Schmittian.”628 Morever the non-cognitivists has “nothing to say to herself 
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about why she is right in thinking as she does rather than as the Schmittian 
does.”629 
This is were the ’uṣūlīs and pragmatists like Misak are on the same 
side. They both believe that if a moral or political action is to be justified, then 
it must have some sort of justification, or in ’uṣūl terms ḥujjīah. It is from this 
background that Misak puts forward an objective form of morality. 
Objectivity and the Community of Inquirers 
In reply to the relativism put forward by Schmitt, Misak argues that we 
do have can be an objective moral understanding, and that this moral 
understanding is the underpinning of democracy. Moreover, she argues that 
we can have objectivity in morality without having a correspondent conception 
of truth. She is trying to neither represent morality as being relative, nor does 
she want to say that the truth of morality is in it’s correspondence. 
My suggestion is that truth is not at the mercy of the vagaries of individuals, as some 
suppose it to be, nor is it a matter of getting right the believer- independent world, as 
others suppose. It has, I shall argue, enough marks of the objective to be deserving of that 
label, suitably qualified. I shall try, that is, to present a view of truth and objectivity which 
undermines the usual all-or- nothing dichotomies and which gives us everything we could 
reasonably want.630 
This has similar debates in ’uṣūl. The ’uṣūlīs also want to have an 
objective morality, which they derive from the methodology presented in ’uṣūl, 
and at the same time they do not believe that this objective morality 
corresponds to the real morality in the lawḥ al-maḥfūẓ. They are then 
presented with the same dilemma, how can this morality be objective? 
Misak answers this question by referring to her understanding of 
inquiry and to the community of inquirers. Thus, objectivity is gained through 
the concept of convergence mentioned earlier, such that a true belief is “one 
that would withstand doubt, were we to inquire as far as we fruitfully could on 
the matter.”631 This concept of inquiring as fruitfully as possible not based on 
the individual. The end of inquiry is not the end when the individual has 
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exhausted all other options. The end of inquiry ends with the community of 
inquirers: “The pragmatist takes correct judgement not to be a matter for the 
individual, even though it is the individual who does the judging, but as a 
matter for the community of inquirers.”632 
Misak tries to solve this dilemma by turning back to inquiry, and 
especially the concept of convergence. Although, as we stated above, she 
doesn’t ascribe to the weighty concept of convergence that Peirce did she 
does ascribe to lighter version of that concept of convergence. And it is 
through this social epistemology that she states brings about objectivity: 
Individuals are the possessors of belief, but whether or not a person’s belief is correct is a 
matter of what the community would determine. What fits with my experience is not of 
paramount importance as far as truth is concerned. What is important is what fits with all 
the experience that would be available, what the community of inquirers would converge 
upon.633 
Robert Talisse also argues in a similar fashion 
The Peircean claim is that, no matter what one thinks about Big Questions concerning, 
say, human nature, the good life, the nature of evil, or man’s place in the cosmos, one 
must recognize a prevailing epistemic interest in getting one’s answers to Big Questions 
right. And getting right answers to such questions requires that one have access to the 
kind of epistemic processes that can exist only under democratic conditions.634 
Misak, however, is not unique in ascribing objectivity to a social 
process. There has been a long debate in the philosophy of science, partially 
inspired by Peirce, about the social creation of knowledge. In regards to the 
objective nature of social inquiry, Helen Longino, argues that “the objectivity of 
science is secured by the social character of inquiry.”635 
She argues that the data and observations that are attained through 
empirical data are only part of the story of scientific inquiry, and that the 
objectivity of this empirical data must be qualified. While the measurements 
and results are reliable there are still background assumptions as to what 
types of data can defend a particular hypothesis. 
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Because the relation between hypotheses and evidence is mediated by background 
assumptions that themselves may not be subject to empirical confirmation or 
disconfirmation, and that may be infused with metaphysical or normative considerations, it 
would be a mistake to identify the objectivity of scientific methods with their empirical 
features alone.636 
It is, therefore, the community of scientists that produce knowledge, 
and it is not single individuals or particular research labs: “What is called 
scientific knowledge, then, is produced by a community (ultimately the 
community of all scientific practitioners) and transcends the contributions of 
any individual or even of any subcommunity within the larger community.”637 
She argues that current model of peer review makes the social 
character of objectivity apparent. “The social character of scientific knowledge 
is made especially apparent by the organization of late twentieth-century 
science, in which the production of knowledge is crucially determined by the 
gatekeepering of peer review.”638 
And she summarizes that “scientific knowledge is, therefore, social 
knowledge. It is produced by processes that are intrinsically social, and once 
a theory, hypothesis, or set of data has been accepted by a community, it 
becomes a public resource.”639 
Longino and Misak argue along similar lines in regards to objectivity. 
For them, objectivity is not achieved through the sole efforts of the individual, 
it is instead a social process. There is not enough space to explore this 
further, but they both have caveats in terms of what this social process should 
look like, and do take into consideration the use and abuse of power as put 
forward by Bourdieu and Foucault.640 For both authors as well, the individual 
still has the ability to think up new ideas and put forward new hypothesis. 
They are not abounding the individual in total. Instead, they argue that 
objectivity is only attainable through communal efforts. What I would like to 
explore in the next section, is to what extent do we extend this understanding 
of community. 
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What is important for both authors, is that they try to argue for 
objectivity but at the same time not to loose sight of reasonable pluralism. 
Misak aruges that her pragmatic approach “does not try to idealise inquiry by 
requiring it to aim at getting the one answer for all. Moral judgement can be 
seen as being truth-apt without denying that disagreement might well persist 
and without denying the fact of pluralism or watering down what is good about 
pluralism.”641 
Autonomy and the Empirical Evidence for 
Epistemic Gain 
Misak and Longino both consider the community and public 
deliberation to be an important part of objectivity and the creation of 
knowledge. Longino talks about this knowledge as being a “public 
resource.”642 Longino does, however, seem to restrict this understanding of 
community to “ultimately the community of all scientific practitioners…”643 This 
seems to suggest that it is a community of experts. 
Misak on the other hands extends her concept of community to the 
greater public. She does this in two counts. The first is expanding the general 
understanding of community such that it is not limited to a communtarian 
understanding. Second, she tries to reduce the role of experts, in this case 
moral philosophers. She does this by arguing that there should be no formal 
systems within moral philosophy and that moral philosophers should have a 
more diminished role than they currently do. 
In terms of community, Misak tries to move beyond communitarian 
constraints. She argues that although communities do have a paradigm of 
moral understanding they are not alone in their experiences and 
understanding of the world. She uses the Southern African Xhosa as an 
example, such “that the Xhosa and all of those who are affected by Xhosa 
decisions do not have a monopoly on experiences relevant to Xhosa 
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morality.”644 It is possible that other communities that been dispossessed of 
their land will be able to relate the experiences of the Xhosa. 
She also argues that it is simply not possible to demarcate the limits of 
a community. “The pragmatist will also pull away from communitarianism by 
noting that it is extremely difficult, if not downright impossible, to define or 
individuate a culture, community, way of life, or a conception of the good.”645 
This problem of demarcation requires us to include all those that we can in 
our deliberation. 
Ultimately, she argues that she is “sympathetic to the idea that we all 
share a tremendous amount, that there is only one community of inquirers, 
that we must think of inquiry as embracing all peoples and cultures.”646 Her 
understanding of 
Moreover, Misak diminishes the roles that experts play in deliberation 
about moral issues. In general the philosopher “will have to be quieter than 
she sometimes has been.”647 This is for two main reasons. First, she denies 
that there is a need for any systematic theory in order to decipher moral 
issues: 
My suggestion has been that the philosopher or theorist should not take any system or 
any one set of rules to be such as to give us a procedure for making correct moral and 
political judgements – things are more complicated than that. The pragmatist thus builds 
the full complexity or the full richness of our moral lives into the position at the outset. The 
reply to Korsgaard is that a systematic theory makes sense of morality only at the expense 
of losing its grip on how morality is.648 
Secondly, she values the capabilities of ordinary citizens and their 
capabilities in deliberating in moral issues: 
This does not mean only, or even mainly, philosophers, ‘experts’ who sit on ethics boards 
in hospitals, and those novelists and essayists who engage particular issues. As feminists 
have stressed, we must not underestimate the value of listening to ordinary people’s own 
stories – their accounts of how injustice, for instance, has played a part in their lives.649 
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Ultimately, Misak claims that the process of understanding morality is 
dependent upon the equal deliberation of all participants. This includes those 
formally trained in some field of moral deliberation – such as philosophers, 
social workers, or religious figures – as well as ordinary citizens. None of 
these expert groups can say which moral judgements are correct but 
So discovering the texture and the ins and outs of a moral claim is not the sole province of 
the moral epistemologist. It is something for all those who take an interest – the novelist, 
the cultural commentator, the rabbi, the priest, and the ordinary person caught up in moral 
tangles. Philosophy, I have argued, must be reluctant to pronounce in any detail on how 
that deliberation should be conducted. It cannot, apart from giving us some rough 
guidelines, tell us which moral judgements are correct. But it can tell us how to make 
sense of moral judgements. It can tell us how to think of moral belief and assertion 
because it can tell us how to think of belief and assertion.650 
It is clear that Misak broadens the scope of the community of inquirers 
much further than Longino does. Misak includes everybody across all walks of 
life with each having an equal say in the matter. An understandable 
conclusion for someone putting forward an argument for democracy. There 
are clearly many criticisms of this approach. Yet one criticism which I will 
focus on is the capability of non-experts to weigh in on difficult questions. 
I assume that the reason Longino limited her understanding of 
community solely to the community of scientists is that she believes it takes a 
certain degree of expertise in order to be able to pass judgement on scientific 
matters. Non-experts would simply not have that degree expertise. No journal 
sends an article to be peer reviewed by the average person. In this line of 
thought a question can be posed to Misak’s approach. Do average citizens 
have the epistemic capabilities to be able to contribute the process of moral 
inquiry? In the next section, I will present a few opinions that vote for a clear 
no. 
People are Primitive and Infantile 
Although many liberals build their political philosophy on an 
ambivalence towards the notion of truth, others saw the non-expert as being 
epistemologically incompetent to partake any notions of truth or even 
                                                        
650Ibid., 126.  
governance, a line of argument that can be traced back to Plato. Although it 
isn’t necessary to go so far back, for many contemporary Western 
intellectuals also hold similar views. 
One of the main figures in this elitist construction of democracy is 
Joesph Schumpeter. Schumpeter was one of the most influential economists 
of the 20th century, and his book Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy is 
considered as “one of the classics in twentieth century social science.”651 
Schumpeter had extremely pessimistic view of the epistemic capabilities of 
the average citizen. In the matter of politics they are simply infantile and 
primitive: 
Thus the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he 
enters the political field. He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily 
recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a primitive 
again.652 
Due to his pessimistic views of the average citizen, Schumpeter put 
forward an elitist model of democracy that constrained the participation of the 
citizen to the simple act of electing representatives. Voters must “respect the 
division of labor between themselves and the politicians they elect”653 and that 
“once they have elected an individual, political action is his business and not 
theirs.”654 
Schumpeter is not alone in his analysis. More contemporary scholars 
also echo this position. Richard Posner, one of the most cited legal scholars 
of the 20th century,655 argues for a conception of democracy that “models the 
democratic process as a competitive power struggle among members of a 
political elite (not to be confused with a moral or intellectual elite) for the 
electoral support of the masses.”656 
                                                        
651Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Routledge, 
1994) ix.  
652Ibid., 262.  
653Ibid., 295.  
654Ibid., 295.  
655Fred R. Shapiro, “The Most-Cited Legal Scholars,” The Journal of Legal Studies 29, 
no. S1 (January 1, 2000): 409–26, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/468080.  
656Richard Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2003), 130.  
Posner argues for an elitist conception of democracy because he is 
highly critical of the epistemic capabilities of the average citizen. He his critical 
of deliberative conceptions of democracy and takes John Dewey to task for 
his stances towards the epistemic qualities of the average citizen. John 
Dewey (d. 1952) was a pragmatic philosopher that argued for broadening the 
deliberative participation of democracy.657 In response to Dewey’s pragmatic 
position towards deliberative democracy, Posner writes: 
The problem with the suggested linkage between epistemic and political democracy …is 
that deliberative democracy, at least as conceived of by Dewey, is as purely aspirational 
and unrealistic as rule by Platonic guardians. With half the population having an IQ below 
100 …with the issues confronting modern government highly complex, with ordinary 
people having as little interest in complex policy issues as they have aptitude for them, 
and with the officials whom the people elect buffeted by interest groups and the pressures 
of competitive elections, it would be unrealistic to expect good ideas and sensible policies 
to emerge from the intellectual disorder that is democratic politics by a process aptly 
termed deliberative.658 
Posner argues that while their is not have advantages that depend on 
deliberation or epistemic gain, it does have the advantage of enabling “public 
opinion to be reliably determined.”659 The feedback that is gained from public 
opinion can be can help inform policy decisions of the political elites. 
There are plethora of other modern intellectuals that argue that the 
average citizen does not have the intellectual capacity to make the informed 
decisions that are necessary to run a well functioning society.660 There is 
unfortunately, a wealth of empirical data that seems to support their 
arguments. Delli and Keeter have written one of the most thorough studies on 
the surveys conducted on the general political knowledge. This includes 
surveys that have been conducted spanning from 1940 to 1994. They show 
that indeed some facts in regards to political institutions and processes were 
successfully answered by the majority of those surveyed. Although they 
considered these results as encouraging, over half of the questions asked 
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were not successfully answered by the majority.661 These included questions 
that were deemed to be “critical to understanding politics in the United 
States.”662 This included general information such that less than half of the 
people questioned could define liberal and conservative, NATO, bipartisan 
foreign policy, or primary elections.663. When it turned to matters that seemed 
In terms of knowledge of economics, of the roughly 80 questions that were 
asked “less than 5 percent of the questions were correctly answered by at 
least three-quarters of the public.”664 Questions in regards to foreign countries 
did not fair much better. The majority of Americans could not correctly answer 
if Japan was a democratic country. Moreover, some would project optimistic 
results to the political system such that 29 percent of Americans believed the 
Constitution guarantees a job, 42 percent that it guarantees health care, and 
75 percent believed that it guarantees a high school education. Although the 
cross national data does show that “Americans are less informed than citizens 
of other nations.”665 the comparative survey data does not show citizens of 
other countries as being well informed. 
This empirical data seems to support those who deny that democracy 
has any epistemic proprieties. If the majority of citizens cannot answer basic 
questions about politics, and if they fail to show any general political 
knowledge, how can they possibly provide any epistemic gain? 
Empirical Evidence in Support 
Other epistemic democrats have argued instead that there is empirical 
evidence that democracy has an epistemic gain. In Democratic Reason 
Hèléne Landemore puts forward a defence for democracy on this ground. In 
regards to the surveys presented above about the general ignorance of the 
public about political matters, Landemore believes that 
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Landemore bases her argument on a model of cognitive diversity 
presented by Scott Page.666 Page argues that groups that have diverse 
cognitive view points will perform better than those that have purely better 
cognitive abilities. He calls this the “diversity trumps ability” theory. 
Landemore builds on this model by arguing that democracy “ensures greater 
cognitive diversity.”667 
Page’s theory is mostly a theoretical model, but he does provide 
empirical evidence in support of his theory. I will not be analyzing his 
theoretical model given the intricacies involved, but will instead focus on the 
empirical evidence provided. Page does, however, approach the empirical 
research with two caveats. First, when we are looking for a performance gain 
we shouldn’t be looking for anything large, such as 20% or higher. That’s 
because even apparently modest gains of 2–3% compound over time to give 
great gains. And really a gain of 2–3% is highly valued by many businesses. 
The second caveat is that working in a cognitive diverse team is like riding a 
bicycle. It will not reach your destination faster unless you learn how to ride a 
bicycle. Similarly, cognitive diverse teams will not produce any gains unless 
the team learns how to work together. He even provides a small theorem for 
this: 
Net Benefits of Diversity = Gross Benefits of Diverse Tools − Costs of Diversity 
I’m doubtful about the usefulness of this theorem given that it only 
redefines the word ‘net.’ Moreover, Page’s restriction that we have to have the 
training and experience in working in cognitive diverse teams puts a limitation 
on the impact that the empirical evidence can provide us. The reason being 
that any type of group work given the proper training and experience can 
learn how to receive optimal results given sub-optimal conditions. Moreover, 
even the conclusions that he reaches are highly qualified: 
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Identity diverse groups perform better when the task is primarily problem solving, when 
their identities translate into relevant tools, when they have little or no preference diversity, 
and when their members get along with one another.668 
Arguably, the last two conditions could be attached to variety of team 
compositions and they would also provide above average results. It is 
therefore difficult to find studies that take into consideration all of the caveats 
and qualifications that Page has put forward. A meta-analysis of diversity and 
team performance concluded that diversity only had a “small positive 
relationship with general team performance”669 while others argue that “the 
hypotheses concerning the effects of cognitive diversity on firm performance 
received mixed support.”670 The evidence that Page presents is simply not 
concrete enough to justify Page’s claim and it is even less capable of 
supporting Landemore’s stronger claim. 
Yet even if we were to agree that Page’s empirical evidence does 
provide empirical evidence for his theory, it still would not provide enough 
evidence for Landemore’s argument. Landemore is arguing that by including 
even non-experts in deliberation we would have an epistemic gain, where as 
Page’s results only deal with teams of experts. Landemore is arguing that the 
inclusion of non-experts will have an epistemic gain even in areas that require 
expertise. It is one thing to show a group of expert political scientists, 
sociologists, and philosophers will have an overall epistemic gain due to their 
cognitive diversity, and something else in total that the same can be said 
about the inclusion of an average citizen that has not have the same technical 
expertise. Those that deny that democracy has any epistemic value refer to 
types of surveys we mentioned above about the general ignorance of the 
average citizen. They are not arguing about the cognitive diversity of a group 
of experts. 
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Landemore and Misak do not make a distinction between experts and 
non-experts. This is crucial not only to strengthen their arguments but to 
present a case for the inclusion of non-experts in the process of ijtihād. The 
arguments that both philosophers are trying to make is that the inclusion of 
average citizens in the process of deliberation is an epistemic gain. Yet, it 
seems that both of them fail to demonstrate how the inclusion of non-experts 
has any gain over the mere inclusion of diverse group of experts. 
Unaccredited and Interactional Expertise 
This section will show how non-experts can provide an epistemic gain 
to a process of inquiry even if that inquiry is highly technical. This will be done 
by arguing for two new types of expertise: interactional and unaccredited. This 
section will answer a fundamental question; how can non-experts provide an 
epistemic gain? This is a question that underlies the arguments put forward by 
Misak and Landemore. They both argue for the inclusion of average citizens 
in political deliberation and argue against epistocracy. Epistocracy being the 
political rule of experts. This inclusion of the average citizen, and denial of 
epistocracy, implies that non-experts provide an epistemic gain. For if all the 
average citizens were considered to be experts then that would by definition 
be an epistocracy. 
Yet, as we stated in the previous section, neither Landemore nor Misak 
put forward clear arguments for the epistemic advantages gained by the 
inclusion of non-experts in deliberation and inquiry. Landemore uses Page’s 
theory of cognitive diversity, but Page only provides examples of groups of 
experts. Misak argues along similar lines and states that having different 
individuals examine a problem from different angles will lead help to discover 
the truth, but is not explicit about how the inclusion of the non-experts adds 
anything more to the deliberation than a group of experts would. She does, 
however, quickly touch on the this subject and it will be discussed below. 
Moreover, this question about the possible epistemic advantages 
gained by including non-experts is key to my argument that non-experts 
should play, and sometimes currently do play, a pivotal role in the process of 
ijtihād. Currently, ijtihād is seen as being an activity that is sole responsibility 
of the expert, the mujtihad. The formulation of rulings is dependent upon a 
complicated inquiry that is outside the abilities of the non-expert. However, if 
non-experts do possesses a type of knowledge that is simultaneously useful 
to the inquiry and only available to the non-expert then including then they 
must be included in the inquiry in order to meet the conditions required by the 
inquiry. 
History of Expertise 
What I am proposing here, about the inclusion of non-experts in 
technical inquiries, have been previously put forward in the philosophy of 
science and political science. I will first present the theories and arguments 
presented in these two fields, and then discuss how I build upon them. 
The first study I will be referencing is in the philosophy of science. 
There are current debates in the philosophy of science about the role of non-
experts is technical scientific inquiry. Philip Kitcher argues that non-experts 
can help define which topics are worthy of inquiry and argues for a more 
democratic understanding of science. He argues that because scientists are 
interested in discovering not just truths, but rather “significant truths.”671 The 
way we understand a truth to be significant, however, is through democratic 
deliberation. 
There have been, however, movements within the philosophy science 
that call for the greater inclusion of non-experts within scientific inquiry. Harry 
Collins and Robert Evans call for such an inclusion. They state that within the 
philosophy of science there are two general problems; legitimacy and 
extension. The first is the problem of legitimacy. The problem of legitimacy is 
“about how we can continue to introduce new technologies in the face of the 
widespread and growing distrust of certain areas of science and 
technology.”672 Here Collins and Evans argue for the inclusion of non-experts 
in scientific inquiry such that they can better understand science and to be 
able to internalize the research findings. The authors argue that “public have 
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the political right to contribute, and without their contribution technological 
developments will be distrusted and perhaps resisted.”673 
Given that the issue of internalization and legitimation was discussed in 
previous chapters on SDT,674 I will not discuss it again here. Although it is 
interesting to note that this problem of legitimation is not unique to Islamic or 
traditional authority, but rather it affects all types of authority. This gives more 
weight to Talal Asad’s argument675 that discourse is a natural part of the 
formation of tradition, and discursive practices should not be interpreted as a 
lack of authority. 
The second problem that they consider is the problem of extension. 
This problem deals with the extent that scientist would incorporate non-
experts. Or as the authors argue “how do we know how, when, and why, to 
limit participation in technological decision-making so that the boundary 
between the knowledge of the expert and that of the layperson does not 
disappear?”676 The author’s argue that “only those who ‘know what they are 
talking about’ should contribute to the technical part of technical debates.”677 
Collins and Evans then set out to broaden the scope of who we would 
traditionally understand as experts, or people who “know what they are talking 
about.” There are two types of expertise that they describe which are relevant 
to the discussion at hand. This is interactional expertise and local expertise. 
Two New Types of Expertise 
Collins and Evans divide expertise into three main parts. No expertise, 
contributory expertise, and interactional expertise. They spend the most 
amount of time on interactional expertise, which is a new concept that they 
are trying to develop. The first two types of expertise are quite clear, and 
standard. If one does not have any expertise, then one does not count as an 
expert. Contributory expertise is when a practitioner has gained enough level 
of proficiency that the can start contributing to the field, or, as they define it, it 
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is “what you need to do an activity with competence.”678 By contribution, it 
means that increase knowledge base in that field. 
Interactional Expertise 
Interactional expertise is rather different. Interactional expertise is when 
one understands the field, but is not a practitioner. It “is the ability to master 
the language of a specialist domain in the absence of practical 
competence.”679 This would include for example managers in software 
development companies. They know enough about software development 
and the project at hand, that they can make value decisions on which course 
of action to take. Yet, they cannot sit down and actually develop the software. 
The same is true for peer review journals. One scholar may be an expert in 
her field, but have interactional expertise in another field. This means that 
even though she cannot contribute to the particular sub-field that she is 
reviewing, she can make value judgements in the peer review process. 
In addition, the authors have conducted several experiments to show 
that interactional experts can have high level of expertise. This consisted of 
two types of experiments. One regarded color blind individuals, and the other 
was about gravitational wave physics. The experiment with color blind 
individuals showed that while color blind individuals could not see particular 
colors, meaning that they were not active practitioners, they did have enough 
interactional expertise where they could actually discern between different 
types of colors. Their expertise was at a level that judges could not discern 
which participant was color blind and which wasn’t. The same was true for the 
physics test. 
Experts Without Formal Qualifications 
In addition to the concepts of expertise, Collins and Evans develop 
meta-expertise. Meta-expertise are “are expertises used to judge other 
expertises.”680 It is under this topic that they discuss varying methods that are 
used to distinguish an expert. One method discussed is the use of credentials. 
Collins and Evans argue that credentials are “not a good criterion for setting a 
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boundary around expertise.”681 The reason being that not all topics will 
actually have an institutional form of expertise, but more importantly one can 
have an expertise without having credentials. This is done through 
experience. 
The authors argue that experience is one of the best criterion for 
deciding who is an expert.682 Although this seems straight forward, the 
authors broaden the scope of what they consider to be relevant experience. 
They give reference to two specific examples. The first are sheep herders 
during the Chernobyl accident, and AIDS activists in Africa. 
The authors reference Brian Wynne’s influential work about sheep 
herders during the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown. Wynne examined Cumberian 
sheep farmers who had restrictions placed on the sale of their stock by 
scientists from the UK Ministry of Agriculture Food and Fisheries (MAFF) due 
to radioactive fallout.683 The Ministry of Agriculture initially stated that there 
would be no effects from the Chernobly fault. Six weeks later they announced 
a complete ban on the sale of sheep of in several areas stating that this ban 
would only last three weeks. After the three week period, however, a smaller 
area was banned indefinitely. This was a dire situation for the farmers whose 
livelihood depended upon their stock. The scientists advised the farmers to 
wait and that the drop in contamination levels where taking longer than 
estimated. Yet again, farmers found the advice of scientists to be overly 
optimistic, and soon felt that the scientists where in a conspiracy against the 
farmers.684 
It was later discovered that the scientists had based their estimations 
on an incorrect model. That model was based upon empirical studies that had 
been conducted on an entirely different type of soil than the Cumberian 
region. Moreover, what had compounded the miscalculations of the scientist 
was that they completely ignored the expertise of the sheep farmers. Wynne 
gives several examples of how this occurred. 
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A graphic example of the scientists’ denial of the specialist knowledge of the farmers was 
the scientists’ decision to perform experiments on the value of the mineral bentonite to 
chemically adsorb caesium in the soil and vegetation. thus helping reduce recontamination 
of grazing sheep. The bentonite was spread at different concentrations on the ground in 
different plots; the sheep from each plot were then tested at intervals, and compared with 
controls on zero-bentonite land. However in order to do this the sheep were fenced in on 
contained fell-side plots. The farmers pointed out that the sheep were used to roaming 
over open tracts of fell land, without even fences between farms, and that if they were 
fenced in they would waste (lose condition), thus ruining the experiment. Their criticisms 
were ignored, but were vindicated later when the experiments were quietly abandoned for 
the reasons that the farmers had identified. The farmers had expressed valid and useful 
specialist knowledge for the conduct and development of science, but this was ignored. 
Similar experiences occurred over other aspects of hill-farming and the scientific 
knowledge relating to the management of the crisis.685 
Wynne referred to this type of expertise as “lay expertise.” Collins and 
Evans state that this terminology might cause confusion because “the term 
has often been interpreted as meaning that laypeople possess specialist 
expertise.”686 They prefer instead the term “experts without formal 
qualifications.”687 As will be discussed below, this is a helpful way at looking at 
how general individuals can be a part of ijtiḥād. 
The second example presented by Collins and Evans are AIDS 
treatment activists and research that was to begin to take place in Africa in the 
late 1980s. Their analysis is based on the research conducted by Steven 
Epstein which was subsequently published in his book “Impure Science: 
AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge.” It is an analysis of how 
ordinary activists were able to improve the outcome of scientific inquiry. 
In 1985, double-blind trails were about to begin for drug that looked 
promising in the fight against aids, AZT. There were many vocal critics of this 
type of trial by activists who were concerned about the “sacrificial lambs” and 
“death by placebo.”688 The began to campaign for different types of trials, 
ones that would hopefully give results before more people died. Thus, a small 
group of physicians and patients began to form groups in order to form new 
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forms of knowledge making. A few researchers began to strike back against 
these activists and physicians, arguing that they did not have the expertise 
necessary to carry out such research. Robert Gallo the co-discoverer of AIDS, 
said against one of the activist groups ACT UP “I don’t care if you call it ACT 
UP, ACT OUT or ACT DOWN, you definitely don’t have a scientific 
understanding of things”689 
Eventually, however, the activists came to acquire a level of 
interactional expertise that even expert critics began to praise them. The 
same Robert Gallo now commented on one of the activists saying that he was 
“one of the most impressive persons I’ve ever met in my life, bar none, in any 
field…I’m not the only one around here who’s said we could use him in the 
labs.” 
Collins and Evans therefore argue that “Any criterion of expertise has 
to allow groups such as the Cumbrian sheep farmers or the AIDS activists to 
be included in the category of expert, and that is why the criterion of formal 
qualification or accreditation is too exclusive. We suggest that a more 
important criterion than qualifications is experience.”690 More importantly, their 
experience with AIDS patients and their understanding of how AIDS patients 
respond to these clinical trials actually led to improvements in the protocols 
and standards of these trials. The activists knew that the research subjects 
would import untested drugs from Mexico and that they would share the 
placebos and trial drugs amongst themselves. This knowledge was crucial in 
being able to implement effective clinical trials. 
Planning Without Local Expertise 
There have been other attempts to categorize this type of unaccredited 
expertise. The second example is from political science. James Scott 
chronicles how large state programs failed due to the fact that they ignored 
this type of unaccredited expertise. Scott labels this as “local knowledge.” He 
examines the disastrous attempts of state-initiated social engineering, such as 
those undertaken by Soviet Russia. Although there are various reasons for 
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the failure of these attempts, Scott labels four, he attributes a large part of 
their failure to the fact that states ignored local knowledge: 
Designed or planned social order is necessarily schematic; it always ignores essential 
features of any real, functioning social order. This truth is best illustrated in a work-to-rule 
strike, which turns on the fact that any production process depends on a host of informal 
practices and improvisations that could never be codified. By merely following the rules 
meticulously, the workforce can virtually halt production. In the same fashion, the 
simplified rules animating plans for, say, a city, a village, or a collective farm were 
inadequate as a set of instructions for creating a functioning social order. The formal 
scheme was parasitic on informal processes that, alone, it could not create or maintain. To 
the degree that the formal scheme made no allowance for these processes or actually 
suppressed them, it failed both its intended beneficiaries and ultimately its designers as 
well.691 
He then develops the concept of mētis. He borrows the Greek term 
through Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernants study of term. They 
describe mētis to be “a particular type of intelligence, an informed 
prudence”692 Later on they add that “the intelligent ability referred to as mētis 
comes into play on widely varying levels but in all of them the emphasis is 
always laid on practical effectiveness, on the pursuit of success in particular 
sphere of activity: it may involve multiple skills useful in life, the mastery of the 
artisan in his craft…resourcefulness of every kind”693 Scott defines mētis as 
“Broadly understood, metis represents a wide array of practical skills and 
acquired intelligence in responding to a constantly changing natural and 
human environment.”694 
To highlight the meaning of mētis Scott compares the farming styles of 
Native Americans to those presented in The Farmer’s Almanac. When the first 
settlers arrived in the Americas the did not know how to grow the type of 
plants available in the New World. They turned to the Native Americas for 
their local expertise. They were told to plant corn when the oak leaves where 
the size of a squirrel’s ear. Within this folk knowledge, was a hidden 
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understanding of the signs of the changing of seasons. In comparison, The 
Farmer’s Almanac will state a more specific time, such as the first full moon of 
May, or even more specific such as suggesting date like 20th of May. This 
would then require adjustments based on latitude and longitude. A date for 
the north would be ill suited for the south. Scott argues that despite the Native 
American’s maxim being about local events, it can still be applied to various 
areas that have oak and squirrels. 
Scott is not arguing for the removal of technical knowledge, but arguing 
that their is a type of knowledge and expertise beyond the technical 
knowledge that is so valued within modern societies. Many people that would 
be considered non-experts have a type of mētis or local knowledge that is 
vital part of understanding reality. 
It is difficult, however, to differentiate between Scott’s use of mētis and 
Heiddegger’s use of phronesis. Although Scott does clarify the use of the term 
mētis with other Greek terms such as episteme and techne, he does not 
compare it with phronesis. Lisa Ann Raphals, however, argues that there is a 
slight difference between the two words: 
metic intelligence operates with a peculiar twist, the unexpected premise that both reality 
and language cannot be understood (or manipulated) in straightforward “rational” terms 
but must be approached by subtlety, indirection, and even cunning. By Contrast, 
phronesis is practical but not inherently oblique, devious, or indirect…it is tempting, but 
misleading, to reduce metic intelligence to “know-how knowledge” 
It is not clear in Scott’s writing if his use of the term mētis was meant to 
be as something distinct from phronesis or if he used it more generally such 
that it would over lap. The substitution of words such as “practical knowledge” 
alludes to this overlap, given that phronesis is generally translated similarity. 
With the semantic differences aside, Scott, Heidegger, Collins and 
Evans would would all agree that experience leads to expertise. To use 
Heidegger’s terms, being in the world develops a type of practical knowledge 
that makes one an expert in a field without the need of formal certifications. 
This practical knowledge contains elements that cannot be be gained without 
experience. No amount of theoretical knowledge and research could have 
revealed the intricacies that are available to practical knowledge. 
This has a tremendous impact for ijtihād and the relationship between 
the muqallid and the mujtahid. Such that muqallid is an expert in their own 
field. Some are formal experts with credentials, such as doctors and 
scientists. Others are informal experts. In the next section, I will argue that 
within Shi’i fiqh, there already are concepts of incorporating the knowledge of 
other experts within the ijtihād. These concepts are broadly discussed under 
the title ḥujjīyah al-qawl ahl al-khibrah (the probative force of the opinions of 
experts). 
What becomes important then is broadening this understanding of 
expertise, to include not only those who have traditionally been considered as 
experts with formal qualifications, but also those who have informal expertise. 
Two Types of Experience and Ijtihād 
The argument defended in this chapter is that understanding truth as 
an end of inquiry requires broadening the community of inquirers. It explored 
how this line of argument has been made by philosophical pragmatists and 
epistemic democrats. It showed how the understanding of ijtiḥād as the 
thorough exertion of the jurist’s mental faculty in finding a solution for a case 
of law,695 is quite similar to Misak’s reformulation of Peirce’s understanding of 
truth: “a true belief is one that would withstand doubt, were we to inquire as 
far as we fruitfully could on the matter.”696 The next chapter will try to expand 
our understanding of expertise, and argues that this process of inquiry should 
include laypersions. It will argue for two new types of expertise: interactional 
and unaccredited expertise. 
These two types of experience broaden the scope of who can 
participate in discussions of Islamic law. It makes room for experts in other 
fields such as sociologists and journalists. It doesn’t mean that they too have 
to become a mujtahid, but that they can gain a level of interactional expertise 
were the can make value judgments. This might, however, get a lot of push 
back from experts in the field who wish to make the field autonomous. 
However, this is a type of expertise required for the running of the Islamic 
Republic in its current form. Members of Parliament, and the President, are 
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not required to be mujtahids, but an interactional expertise of Islamic law is 
required of them for them to be able to maneuver in the current social political 
climate.697 
Unaccredited expertise is of significance for ijtihād as well. We have 
seen similar cases. The following chapter will go into the ramifications of 
unaccredited expertise in the process of ijtihād. One in example that will be 
explored in particular is the advent of labor in the early period of the Islamic 
Revloution of Iran. A few members of parliament had made a draft labor law 
that was overseen by many of the marāja‘ at the time. This draft was seen as 
complying completely with traditional Islamic law. When the draft came to be 
implemented, it was highly contested by labor unions, specifically because the 
understood that it would give too many rights to the corporations. It was due 
to the high level of unaccredited expertise that the workers had which enabled 
them to see how oppressive the law would be. This was the turning point that 
Ayatollah Khomeini decided to push forward with his notion of Wilayat al-
Fagih. He overturned the previous labor law, and put forward a new draft that 
was more in line with the demands of the workers. 
Unaccredited expertise shows the importance for having a public 
dialogue when it comes to Islamic law. The process of inquiry is only complete 
if we include the expertise that people gain from their day to day life 
experiences. The following chapter will show there is already room for 
inclusion for this type of expertise. It will explore the role that classical 
jurisprudence has given to the ahl al-khibrah, the people of expertise and try 
to include unaccredited expertise within this group. 
Autonomy, Unaccredited Expertise and Ijtihād 
This chapter will tie in the relationship between autonomy and ijtihād. It 
will pull together the findings of the previous chapter to discuss its impact on 
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the process of ijtihād. In the previous chapters I argued for several premises. I 
argued that Shi’i jurisprudence is based on the idea that an apparent ruling, 
al-ḥukm al-ẓahirī, is a ruling that is reached after an end of inquiry. I will argue 
that since autonomous agents have expertise in many issues that relate to 
them, their deliberation is vital in developing the al-ḥukm al-ẓāhirī. Inquiry can 
only end if the experts on that subject have deliberated on the issue. 
Autonomous agents have unaccredited expertise on many subjects. 
Autonomous agents must therefore be a part of the deliberations on the 
subjects of which they are experts. 
In the first chapter in this section, it was established that the al-ḥukm 
al-wāqi’ī was different from the al-ḥukm al-ẓāhirī. While the al-ḥukm al-wāqi’ī 
was the real ruling that God intended as written in the lawḥ al-maḥfuẓ, it is not 
a ruling that a mujtahid can reach. Instead, a mujtahid only reaches the al-
ḥukm al-ẓahirī after state of inquiry. Then it was established that inquiry is not 
a solo affair. Inquiry ends after it has gone through a social process of 
deliberation among the community of experts. The understanding of experts 
was broadened to include interactional expertise as well as unaccredited 
expertise. In this chapter, it will be shown how interactional and unaccredited 
expertise are crucial in the process of ijtihād, and moreover in certain cases 
they are already fulfilling crucial roles. First, I will discuss how these two types 
of expertise can theoretically fit within the ’uṣūlī framework, and second I will 
show a few case studies of these two types of expertise in action. 
In this chapter I will make the case for the greater inclusion of 
interactional and unaccredited expertise. My argument will begin from the 
starting point that there is already a space for credited expertise within the 
process of ijtihād. The role of experts is debated under the rubric of ḥujjīyah 
ahl al-khibrah (probative force of experts). Given that it is generally accepted 
that the opinion of experts have probative force, there should not be any 
difference between credited and unaccredited expertise. The process of 
ijtihād will reach a better al-ḥukm al-ẓāhirī if it includes these unaccredited 
expertise. I will then give two examples of how this type of unaccredited 
expertise has been used, and how it has affected Shi’i fiqh. 
It should also be noted that I am not trying to describe the process of 
ijtihādin its current form. I trying to argue for the greater involvement of the 
muqalid in ijtihād, because they have knowledge or expertise that can provide 
an epistemic gain. 
The Current Role of Expertise in Uṣūl al-Fiqh 
The word experts and expertise in our modern context seems to 
conitate the role experts play in understanding the moral dillemas presented 
by modern technology. The genre of medical ethics tangibly represents this 
problem, as it was slightly touched upon earlier.698 Yet, the issue of expertise, 
as it is found in the traditional literature, is debated mostly in regards to a 
rather more mundane discussion, the opinions of the lexicographers.699 The 
reason for this is not because lexicographers are of rather great importance, 
but because the concept of relying on expertise was rather settled, and there 
was not much to debate. Whether or not lexicographers should be considered 
as experts, however, was hotly contested, as we shall see.  
The reason the debate on expertise was settled is because the concept 
of expertise is the foundation for the concept of taqlīd.700 As it will be shown 
below, certain scholars believe that the relying upon the judgments of experts 
is rational and it is this rational reasoning that in turn provides support for the 
concept of taqlīd. A debate about the role of experts will tend to return to the 
subject of taqlīd.  Thus, it is the debate about the expertise of lexicographers 
and mujtahids that grounds the current practice of relying on medical 
experts.701 
The Probative Force of Ahl al-Khibrah 
One of the places where the discussion on ahl al-khibrah can be found 
are on the debates in regards to the probative force of the ahl al-lugha, the 
lexicographers. Qur’an and ḥadīth are part of the core sources for ijtihād and 
any attempt to understand these sources requires a good grasp of the 
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language, and it is common for scholars to refer to dictionaries and lexicons. 
Thus, very early on, the reliability of the lexicographers came into question. 
There is a debate amongst scholars in regards to the opinions of 
lexicographers. There have been multiple reasons given as to why the opinion 
of lexicographers has probative force. Some scholars have argued that there 
is a consensus, ijma, amongst earlier scholars that is itself a justification of 
why the opinions of lexicographers has probative force. However, the concept 
of consensus itself has been critiqued and it is argued that it does not have 
probative force.702 
Akhūnd al-Khurāsānī, in his authoritative book on ’uṣūl, Kifāyah al-
Uṣūl, debates the probative force of lexicographers immediately after he 
argues for the probative force of the apparent meaning of the text, hujjīyah al-
ẓuhūr. After one has stated that the text has probative force there must be a 
means by which to understand the text. Khurāsānī describes roughly five 
different arguments for the probative force of the opinions of lexicographers 
and ultimately concludes that their opinions do not have probative force. 
Nonetheless one of the arguments that he examines is the argument that 
lexicographers are experts, and experts have probative force. Khurāsānī 
accepts the first premise but not the second. Experts do have probative force 
but lexicographers are not experts in language for the means of ijthād. He 
considers lexicographers as experts in recording the usages of the term, but 
they are not experts in defining the literal (ḥaqīqī) and metaphoric(majāzī) 
meanings.703 Thus while Khurāsānī is critical about the opinions of 
lexicographers, he accepts the probative force of experts as being 
fundamental. 
Ayatollah Kho’i in his Misbāḥ al-Uṣūl takes a position similar to 
Khurāsānī. Kho’i also presents various arguments for the probative force of 
lexicographers, and similarly ends up rejecting them all.704 One of the 
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arguments he does analyse is the argument that lexicographers are experts. 
In line with Khurāsānī he denies that they are experts in defining the literal 
meaning ḥaqīqī from the metaphoric (majāzī. Nonetheless, he does not deny 
the fact that experts do have probative. 
Ayatollah Mohammad Taqī Shahidipoor, a well known student of the 
late traditionalist marja‘ in Qum Ayatolloh Javad Tabrizi (d. 2006) whose 
classes in fiqh and uṣūl are gaining popularity,705 in his analysis gives an 
overview of the opinions held by Khurāsānī, Kho’i, and Muhammad Baqir al-
Sadr. His conclusion is similar to Khoi’s and Khurāsānī’s in that the opinion of 
lexicographers does not have probative force. Yet, he also analyses the 
argument that lexicographers are experts. He as well finds no fault with the 
premise that experts have probative force. 
It should be noted although all of the scholars mentioned above debate 
about the status of lexicographers as experts, but none of them debate about 
the permissibility of relying on the opinion of experts. This shows the extent to 
which Shi’i scholars accept the opinions of experts. The debate about 
expertise is not about the validity of accepting the statements of experts, but 
about who should be considered as an expert. Moreover, as it will be 
discussed below, had Shi’i jurists doubted the role of the expert, it would have 
countered their own arguments for taqlīd. 
Expertise and Taqlīd 
Debates about the probative force of the ahl al-khibrah are also 
connected to debates about taqlīd.  One of the classical texts which is still 
used in the ḥawzah curriculum is the Uṣūl al-Fiqh by Muḥammad Ridha 
Muẓafar. Muẓafar differs from the opinions given above in that he does 
believe that the opinion of lexicographers has probative force. In the section 
titled “The Probative Force of the Lexicographers” (Ḥujīyah Qawl al-Lughawī), 
he examines different reasons given for the probative force of lexicographers. 
The argument that he considers to be the most valid is based on the necessity 
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of referring to experts. He writes that rational reasoning rules that an ignorant 
person should refer to an expert: 
This is because the rationality rules that it is obligatory for an ignorant person to refer to a 
knowledgeable person. Thus, the shāri` must rule a similar ruling. The reason being the 
rational ruling is one of the one of the praiseworthy rulings that has gained consensus 
amongst the opinions of rational people, and the shāri` is one of these rational people. 
Nay, he is their chief. Moreover, it is based upon this rational ruling that we say it is 
obligatory for that we say the layperson should refer to the mujtahid in the issue of 
taqlīd.706 
Ayatollah Kho’i also makes the same argument. In his al-Tangīḥ fī 
Sharḥ al-`Urwah al-Wuthqāh under the section of taqlīd he explores the 
reasons as to why layperson should follow a mujtahid and narrows them down 
to two main reasons, the first of which is that the mujtahid is an expert. He 
argues that all rational people follow experts, it is a sīrah al-uqalā, and this 
sīrah has not been negated by the shāri’. This dependence on experts is so 
common that if the layperson where to be made aware of it, he would quickly 
agree.707 
In an article written specifically on the probative force of experts, Alī 
Akbar Bābāī, a student of Ayatullah Wahid Khorasani,708 echoes Muẓafar’s 
position that the probative force of experts is fundamental to the issue of 
taqlīd. Under a section of his article titled “The Importance of this Debate” he 
writes that this topic is related to the probative force of the faqīh and the 
permissibility of taqlīd. The reason being that the faqīh is an expert that 
derives Islamic law from its principal sources, and this is itself a prime 
example of what it means to be an expert.709 
The reason that these debates will cycle back to taqlīd is because they 
are both based on the same premise; the idea that an ignorant person should 
rely on a knowledgeable person. Put differently, that expertise has an 
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epistemic gain. Given that the layperson does not have the ability to decipher 
the correct rulings, and that it is not possible in all cases to do iḥtīyāt or 
precaution, the layperson must therefore rely upon an expert to understand 
his duties to God. 
Robert Gleave summaries the role of taqlīd within Shi’i thought as 
such: 
Their reasoning, following the traditional lines of argument, is clear: a person who has not 
been trained in the skills necessary to interpret the sources cannot be expected to 
understand those sources with the same level of understanding as a mujtahid. The 
mujtahid may be fallible – he may misunderstand the texts – but he at least has the 
qualification of ijithad, and his decisions flow from the application of justified interpretive 
methods. His decisions are, therefore, more likely to be in line with God’s wishes than 
those of the unqualified individual. If the individual cares about complying with God’s law, 
caution at least dictates that he follow a mujtahid.710 
The justification for taqlid is that the mujtahid has gone through a 
legitimate process of inquiry. While there is a socialisation of knowledge which 
dictates what constitutes good evidence, and what makes a good argument, 
nonetheless a process of inquiry is still required. 
Unaccredited Expertise in Shi’i Fiqh 
Not only is there room for unaccredited expertise in Islamic law, but we 
can already find it’s affect on Islamic law in Iran’s contemporary history. Two 
specific cases will be studied in this section that highlight this issue. These are 
the debate over Labour law and the debate over family law in post-
revolutionary Iran. The debate over labor law has been formative for the 
establishment of the concept of the Guardian jurist. It was this debate that 
was the catalyst for Ayatollah Khomeini to present his idea of the Guardian 
jurist. Both of these cases not only show the involvement of the wider public in 
forming fiqh, but they have been used by academics to highlight the role of 
social movements in forming tradition. It is here that our analysis will begin 
with the works of Asef Bayat and how he considers non-movements as having 
an effect on the formation of truth. 
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One of Asef Bayat’s core endeavours has been in showing how 
societal movements formulate tradition, especially in regards to the question 
of the compatibility of Islam and democracy. He argues against those that 
believe that there is something intrinsic about Islam that makes it antagonistic 
with democracy. He argues that this places too much emphasis on the 
theoretical interpretations on Islam, and that it privileges the text over the lived 
tradition. He insists that we should be focusing on social movements, and how 
social movements define truth. 
This concept, that social movements are instrumental in forming truth 
and tradition, becomes one of Bayat’s core arguments. He argues that the 
conception of truth goes beyond mere rational deliberation and that social 
movements can influence our understanding of truth: 
A central argument of this book is that sacred injunction are matters of struggle, of 
competing readings. They are, in other words, matters of history; humans define their 
truth. The individuals and groups who hold social power can assert and hegemonize their 
truths. Historical narratives in this book demonstrate how societal forces, notably social 
movements, play a decisive role in changing and shaping “truth” of holy scriptures.711 
Thus the mixture of Islam and democracy is dependant more on social 
movements than it is on rational deliberation amongst religious intellectuals. 
He states that “the question of democratic polity is then one of political 
struggle rather than religious scripture, even though religion is often deployed 
to legitimize or to resist political domination”712 
It has been through these social movements, or non-movements as he 
labels them, that the Iran has been able to traverse from an Islamist to Post-
Islamist phase. This Post-Islamist phase is a fusion of Islam and the concept 
of rights. It is religious while still allowing for a pluralism of voices. Through 
several of his works, he chronicles how these changes where able to take 
place through social movements. 
Bayat is not the first to recognise the importance of non-epistemic 
factors in the construction of truth. Foucault put forward his understanding of 
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power, and Bourdieu put forward his understanding of habitus and capital.713 
At times Bayat seems to echo Foucault when writes that “the obstacles to 
democratic governance in Muslim societies have little to do with religion as 
such; they are more closely tied to material and nonmaterial interests of hose 
who hold power.”714 Yet, Bayat excludes an analysis of Foucault and 
Bourdieu, and justifiably so. Analysing how Bayat’s theory fits between 
Bourdieu and Foucault would in of itself require a separate theoretical work. 
Bayat is instead interested in chronicling the social changes that have 
taken place to make room for post-Islamism. There are a few cases studies 
that Bayat examines in order to defend his argument. One of these case 
studies is the question in regards to women’s roles in society. Bayet describes 
some of the forms of nonmovement that women undertook within Iran and 
argues ultimately that “[n]ot only did such practices challenge the prevailing 
assumptions about women’s roles, but they were followed by far-reaching 
structural legal imperatives.”715 These “far-reaching structural legal 
imperatives” are of significance here. Bayat puts forward a good deal of 
evidence to support his claim about how practice influences theory. 
Bayat’s short coming is that he does not engage with intellectual 
thought. On many topics Bayat’s analysis ends with the change of social 
conditions. Yet, if a core argument of his is that social movements create 
truth, it must be demonstrated how these social changes where reflected in 
intellectual thought and became a part of the truth. Many social changes can 
appear out of compromise, such as a modus vivendi, and not have any impact 
on internal conceptions of the truth. Even his analysis of the female 
movement fails to incorporate any changes made to family law, even though 
Ziba Mir-Hosseini has well documented these changes, which will be shown 
below. There is no analysis about the internal dynamics of post-Islamist 
thinkers and how they have reconciled these changes with their core beliefs. 
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More importantly, there is no analysis of the debates that ranged 
amongst lawyers and clergy in regards to some of these legal changes. The 
debates around the changes to Iran’s labour laws have had a fundamental 
effect to the sweeping changes that a single scholar is able to make in 
response to a popular movement. Bayat does not discuss any of these deeper 
changes in thought, nor does he even mention this incident. 
Other academics working in the field, such as Ziba Mir-Hosseini and 
Asghar Schirazi, do comment no these changes and there analyisis well be 
referenced below. Yet, what Bayat was able to argue, the relationship 
between social movement and truth, is a fundamental insight, and it is this 
point that I wish to elaborate below. Documenting the series of changes that 
has occurred to Islamic law as it has been incorporated into the state helps to 
bolster Bayat’s argument. 
State Incorporation of Fiqh 
I consider the incorporation of Islamic law into the state to be along the 
same lines of Bayat’s analysis. It has been at times the incorporation of 
Islamic law into the state that has sparked the various social movements 
which Bayat is analysing. This is primarily because it forces Islamic law to be 
enacted and it also forces Islamic law to be critiqued in response to its 
effectiveness. 
Currently, traditional fiqh is an opt-in basis. Outside of the state, the 
mujtahid has no coercive function. Once an individual decides to be a muqalid 
there is no apparatus to make sure that they are abiding by all the rulings. 
Thus the muqallid can opt-out of the rulings at anytime, although they would 
be considered as sinning.This differs from state law. The state claims the right 
to force individuals to abide by its laws. This coercive force raises the 
importance of state laws in relation to the autonomy of the individual. To 
highlight the difference, one can simply look at the ability of the state to 
enforce contracts. The two cases I will discuss below are both contractual 
obligations. In the case of labor law, the state can interfere on behalf of 
workers to defend their rights. The same can apply for family law and the 
custody of children, or the enforcement of any rules that require monetary 
compensation. 
Moreover, the laws passed by the state are generally expected to be 
effective. That is they are expected to comply with standards of good 
governance because of the impact that these rulings have on the lives of 
citizens. This has two effects. First, the state must rule on certain issues, and 
secondly that ruling would be required to have a positive outcome. Again an 
example will help clarify these two points. Given the advancement of 
technology, there is an issue about how the resources of mines are to be 
allocated.716 Traditional Islamic law does not state that any individual can own 
a mine, and that any amount that is excavated belongs to the person that did 
the excavating. It is clear that if we were to distribute natural resources 
according to this ruling with modern technology it would be detrimental to the 
mines and to the economy. There would need to be some sort of coordination 
among the different corporations as to how to best excavate the mines. A 
traditional scholar would have the luxury to ignore this dilemma if he or she so 
wished. There are no corporations that would demand a ruling from them 
partly because, as stated above, their rulings would not be enforceable. On 
another note, given the impact that the ruling of the state has on mines and 
natural resources, those whose lives are impacted are likely to closely 
examine the general laws and policies put forward by the state. If the rulings 
are in a way detrimental to their well being there is much motivation to push 
for change. This is exactly what we see with the two cases below. In the case 
with Labour Law, given that the Islamic law was now ruling over a form of 
economic activity that was foreign to its development, rulings where modified. 
The great impetus for this change came from the very people who these laws 
where going to impact: the workers themselves. 
This incorporation of the Islamic law into the state has also been an 
impetus for the rethinking of Islamic law. The call for implementing Islamic law 
in the state had a transformative effect on Islamic law. It required a rethinking 
of in both the content and process of jurisprudence. 
                                                        
716 Morteza Motaharri, Islām va Muqtaḍiyyāt Zamān (Tehran: Sadra, 1993). 
 
’Return to sharia’ has not been a return to the classical feqh notion of plural and uncodified 
laws; the judiciary has retained not only many of the legal concepts and laws of the 
Pahlavi era, but also the notion of a centralised and unified legal system.717 
The culmination of changes as lead even many traditionalist scholars 
to call for new approaches to fiqh and ’uṣūl. Thus we see attempts to give 
greater importance to the context, the theory of zamān va makān, or to 
incorporate conceptions of the maqāsid al-sharī`a. 
Traditionalists do in general object to the changes made by the 
Islamists to Islamic law. They critique the fact that these changes do not 
correspond to the methods prescribed within ’uṣūl al-fiqh and that they tend to 
be haphazard.718 
Labour Law 
The reforms that have been undertaken in Iran’s labor laws highlight 
the necessity of unaccredited expertise to its full extent. In fact, this case has 
been used by religious thinkers as a prime example of the need for new 
approaches towards Islamic law.719 The reason being that Modernity and 
industrialization has brought about significant changes to the means of 
production that it justifies rethinking traditional rulings on contracts. 
Labour unions formed one of the core backbones of the Islamic 
revolution.720 These unions believed that the laws implemented by the Shah 
did not fully protect their rights as workers. They joined in the revolution with 
the hopes that their working conditions would improve. After the establishment 
of the Islamic state, an expert team of lawmakers was formed to draft a new 
labor law. The Ministry of Labour, the conservative Ahmad Tavakoli, headed 
this team. Tavakoli tried in earnest to keep the new law in conforming to 
traditional laws of contract and leasing, ujrat. In order to achieve this goal, the 
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team worked closely with prominent scholars and the bill had been checked 
by Supreme Council of the Economy.721 
Given that the law used contracts as model, issues dealing with the 
number of working hours, vacation time, and dismissals where to be settled in 
between the individual employer and employee in those contracts.722 When 
the bill was announced to the public, it was met with violent protests. The 
protests where so severe that Tavakoli had to resign and the bill did not pass 
the Council of Ministers.724 
Plans where then set into place for new drafts of the Labour Law. A 
process which spanned several years.725 Part of the debate that was going on 
at the time was in regards to the extent of state paternalism. How far can the 
state go in controlling people’s social interactions?726 The parliament at the 
time had devised an ingenious way of incorporating the state into traditional 
Islamic law. They argued that since the state gives public services to 
corporations, those corporations would have to agree to the laws passed by 
the state if they wish to continue using those services. Thus parliament 
passed a law that stated that corporations that have more than five 
employees must insure their workers.727 
Since parliament knew that the Guardian Council would veto any 
Labour Law that included the heavy involvement of the state, the draft of the 
Labour Law began with the same clause mentioned above.728 Since 
corporations were using public services offered by the state, they must agree 
to the conditions put forward in the Labour Law if the wish to continue using 
these services. Yet, even with this condition, the Guardian Council rejected 
the law. They stated that the new law contradicted the laws of Islam. This led 
to a protracted series of letters from both the parliament and the Guardian 
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Council to Ayatollah Khomeini.729 Khomeini sided with the parliament, stating 
that such conditions were within the bounds of Islamic law. The Guardian 
Council was still not convinced and refused to allow the law to pass. It was 
here that Khomeini emphasised his concept of wilāyat al-faqīh al-muṭlaq 
where the jurist would have the same powers of the Prophet and Imam to 
bring about change to Islamic law. In this vein, the Expediency Council was 
created, and the Labour Law was passed.730 
This new draft of the labor was only feasible due to the direct 
involvement of workers. Because of their unaccredited expertise as workers 
they better understood how a law based solely on personal contracts would 
be detremental to their well being. The protests of workers against the first 
draft of the Labour law sparked a series of events that brought about a 
reevaluation of many aspects of Islamic law, such as the validity of the 
concept of the concept of ujrat in employment, the limited power of secondary 
contractual conditions (sharṭ ḍimn al-‘aqd), the powers of the Wilayat al-Faqīh, 
and also led to the development of the Expediency Council. 
This case clearly shows the necessity of incorporating unaccredited 
expertise in the process of ijtihād. The expertise that they had gained as 
workers in a modern industrial society gave them awareness into the 
ramifications of the Labour Law. This was an insight that the expert team 
originally assigned to draft the Labour Law did not have. Incorporating the 
expertise of these workers clearly leads to an epistemic gain. The 
ramifications of these changes to Islamic law are still reverberating in Shi’i 
jurisprudence. 
Family Law 
There were a lot of modern changes that were brought forth in the 
Shah’s family law. These changes were highly criticised by the scholars at the 
time. After the revolution these laws were initially revoked, but were later 
reincorporated into the constitution. This was done in part due to the active 
protest of women. This section will look at how these changes were brought 
about and we’ll try to look at the reasoning behind these changes. 
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There were two sets of reforms that were brought about doing the reign 
of Mohmmad Reza Shah that were know as the Family Protection Laws.731 
The first reforms were enacted in 1967, and this was with 23 articles and one 
note. The new laws stated that it was mandatory to register your marriage and 
your divorce. New courts were also established for dealing with a variety of 
different familial disputes and these courts had judges presiding over them. 
One of the major changes was the change to divorce. Divorce had to be done 
with a court certificate and if it was done without a court certificate it was 
considered an offence and had 6 to 12 months jail time. It was mandatory 
therefore for all couples to appear at these courts. This is in contrast with the 
traditional Islamic law that states that men have a unilateral right to divorce. 
They were able to circumvent this law buy adding conditions to the marriage 
contract. All couples that wanted to marry would have to agree to this 
condition that the divorce could only be carried out by the courts. The second 
reform came about in 1975, with 19 notes.732 These extended the reforms 
from 1967. They increased the minimum age of marriage. The minimum age 
of mass for females rose from 15 to 18, and for males rose from 18 to 20. 
There were also changes to child custody by granting the courts more powers 
in divorce and deciding who gets custody of the child. Ayatollah Khomeini was 
a vocal critic of these laws. He states that any divorce conducted by these 
courts not be valid and that the previous contracts would still be in place. 
the ‘Family law’ (FPL), which has as its purpose the destruction of the Muslim family unit, 
is contrary to the ordinances of Islam. Those who have imposed [this law] and those who 
have voted [for it] are criminals from the stand-point of both the Shari’a and the law. The 
divorce of women divorced by court order is invalid; they are still married women, and if 
they marry again, they become adultresses. Likewise anyone who knowingly marries a 
woman so divorced becomes an adulterer, deserving the penalty laid down by the Shari’a. 
The issue of such unions will be illegitimate, unable to inherit, and subject to all other 
regulations concerning illegitimate offspring.733 
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After the Islamic Revolution the FPL rulings were initially overturned in 
practice, even though they were never officially repealed. The FPL courts 
were replaced by the Special Civil Courts. In the long term, however, many of 
these same ruling found there way back into the courts. Mir-Hosseini argues 
that, ultimately, there has been more continuity than break after the revolution, 
and that there were no deep theoretical arguments about the law, but that 
instead the new Islamic Republic was “able to achieve their objectives through 
changing its practice. ”734 
Some of these changes can be seen resonating within a few traditional 
works in fiqh, although they still have not made a large impact in traditionalist 
discussions on divorce. Ayatollah Muhaqiq-Damad, in his Barrisī Fiqhī Ḥuqūq-
e Khānivādeh, writes that in light of these legal changes, gaining a court 
approval can be seen as an extra condition on the requirements of divorce. 
This effectively limits unilateral divorce within Shi’i law.735 
Bayat in his analysis reiterates many of the points brought up by Mir-
Hosseini. They both emphasis the power of presence that women had after 
the revolution, and how this was aided by the intellectual movements 
happening at the same time. Bayat, however, does not go into detail 
regarding the direct impact that these non-movements had in terms of 
changes to family law. Instead, he paints a rather broad picture of all the 
changes that occurred because of these non-movements which also include 
changes to family law. 
There have been multiple causes at play as to why the laws on divorce 
after the revolution were eventually changed. One of these reasons for the 
change has been the non-credited expertise of women that was gained 
through the very experience of going through a divorce. Ziba Mir-Hosseini 
writes how the changes in law where in part due to the protest of women in 
the newly established courts immediately after the revolution. She writes that 
when she visited these courts in 1985 “women were insistent on voicing their 
discontent; some used every occasion to remind the Islamic judge of the 
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injustice of a system which could afford them no protection.”736 She quotes an 
example of one women’s reaction during her divorce court: 
Is this how women are honoured in the Islamic Republic? Is this how Islam rewards 
motherhood? Is this the justice of ‘Ali that he can throw me out just because he has found 
a younger wife? Where do I go now? Who is going to take care of me? What will become 
of my children?’’737 
Mir-Hosseini adds that judges would sympathise with these protests 
but would simple reply that it was the law and there was nothing that they 
could do. The experience of women in these courts was fed back to the 
women working in parliament. These women in part led a push towards more 
reformed laws which culminated in the Amendments to Divorce Regulations in 
1992. These new laws brought back many of the same rulings of the older 
FPL, such as limiting a man’s right to divorce, and the need of arbitration.738 
Asghar Schirazi in his analysis of the Iranian Constitution also states 
that the protests of women led to legal changes. He writes that the pressure of 
women was great, that it even led Ayatollah Khomeini to modify his rulings.739 
He then goes on to echo Mir Hosseini’s position and states that the these 
movements were able to bring about legal reforms.740 
Louise Halper as well emphasises the use of knowledge gained by 
unaccredited expertise in rethinking Iranian family. She compares these 
changes to Legal Realism. Although Legal Realism covers a broad array of 
stances towards jurisprudence, Halper has found similarities between the 
events surrounding the family law and Legal Realism in the emphasis that 
jurisprudence should be informed by social knowledge. By social knoweldege 
she means the inclusion of laypersons as discussed above. She argues that 
this is precisely what has been happening with this case of family law: 
Here I want to focus on just one part of what I have said about Legal Realism, namely, that 
the making of law can/should be informed by social knowledge. Some of the Realists were 
of the view that social knowledge was also scientific and thus determinate; that there was 
indeed an answer to social problems, both definite and value-free. Lawmaking is, in this 
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view, an abstracted version of administration. It is in this sense that I think one might 
speak of legal realism in post-revolutionary Iran: that is, there is a visible attempt to make 
law that is responsive to social needs. Because of the commitment to Shari`a, this law is 
not being “made” in the legislative sense, yet its interpretation is taking place within a 
legislative forum and the consequence of this legislative reinterpretation is a substantial 
shift in its application.741 
Bayat, Mir-Hosseini, and Halper all agree that the lived experience of 
women that went through the divorce courts, and the feedback that they gave, 
brought about a change to Iranian family law. It is a change that even 
traditionally minded scholars such as Mohaqiq-Damad have acknowledged. It 
could be argued, therefore, that by incorporating the experiences of these 
women has led to an epistemic gain for legal scholars. This epistemic gain 
has contributed to the process of ijtihād which has moved the ḥukm al-ẓahirī 
even further along. The reverse can also be true. That by ignoring the lived 
experiences of these women we have not fulfilled the process of inquiry to its 
fullest. That is to say that the process of ijtihād would be incomplete. This 
could in turn make any ruling that does not take into consideration these lived 
experiences as questionable. 
Modarrasi and the Incorporation of Unaccredited 
Expertise 
The argument that the experience of laypersons should be included in 
the process of ijtihād has lately been picked up by at least one the 
contemporary scholars. Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi al-Modarresi, in his 
reconception of fiqh argues that the involvement of individuals and civil 
society is important for the establishment of fiqh. He argues that individuals 
have a level of expertise that must be incorporated in the process of ijtihād. 
Moddarisi comes from the traditional ḥawzah background and currently claims 
himself to be a marja` al-taqlīd with many followers across the world but 
especially within the Gulf states. 
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Modarresi is arguing for the inclusion of the broader public in the 
process of ijtiḥād through the use of shūrās, councils. He notes that these 
shūrās represent an accumulated experience, al-khibra al-mutrākimah.742 One 
of the reasons that Modarresi takes this stance is based on epistemological 
grounds. He argues that by including a variety of people in these shūrās has 
an epistemic gain, and that it is possible reach better conclusions to difficult 
questions.743 Beloushi in his analysis of Modarrasi’s opinion on shūrā, 
describes how it is based no the principle of ahl al-khibrah as discussed 
above.744 He similarly cites the discussion of lexicographers. 
The second reason that Modarresi defends the use of shūrās is 
because of legitimacy. He argues that once a ruling has been brought about 
through the use of the council and democratic participation of the people, that 
ruling will be seen as more legitimate. This closely echoes the arguments put 
in the first half this thesis about internalization.745 
Modarresi places the concept of shūrā as one of the core processes in 
which rulings are derived. As a close observer of the events that have 
unfolded after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, he has likely been 
influenced by the events which described above. Arguably, there is a better 
appreciation for the complexities of law, and the need to make use of as many 
different types of expertise as possible. 
Theory But Not Practice 
There is ample evidence that unaccredited expertise has an epistemic 
gain, and given this epistemic gain, it should be incorporated into the process 
of ijtiḥād. The role of unaccredited expertise within the sciences is gaining 
importance, and the case studies in Iranian law show how unaccredited 
expertise as brought about a more nuanced understanding of Islamic law. 
It is through this unaccredited expertise that the individual can express 
their autonomy. The accumulation of what seem to be ordinary life 
                                                        
742Muḥammad Taqī al- Mudarrisī, Al-Tashrīʿ Al-Islāmī: Manāhijuhu Wa-Maqāṣiduhu, vol. 
2 (Teharn: Iran: Dār Intishārārt Mudarrisī, 2002), 253; Beloushi, The Theory of Maqāsid, 
202 -205. 
743Ibid., 2:255.  
744 Beloushi, The Theory of Maqāsid, 202 -205. 
745 Ibid. 
experiences lead to an understanding of society and circumstances that 
exceeds even those who are deemed to be experts. By recognizing that the 
inclusion of autonomous individuals in the process of inquiry will help us to 
reach the truth, will hopefully bar us from using autonomy as merely a means 
of control. The concept of unaccredited expertise helps to give credibility to 
the autonomy of individuals. 
This does not mean, however, that current methods of ijtiḥād do 
incorporate unaccredited expertise. If anything, the amount of protests that 
were required to challenge a ruling is evidence that current methods of ijtiḥād 
do not take unaccredited expertise into consideration. The topic of discussion 
thus far has been about the epistemic gain of unaccredited expertise and 
there has been no discussion about the best approach to incorporating this 
expertise into the process of ijtiḥād. 
Modarresi has presented a very general framework for incorporating 
unaccredited expertise into ijtiḥād, with the use of shūrās, but he is practically 
alone in this endeavour. This endeavour would require further work, similar to 
the work being done in the sciences by Philip Kitcher, Helen Longino, and 
Harry Collins. 
Conclusion 
Autonomy is one of the main social changes that has arisen out of 
modernity. The radical social changes brought about by modernity and 
urbanisation have meant that people have the capacity to develop their own 
identities, values, and courses of action. Simultaneously, there are values and 
moral beliefs held by religion that require conformity from their adherents. 
These moral values are seen to be the production of elites in distant lands 
that derive rulings from books written in the distant past. 
I have tried to show how it is possible to bring these two concepts 
together through the understanding of discursive selves. This study set out to 
argue that autonomy is important for Shi’i thought for both the internalisation 
of tradition and the formation of tradition. This argument required the 
clarification of two points. The first clarification was there was an overlapping 
consensus between Shi’i thought and the requirements of autonomy, namely 
freewill and rationality. The second was a clarification of the definition of 
autonomy and the necessity of understanding autonomy as social-historically 
embedded.  
In regards to the first issue, I tried to show autonomy and Shi’i 
philosophical anthropology as traditionally understood overlap. Thus, I 
compared the three distinct attributes of autonomy – freedom, rationality, and 
a natural disposition towards good –with the concepts of free-will, the 
intelligibility of good and evil, and fiṭra found within Shi’i thought. 
Autonomy requires individuals to have the internal freedom necessary 
to define their own projects or values, which captures the general sense of 
“self-rule.” Shi’i thought has incorporated this understanding of “self-rule” 
under the concept of ikhtiyār or free will. The Shi’i position on free will 
developed from early debates between various theological schools around the 
issue of free will and predestination, with the Shi’a siding with the proponents 
of free will. It has since become part of the standard conception of Shi’i 
philosophical anthropology.  
Autonomy also requires the ability to rationally distinguish between 
morally right and wrong actions. This is a notion that was debated early on in 
Shi’ism under the concept of the intelligibility of good and evil (al-ḥusn wa al-
qubḥ al-‘aqliyyan). Early Islamic theologians argued whether good and evil 
could be understood through rational deliberation, with Shi’a theologians 
arguing in the affirmative. This concept has become central not only to Shi’i 
philosophical anthropology but also grounds the argument for the use of 
rationality within Uṣūlī legal theory. Moreover, autonomy also includes the 
notion that individuals are naturally inclined toward the good. Not only are 
they free and rationally capable to make moral choices, but are also are 
inclined to do so. This overlaps with the notion of fitrā, or a good innate 
nature.  
Yet, while there are concepts within Shi’i thought that support 
autonomy, the concept of taqlīd as defined within the Uṣūlī tradition seems to 
negate autonomy. I have tried to argue that this conflict is not as great as first 
imagined. This was done in two ways. The first consisted in defining the 
scope of taqlīd and stating that taqlīd is only possible for issues relating 
religious practice, and does not cover the fundamental beliefs of the religion. 
Taqlīd is not a viable approach for believing in the uṣul al-dīn. Moreover, I 
argue that taqlīd is a type of epistemic dependence; one is dependent on 
another’s opinion about the moral status of certain actions.  Being dependent 
on others does not deny one’s autonomy. This is a point I reiterate through 
the use of empirical studies conducted by the proponents of SDT. 
I then try to provide the intellectual background for my arguments for 
the discursive self by examining the works of Mohammad Mojtahed 
Shabestari. I show that Shabestari has an individualistic understanding of 
autonomy and that his understanding of autonomy contracts the very 
philosophical hermeneutical tradition that he is borrowing from. I show that 
Gadamer, the most influential philosopher working within this said tradition, 
puts forward an understanding of the self that is situated in a tradition. 
Gadamer revives the importance of tradition and authority and states their 
importance for moral philosophy. Simultaneously, he does not deny the very 
autonomy of the individual. This begins my analysis as to how one can be 
situated within a tradition, dependent on the opinion of others, and still be 
considered autonomous. 
I further delve into this understanding of the discursive self by 
examining the contemporary works of various philosophers that have 
discussed the issue of philosophical anthropology. This was done to show 
how a consensus is forming within Western philosophical anthropology that 
the self is in some sense situated within a tradition or culture. I showed how 
even liberal philosophers, the strand of philosophy most associated with 
individualistic understandings of autonomy, had move towards this new 
understanding of the self.  
This then sets the ground to examine how a discursive understanding 
of the can be brought into reflective equilibrium within Shi’i thought. The first 
half of my argument was that autonomy was important for the internalisation 
of religion. Given that Shi’i thought already incorporated the concepts of free 
will and rationality, it was important to tackle concepts that would justify 
interference in one’s autonomy. This led to a discussion of the concept of 
forbidding wrong. The concept of forbidding wrong states that it is an 
obligation to try and deter individuals from wrong actions and belief’s and 
promote good actions and beliefs. 
 I argued that the concept of forbidding wrong and autonomy where not 
necessarily in conflict. One of the conditions of forbidding evil is the condition 
of efficacy. This condition of efficacy was established quite early on in Shi’i 
history and continues to be a necessary condition. The condition of efficacy 
requires one to be sure that one’s action will be probably effective in 
forbidding a wrong or promoting a good. Moreover, if one’s attempt at 
forbidding wrong leads instead to promoting wrong, then one is not permitted 
to continue with the said attempt. Beheshti is presented as an Islamist Shi’i 
thinker that valued the positive role of autonomy in internalising faith and 
tradition. 
There is empirical evidence that denying autonomy and controlling 
environments will generally fail this condition. The evidence for this argument 
was given through the studies in psychology conducted under the rubric of 
Self Determination Theory. Controlling environments, those that denied 
autonomy, hampered the internalisation of beliefs and practices. In reverse, 
there is also empirical evidence that the most effective means of motivation, 
and the internalisation of beliefs and values, is through autonomy supportive 
contexts. 
Thus, the most effective means of meeting the condition of efficacy 
required for forbidding wrong is by supporting an individual’s autonomy. 
Attempts that deny an individual’s autonomy are not effective and therefore do 
not meet the criteria of efficacy.  Moreover, SDT makes a clear delineation 
between autonomy and independence. They argue that one can be 
dependent on another and still be autonomous. This therefore negates the 
arguments that taqlīd, as a type of epistemic dependence, would necessarily 
conflict with one’s autonomy. 
The second half of my argument deals with the fact that autonomy is 
more than just the internalisation of tradition, but also about the formation of 
tradition. Individuals through their own life experiences reach conclusions that 
can be at odds with authority. I argue that these experiences lead to an 
unaccredited expertise, and that incorporating this type of expertise in the 
process of ijtihād leads to an epistemic gain. Thus the experiences and 
opinions of autonomous individuals should not be seen as extrinsic to tradition 
but a part of the discursive tradition. 
My argument begins by developing upon the concept of discursive 
tradition as put forward by Talal Asad. By stating that tradition is discursive 
means that tradition is developed through a broad debate and deliberation. A 
part of this discursiveness is the embodiment of contestation and conflict. This 
understanding of tradition as discursive creates a space for the participation of 
the layperson. 
I then argue for a more formal appreciation of the positive contribution 
that the layperson can make in terms in the process of ijtihād. Firstly, I argue 
that ijtihād does not imply that jurists necessarily reach the truth in their 
understanding of Islamic law. Ijtihād is simply the conclusion that a trained 
jurist reaches after finishing a period of inquiry. This is evident in the 
differentiation made between the ḥukm al-ẓahiri and the ḥukm al-wāqi‘ī in 
Uṣūlī thought. This understanding of ijtihād also matches the understanding of 
truth put forward by the Pragmatists, who also argue that truth is a conclusion 
reached at the end of an inquiry. 
Next, I argue that Shi’i legal theory has always taken into consideration 
the role of experts within the process of ijtihād. This is evident in the position 
the appeal to the ahl al-khibra, the people of expertise. The reliance upon 
expertise is such an integral part of Shi’i legal theory that it underpins the 
necessity of taqlīd itself. Thus, if one is said to have truly reached the end of 
inquiry, meaning one has truly exercised one’s ijtihād, then one would have to 
include the opinions of experts. 
Finally, I argue that laypersons also have gained a type of expertise, 
what I come to label as unaccredited expertise. Laypersons develop this type 
of expertise, not through formal training in accredited institutions, but through 
their daily life experiences. This type of expertise goes beyond the formal 
expertise provided by institutions.  
Thus, if ijtihād is a ruling that a jurist reaches after the end of an 
inquiry, and the reliance on experts is necessary in this inquiry, and 
laypersons have a type of expertise, then ijtihād is said to have truly taken 
place if the opinions of the relevant laypersons have been taken into 
consideration. If a jurist reaches a conclusion without incorporating the 
relevant laypersons, it means that a type of expertise has not been consulted, 
and the process of ijtihād has not been exhausted to its full extent. 
The ultimate impact of this dissertation is that Shi’i faith has much to 
gain by paying greater attention to autonomy. In 1954, William Golding 
published the novel Lord of the Flies about a group of young boys whose 
airplane crashes into an uninhabited Island and who then try to govern 
themselves, leading to horrible results. It is a tale of how uncontrolled freedom 
releases the savagery within us. This I think is the fate that many assume will 
come of being autonomy supportive. 
Far from fears of some sort of Lord of the Flies scenario in which chaos 
would reign supreme, providing support for autonomy can help individuals 
internalise religion and provides a motivation to perform actions that religion 
would require from them. It is important that one does equate autonomy with 
independence and freedom from structure. Moreover, the feedback from 
individuals lived experiences can help to decipher what is morally right and 
wrong. Suppressing autonomy would only provide the opposite. It would 
require a controlling context that could seriously demotivate religious action 
and stop the process of internalisation. It would also deny scholars access to 
crucial type of expertise and lead to decisions that could potentially harm 
followers of the faith. There is much to be gained from autonomy, and much to 
be lost by its denial. 
My research into autonomy, however, has led me to reconsider the 
central role of autonomy within philosophical and religious thought. It seems 
that discursiveness is a more central theme than autonomy itself. The 
research can in short be said to defend Brandom’s claim that we are at heart 
“makers and takers of reasons…”746 The anthropology of Islam has so far 
been focused on the discursive aspect of tradition. Yet, tradition is only 
discursive because we ourselves are discursive. It is through discourse with 
others that we come to develop our identities and shape our beliefs. 
We begin our inquiry from the starting point from which we find 
ourselves, equipped with the tools of rationality that we have learned through 
the tradition we are embedded, and through which we evaluate and revaluate 
new and old beliefs. The formation of our own identities are as discursive as 
the tradition which we internalise. For surely the reason tradition is discursive 
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is because we, as participants, come to deny, accept, or modify various 
aspects of the said tradition. 
Authority is therefore understood within this discursive practice. The 
ruling of a marjā` is not authoritative because of the status of the marjā`. It is 
authoritative because others have come to believe that the ruling given is the 
best possible conclusion after a state of inquiry. Even here, the ruling of a 
fatwa can be seen as the beginning, and not the end, of discourse. For after a 
marjā’s ruling is given, the discussion about the issue truly begins. It is after a 
period of discussion and discourse that ruling becomes internalised, rejected, 
or modified. Ayatollah Khomeini’s ruling on labor law, and the subsequent 
discourse that followed, is an explicit example of this. 
If discourse is more fundamental than autonomy to humanity, then it 
would require that we re-examine our social institutions. If discourse is 
fundamental to both our identities and to the discovery of truth, then social 
institutions should be developed to safeguard, and improve, this discursive 
practice. I shall return to this point below. 
Limits of the Research 
The major limits of this research have been in regards to the 
ramifications of autonomy. While this study has dealt with the topic of 
internalisation and belief, it has not dealt with the topic of rejecting belief. The 
research on SDT where conducted in situations in which either there was no 
effective means of rejection, such as elementary school students, or that there 
were no penalties for exit, such as businesses. The situation would be more 
troublesome for Shi’i thought given the traditionally harsh punishments for 
apostasy, irtidād.  
There are different types of apostasy with different types of 
punishment. Apostasy is categorised into two different types, fiṭrī and millī. A 
fitrī apostate as an individual that was born into a Muslim family but converted 
out of the religion. A millī apostate is an individual that was not born into a 
Muslim family, converted to Islam, but then converted back out. The penalty 
for male fiṭrī apostates is death without the possibility of repentance, and the 
punishment for male millī apostates is imprisonment, but they are given the 
opportunity to repent. Females are not executed, but are imprisoned in both 
cases.747 
 The punishments in general do pose a challenge for autonomy. 
Although this challenge is arguably more in paper than in practice, and 
studies in regards to the application of these laws highlight the difficulties 
faced in their enforcement.748 Yet, any type of analysis on the topic would 
require an intellectual history of the topic as well as its current practice in 
Muslim majority countries. The concept of apostasy is also closely tied to the 
political structures of the Muslim majority country. Apostasy laws are 
stipulated in governmental constitutions and carried out by official courts.749 
An analysis of the apostasy would thus also require an understanding of the 
political climate and the political structures that allow for the punishments of 
apostasy to be carried out. 
The reason that apostasy was not discussed in this study is precisely 
because of the depth of intellectual history and analysis it involves. However, 
this current study does highlight the negative ramifications that apostasy laws 
can have for religious faith. Most rational arguments, as opposed to textual 
arguments, in defence of apostasy laws state that they laws are necessary in 
order to safe guard the faiths of others. The current study provides evidence 
that counters this argument by showing that controlling context can in fact 
hinder internalisation. An argument could be made that the benefits of 
autonomy out way the negative impact of apostasy laws. This, however, 
requires its own research. 
The topic of apostasy does lead to another limitation of this research, in 
the sense that apostasy laws are generally carried out by the state. The 
question therefore arises about the relationship between the concept of 
autonomy and the state. This is not just in a negative sense, such as 
understanding that the state can impede autonomy, but in a positive sense as 
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well, one in which state structures can enhance autonomy. One of the issues 
covered under the discussion of SDT is that the benefits of autonomy are best 
realised with the use of some type of structure. Yet, this research does not go 
into the types of structures that could best make use of autonomy. This would 
require a discussion of the types of formats that would help to internalise 
religion, and ways in which information could be exchanged so that it could 
help in the formation of tradition. This would also entail the establishment of 
political institutions that could help to facilitate these goals. Each of categories 
by themselves would require a separate analysis. 
The issue of political institutions, however, does seem to have an 
influential factor on both the internalisation and formation of tradition. It is hard 
to imagine how smaller institutions can help facilitate these goals if they are 
working in an environment that undermines them. On the other hand, one 
wonders how these political institutions can be established if the people 
themselves have not established the norms that required by these political 
institutions. 
Further Research 
There are two possible paths for the future of this research. The first 
has to with the establishment of institutions that allow for autonomy supportive 
contexts, and the second is research into the issue of authenticity. I briefly 
touched on this notion autonomy supportive institutions above. The full use of 
autonomy supportive contexts can only be seen in an environment that allows 
it flourish. This would require not just the use of autonomy supportive contexts 
in smaller settings such as the classroom or mosques and youth groups, but 
the lager national context as well. This would include the arrangement of 
political and social institutions so that it could bring about the most 
constructive use of autonomy. 
What I have in mind is something similar to Habermas’ project in which 
he begins by describing his discursive communication theory and then tries to 
build political institutions around that theory.750 This would be a different 
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undertaking within Shi’i thought because there are different social and 
religious considerations. There are different values that must be brought into 
reflective equilibrium. This would most likely require a decision to be made 
early on about whether one should try and develop a political and thin 
conception of autonomy that can be used to develop and overlapping 
consensus, or as a comprehensive doctrine such that it would require a 
substantial organisation of different concepts within the web of thought. That 
is to say would these political institutions be rested on deeply thought-out 
concepts that would require citizens to, in a sense, invest in this overarching 
paradigm, or rather should they be developed on thinner concepts that a 
variety of different people can come to agree upon. I am clearly uses Rawls’ 
distinction between political and comprehensive doctrines as he lays it out in 
his book Political Liberalism. 
I am partial to the development of political institutions based on political 
concepts mostly because it seems like a more feasible project. My experience 
in Iran and discussing the thought of many reformists with the general public, 
is that it is too much of commitment to for individuals to incorporate a 
comprehensive doctrine when they have more practical needs at hand. The 
instrumental use of autonomy that I have put forward in this study can help in 
developing political concepts necessary for these political institutions. My 
arguments for the importance of autonomy and autonomy supportive contexts 
ultimately focused on the benefits that autonomy can have for Shi’i thought, 
and it was done in way that extended already grounded principles within Shi’i 
thought. It would be difficult to present autonomy as a completely political 
concept, as the examples I used early on in regards to the concept of 
rationality amongst the adherents of the maktab-e tafkīk. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to make concepts thinner than others, and it would be these thinner 
concepts that could gain more of a consensus. In a broad sense, I would 
agree with Rawls’ notion of the necessity of thin political concepts, but simply 
limit how thin they could possible get without losing substance. 
The second possible type of research is about the notion of 
authenticity. By that I mean the current trend, and ability, of individuals to 
develop a conception of religion that suits them. I am not trying to imply that 
there is a strive towards a Salafi type of personal ijtihād but that there is a lot 
of reflection that goes one before an individual truly internalises a ruling or 
belief. This was discussed under SDT’s understanding of the organismic 
understanding of the self; that it takes beliefs and values are internalised by 
making space for them amongst other beliefs and values. Yet, what ultimately 
ends up being internalised differs amongst individuals. It is this process that I 
label as authenticity. Beyond legal rulings, people’s conceptions of God, the 
Imams, faith and variously other theological concepts differ, and are impart a 
reflection of life experiences and a result of this active internalisation. It would 
be wrong to assume that everyone will internalise beliefs and actions the 
same way, but rather that this process of internalisation will lead to variety of 
religious understandings that will ultimately overlap on many of the important 
topics. 
Charles Taylor discusses this point directly when he labels the current 
individuation of religious practices as “the age of authenticity.”751 Jocelyne 
Cesari reaches a similar conclusion in her study of Muslims in the West, as 
does Fariba Adelkhah in her study of religious practices in Iran. 752 My own 
personal experience with Muslim practice both in Iran, and the West highlights 
this trend, as will be explained below. 
This is not to say that each person develops an understanding of 
religion that is vastly different from others, but that there is more variety in 
religious understanding that is emerging from the bottom up. In my own 
interviews with adherents of Shi’ism I often come across the deeply personal 
justifications that each individual has for why they are religious and how they 
conceive religion. I have been a part of online social groups where intricate 
details of basic Islamic laws are discussed to a good degree of sophistication. 
As an example, I have been part of an online community where a mother that 
was breastfeeding her child asked about the limits of fasting if fasting where to 
harm her ability to give milk to the child. Although everyone in that community 
where religious, and most of them did do taqlīd, the debate quickly turned 
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technical when legal maxims such as lā ḍarar (no harm) and tayasur (ease) 
where brought up. One of the members of this community later told me that 
the scholars make Islamic law seem so difficult but that ultimately it is not 
rocket science and that even they could derive Islamic law. This response is 
in part do to lack of communication with the offices of many of the marāja‘. A 
personal communication with the office is generally quite short as the offices 
are overrun with inquiries. This leaves many feeling that either the office did 
not understand their situation or that their answer prompted even more 
questions. An answer from the office will generally go through a communal 
critique, as the one cited above, where individuals try to tease out the 
meaning and implication of the office’s response. 
 
Yet, beyond content, the justifications will differ amongst individuals as 
well. I have interviewed various believers who state that imān is simply a 
matter of faith and not rational belief. They are not a part of the maktab-e 
tafkīk but neither do they ascribe to the uṣūlī notion that faith must be 
rationally grounded. They justify belief in completely personal grounds, and for 
reasons that others would consider unfounded. Yet, if one where to try and 
deny them this reasoning it might lead them to reject faith rather than 
grounding their arguments in what from a certain perspective be considered 
more epistemically sound arguments. 
This notion of authenticity in justification might present a problem for 
the model of autonomy as motivation presented in this study. The reason is 
that the individual is motivated to pursue religion and has internalised religious 
belief and actions but for, what some might say, the wrong reasons. Given 
that the current uṣūlī approach to theology requires that religious belief be 
based on certainty, one wonders what the view of such beliefs would be. The 
question in general is to what degree is room to be made for the notion of 
authenticity. 
Overall, understanding the concept of the discursive self and how it fits 
in with Shi’i tradition helps provide a framework for which various different 
aspects of moral and political philosophy can develop. It makes it possible to 
understand issues within the family in terms of childhood development, 
especially in regards to moral and spiritual development. It also allows for the 
development of political philosophy, particularly in regards to how secular 
political institutions can fit with religious institutions.  
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